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ABSTRACT 
A distinction is ,commonly drawn between "Content" 
and "Distance" models of similarity. The set theoretic 
interpretation of Content models is developed using 
Restle's (1959, 1961) structures. Zt is found that 
for spaces in which all dimensions are prothetic, a 
normalised type of model, similar to many vector 
content models, is correct: n for x,yelR , B > 0, 
D 1(3 (x,y) 
or 
D 26 (x,y) = 
0: IXi-Yi' 13)1/13 
CE 'xi +y i I a) 17 a 
For spaces in which all dimensions are metathetic with 
no quantitative variation ("equal-measure metathetic") 
a Minkowski Distance model is correct. Different models 
are necessary for less simple cases. 
The properties of the D la and D 2(3 distance 
functions are investigated. They have most of the 
invariance properties of the Content models and do not 
in general obey the triangle inequality or have 
, 
additivityon straight lines. Their Eosimilarity contours 
may be non-convex, and they disobey the additivity, 
subtractivity and decomposability properties set out 
by Beals, Krantz and Tversky. 
Two similarity models of category scaling are 
sugges~ed. Both predict the correct shape of the 
category-scale function for both prothetic and 
metathetic continua. 
The similarity models are applied to some data 
of Ekman (1965)~ they give an excellent fit and 
correctly predict the nature of the respective continua. 
A Monte Carlo multidimensional scaling study using 
the D 18 and D 28 models showed that the normalised types 
of model are quite incompatible with the distance 
types of model: scaling of one type by the other gave 
low stress, highly interpretable solutions which were 
nonetheless quite invalid. An experiment of Eisler's 
is interpreted in the light of this result and of an 
auxilliary experiment. 
It is concluded that, while the models have 
several weaknesses, they provide a rational basis, with 
prima facie empirical validity, for future similarity 
modelling. Two distinct types of model are identified 
- the normalised and the distance types - which are 
mathematically and psychologically incompatible. This 
demands a review of the validity of analyses of 
previous similarity experiments. 

1. 
CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is concerned with 
psychological similarity, psychological distance, 
and the unsatisfactory nature of some of the 
present mathematical models of these concepts. 
Modern psychology has increasingly recognised 
the concepts as important, even central, to the 
understanding or description of a wide range of 
psychological phenomena, including choice, 
stimulus generalisation and confusion, and 
discrimination. Probably reflecting this 
importance, direct similarity and dissimilarity 
judgments have been increasingly used, and a 
school built around various attempts to model 
these independently. Whether similarity in all 
these contexts is the same thing is a question for 
study, but from them, a rough picture of what 
psychological similarity and psychological distance 
are like seems to be ~rging. To get a clearer 
understanding of what we are talking about however, 
it seems desirable to put this into h.j.storical 
context. We therefore give a very short and very 
rough sketch of the way the main models of 
similarity and dissimilarity have developed. 
2. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The early history of the use of mathematics 
in Psychology is largely the early history of 
psychophysical scaling. The early psychophysicists, 
from Fechner (who coined the term "psychophysics" 
- see, for example, Boring, 1950) onwards, were, 
like all psychophysicists, interested in the 
relationships between physical magnitudes and the 
corresponding sensations in the organism. They 
were, implicitly or explicitly, trying to find 
a function, hopefully of a general nature, 
relating the particular physical magnitude to its 
corresponding psychological sensation, and in 
doing so construct a scale for measuring sensations 
on that continuum. 
The words "that continuum" indicate one of 
the two most obvious features which differentiate 
the earlier psychophysicists from their successors: 
unidimensionality. Both in the interests of 
simplicity and because of lack of suitable models, 
methods and computing tec~niques for analysing 
responses to multidimensional stimulus sets, early 
psychophysicists kept to the paradigm of holding 
all but one variable constant and studying each 
such variable individually. One of the major 
contributions of L.L. Thurstone (e.g. Thurstone, 
1947) to psychophysics was to breach this 
barricade to the development of multidimensional 
3. 
scaling. Thurstone not only gave a rational basis 
for models of most areas of psychophysics, but 
also developed the techniques of Factor Analysis 
to make use of judgments made on a multidimensional 
set of stimuli within the context of his models. 
It should be noted though, that in his 
models, and in his use of Factor Analysis, 
Thurstone automatically assumed a particular way 
of combining the various dimensions or continua 
into a single quantity which underlay the 
observer I s behaviour. This "combination ruleR 
was the Euclidean distance: the distance of 
ordinary geometry, the distance of everyday life. 
It was chosen for its familiarity and mathematically 
pleasant nature rather than its plausibility as a 
model of any behaviour. In Factor Analysis, Thurstone 
neither used it explicitly (he used instead correlation 
coefficients which are closely related to Euclidean 
distance), nor, therefore, did he put it forward as 
representing a specific psychological construct, such 
as, for example, dissimilarity. It was left to 
Richardson (1938), his colleagues and following workers 
to begin the task of explicating what the distance 
function really meant. 
The second feature that clearly differentiates 
the earlier psychophysics from the more modern 
4. 
is its experimental methods. Under the (possibly 
correct) assumption that sensations are not directly 
measurable, virtually all judgments asked of 
observers were indirect ones: those of comparing 
differences and magnitudes, discriminating between 
magnitudes, detecting magnitudes. They were never 
asked how different or similar two magnitudes 
were, or how great a magnitude was. Starting with 
Fechner, and up to and including Thurstone, indirect 
methods were almost invariably used. The work of 
S.S. Stevens and his colleagues in the 1950's 
however, has brought about the recognition of 
direct judgment methods in psychophysics as a 
probably valid and almost certainly useful technique. 
They produced a specific model for psychophysics 
- that the sensation was a fixed power of the 
physical value on each continuum - and a 
distinction between prothetic (intensive) and 
metathetic (substitutive) continua, which appear 
to have somewhat different psychophysics(e.g. Stevens, 
1957; Stevens and Galanter, 1957). 
From the late 1950's the direct estimation 
techniques were applied extensively to similarity 
judgments (mainly by the Scandinavian school led 
by GQsta Ekman) with reliable results (e.g. Ekman 
and Sjoberg, 1965). 
5. 
1.2 MULTIDLMENSIONAL SCALING AND SIMcrLARITY 
MOaewn p.yebophysics thus has two major 
characteristics which distinguish it from both 
its beginnings and its not-too-distant pasta the 
ability to deal with .al~i41men.ioDal stimuli, and 
the general acceptance and use of direc_ estimation 
methods. 
Multidimensional psychophysics is, to a 
large extent, identified with the use of the 
powerful multidimensional scaling algorithms 
developed in the early 1960's by R.N. Bhepard and 
J.B. Kruskal (Shepard, 1962a, b; Kruskal, 1964., b). 
These are, in a sense, generalisations of the 
earlier factor analysis techniques as used 
(first by Ri chard son) to find the factors underlying 
the similarity or dissimilarity between stimuli, 
often found by direct similarity or dissimilarity 
estimation. Thus the modern multidimensional scaling 
algorithms were to at least some extent designed 
with the direct judgment technology in mind - but 
more of this later. However, one of their main 
oontributions, leading largely from Shepard's 
(1957, 1958a, b) earlier work on stimulus 
generalisation, was that their structure made 
explicit some of the modelling assumptions neoessary 
in any multidimensional scaling technique. 
Firstly they recognised that the Euclidean 
distanoe was merely one of many possible 
6. 
distanoe functions. Its acceptance as a model 
of psychological distance was a matter for 
experimental verification just like any other 
model in psychology. Secondly, they made more 
explicit what the distance function meant 
psychologically and how it was to be used. The 
distanoe function was to represent, as Richardson 
had originally suggested, psychological distance. 
But whereas factor analysis assumed that psychological 
distance was a linear function of the distance 
function so that it could represent 
psychological distance and nothing else (unless 
fortuitously, or if the relationShip to 
psychological distance was known), the new 
algorithms assumed only monotonicity between 
psyoholoqical distance and the distance functi-on. 
Thus they could represent a wide range of 
similarity-related psychological phenomena - like 
probabilities of confusion, generalisation or 
discrimination, and of course similarity itself. 
As long as it was true that the behavioral measure 
in question was monotonic with dissimilarity, it 
could be represented by the distance function. 
7. 
This of course puts great importance on 
the form of the distance function being used for 
the modelling. Although the class of monotonic 
functions is a very general one, there still 
remain important restrictions on the form of 
the distance function used. This is the burden 
of the theory put forward by Beals, Krantz and 
TVersky (e.g. Deals, Krantz and Tversky, 1968). 
That multidimensional scaling works using only 
"any monotonic function" is a warning of this 
faot: it is restrictive enough to give a quite 
rigid solution for a given distance function. It 
may of course be possible, as suggested before, that 
similarity has a different mathematical form 
in different contexts: there is already a 
substantial body of evidence to suggest this, and 
we will be investigating further in subsequent 
chapters. But the gross form of the similarity 
or distance function in each such context will 
need to have specific features which may be 
different from those in other contexts. The distance 
functions commonly used at present may not have all 
the required "gross features". What these "gross 
features" are, we will go into shortly. 
8. 
1.3 DIRECT ESTIMATE MODELS OF SIMILARITY 
When looking for a good model of dissimilarity 
or similarity, the obvious place to go is not, as 
most multidimensional scaling techniques have. done, 
to a mathematical text on distance functions: 
mathematical traotability 1s a pleasant attribute, 
but should hardly be the critioal one. The obvious 
place to go is in the area of the seoond major 
oharaoteristio of modern psyohophysics: direot 
magnitude estimation; and in particular, 41~eo~ 
aJ.milU':I:tty or 41ut.atlU'i~r .81W1a~J.on. It seems 
strange that two major streams of modern 
psyohophysioal thought have barely interaoted 
in this obviously desirable manner. The Scandinavian 
psychophysical school and its adherents have 
built up a great variety of information on 
direct estimates of similarity. They have 
proposed a great variety of models for these 
estimates, (see for example, Sjoberg, 1973; 
Lund 1974a), many of whioh seem ad hoc and poorly 
tested, but all of which fit data well enough 
to give their "gross features" enough credibility 
to at least rival those of models used in 
noometric multidimensional scaling. As will be 
seen, some of these features are inconsistent with 
the models of multidimensional scaling, yet on one 
9. 
hand, the multidimensional scaling theorists and 
investigators have made no attempt to incorporate 
them into their algorithms, while on the other, 
the similarity estimation school appears to spend 
a large proportion of its effort trying to 
accommodate its results within the models of 
the multidimensional scaling algorithms. The 
cause may be technical problems (see Chapter 6) 
but it would seem worthwhile if such problems 
could be overcome. 
1.4 GROSS FEATURES OF SIMILARITY AND DISTANCE FUNCTIONS 
The models put forward by the direct 
similarity estimation school have been oalled 
~OGR~.n~· mca.18 (Ekman and Sjoberq, 1965), 
because of their set theoretic foundation, 
similarity being assumed to be the ratio of 
"common" to "total ll properties. A great variety 
of •• eh models have been put forward, all varying 
in their definitions of "oommon" and "total", 
and although they have almost always been tested 
in one special case, there are only three or four 
real contenders. We will not enumerate any of 
them at this point (see Chapter 2 and Lund, 1974a), 
but most have the following "gross features" that 
have some importance both psychologically and 
mathematically. 
10. 
Noting that the content models are usually 
defined only for non-negative values, and using 
the notation of Table 1.1 (P. 36), with ]Rn taken to 
represent psychological space, we have: 
n+ n+ For every x,ye:lR , ae:lR. , ae:iJR, 
o ~ $(x,y)! 1. 
$(x,x) = 1. 
$(x,y) = 1 ===>x = y. 
$(x,y) = $(y,x). 
$ (x+a,y+a) > $(x,y), a =I 6. 
$(ax,ay) = $(x,y) 
if Cl > o. 
$(x,y) = 0 
if x and y are on different axes. 
$(e,x) = O. 
(Sl) 
(82) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55)* 
(56) 
(S7) 
(S8) 
The -.:U.sumce aod&lsi' used in multidimensional 
scaling are generally the Minkowski distances 
given by 
n all< 
D (x,y) = ( L IXi - y.1 ) a , a > 1, 
i=l 1. 
*1 have yet to find a rigorous proof of this 
condition for all the important content models, 
but.E appears, via numerical examples, to be 
near enough for inclusion as ngross features". 
11. 
although others, usually variations on this, 
have been used, and many others suggested 
(e.g. Young, 1972, Shepard, 1964). The "gross 
features" of these have been thoroughly 
investigated mathematically by Tversky, Krantz 
and Beals (Beals and Krantz, 1967; Beals, 
Krantz and Tversky, 1968; Tversky and Krantz, 1970), 
who have in fact derived necessary and sufficient 
conditions on the ordering of pairs of objects 
(x,y) for them to exist. They have also 
done some work on testing these ordinal conditions 
experimentally. 
The "gross features" given here are somewhat 
different from those discussed by Beals, Krantz 
and Tversky, but they are chosen firstly because 
they correspond to those given for the content 
models of similarity, for which no Beals, Krantz 
and Tversky-type axiomatisation yet exists, and 
seoondly for the psychologically useful and 
intuitive interpretations accessible from them. 
They are less general than those of Beals, Krantz 
and Tversky but some of their more important 
conditions can be derived as sufficient conditions 
for ours. Ours do not claim to supplant theirs 
however. 
12. 
The features, corresponding to those given 
for the content models, are (using the same 
notation as before): 
, n n For every x, y, z£1R , a£lR , a£lR 
o ~ ID (x,y) < CID 
ID (x,x) == 0 
ID (x, y) == 0 
-
x = Y 
ID (x, y) = ID (y,x) 
ID (x+a,y+a) == D (x,y) 
ID (ax,ay) == lallD(x,y) 
The following property has no direct 
(Dl) 
(D2) 
(D3) 
(04) 
(D5) 
(D6) 
counterpart in most of the content models, but 
is nonetheless a mathematically very important 
one: 
ID (x,y) < ]I) (x,z) + ID (z,y) 
A distance function with properties 
01 - D4 and 07 is called a metric and should not 
be confused with the less general distance 
obeying all of the conditions 01 - 07. 
Beals, Krantz and Tversky note the internal 
additive nature of these distances (interdimensional 
13. 
additivity), the lack of interaction between 
dimensions (decomposability), and the fact that each 
dimension makes its contribution through a function 
of the difference between the values of the objects 
on that dimension (intradimensionalsubtractivity). 
If we let (rather loosely) xi = (O,O, ••• ,O,xi,Q, ••• ,Q) 
for any x = (xl,x2, ••• ,xi_1'Xi,xi+l, ••• ,xn)' then 
a necessary condition for interdimensional additivity 
is 
(08). 
05 is a necessary condition for intradimensional 
subtractivity and sufficient (as a special case) 
for a decomposability condition somewhat different 
from that of Beals, Krantz and Tversky. 
1.5 DISCUSSION OF THESE FEATURES 
1.5.1 Conditions 1 - 4 
Looking at these conditions in more detail, 
it is clear that conditions 1 - 4 are more in the 
nature of boundary and rather trivial regularity 
conditions than anything basic in the structure. 
Perhaps the only really notable feature is that 
similarity is bounded, both above and below, while 
distance, at least defined on an unbounded space, 
14. 
is only bounded below (condition 1). This will 
have a definite effect on the permissable forms of 
the transformation from one to the other. Since 
it is generally assumed that similarity (and 
distance) form a ratio scale, the absolute value 
of the upper bound in SI is not necessarily 
fixed, but is usually taken as unity for convenience. 
Conditions 2, 3 and 4 are usually merely 
assumed true: departures from 2 and 4 occur, but 
are not usually major enough to be significant. 
Conditions 3 of course, are not strictly true 
in all cases: if similarity is restricted by 
instruction or otherwise to only a subset of the 
attributes present (e.g. "Judge the similarity of 
the two objects with respect to their colour and 
size only", or, "when judging the similarity of 
these objects, ignore differences in colour"; 
both occur spontaneously in everyday life) then we 
may very well have two nonidentical Objects rated 
as totally similar. 
1.5.2 Condition 5 
It is conditions 5 and 6 that are the critical 
ones. 05, 56 and 06 all take the form of 
functional equations which greatly limit the possible 
forms of _ and lD. Conditions 5 relate to 
translations of the space. 05 states that 
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differences anywhere in the psychological space 
are equal. This, of oourse, has been a matter of 
great controversy, debate and investigation in 
psychophysics from Fechner to the present day. It 
is like saying that the psychologioal difference 
between having one candle and two candles (or between 
no candle and one candle for that matter!) lighting 
a room is the same as the difference between having 
one hundred and one hundred and one candles 
lighting the room, which is obviously false. 
Of course, one aim of psychophysics has been to 
construct a space in which equal distances appear 
equally different, so it could be said that D5 is 
acceptable if the right sensation scales are 
found. If the "right sensation scales" are, 
however, the direct estimation, power-law, scales 
of S.S. Stevens, as appears very likely, this 
would seem to be a reason for rejecting D5, at least 
in prothetic (intensive) continua. 
There are three other points to note about 
Conditions 5. Firstly, leaving the space open to 
translation means that the origin has no fixed 
position. Thus it has no real interpretation 
in psychological terms. Conversely, the similarity 
space, with SS holding has a fixed origin which 
can easily be interpreted, at least for intensive 
continua, as the point of zero intensity. The 
lack of this obvious and desirable property would 
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again seem to show a weakness in the distance 
condition 05. Secondly, the condition 
ss gives some idea as to how the similarity 
function behaves (this is filled out further by 
S6). The further the objects are away from the 
origin (i.e. the greater the intensity on their 
constituent dimensions) the less psychological 
difference a given absolute change in the 
objects makes. This is consistent (qualitatively) 
with the candle example given above. Thirdly, 
as stated before, a decomposability condition is 
a necessary condition for 05. It states that the 
value on other dimensions has no effect on the 
difference between two values on any single dimension. 
This is weaker than Beals, Krantz and Tversky's 
decamposability condition (Tversky and Krantz, 1970), 
but it can be seen to be true in this case, and not 
for the content models, by putting 
n+ 
a = (al,a2, ••• ,ai_l,0,ai+l, ••• an)' where aelR , 
in 05 and ss. Oecomposability is an important 
condition in the theory of distances (see Tversky 
and Krantz, 1970) but has been disconfirmed in two 
of the three experiments we know of that test the 
condition specifically (Wender, 1971, and Krantz and 
Tversky, 1975). 
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Thus, certainly on the assumption of the power 
law of intensive continua, the "content" models 
would seem to fare the better of the two on 
conditions s. 
1.5.3 Condition 6 
Condition 86 states the invariance condition 
for the similarity models. In a sense it is the 
opposite of D5, the invariance condition of 
the distance models. S6 states that all pairs 
of objects in the s~e proportion (in the sense 
that each respective dimension is in the same 
proportion for each pair of objects) have equal 
similarity. In each single dimension, this 
reduces to equal ratios being equally similar 
(or different). Thus the psychological difference 
between one and ten candles lighting a room would 
be the same as that between ten and one hundred candles. 
(Notice that nothing can be said about the 
psychological difference between no candles and 
any number of candles solely by S6). 
On the other hand, D6 states that things 
twice as intense are twice as different: the 
difference between ten and a hundred candles is 
ten times that between one and ten candles. This, 
again is often absurd. This property is unfortunately 
usually glossed over in multidimensional soaling, 
however, because it is used to normalise the 
distances or configuration to keep their absolute 
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values within reasonable bounds. 
Thus, again, with intensive continua, it 
would seem that the "oontent" models are far more 
plausible than the distance models with regard to 
conditions 6. 
1.5.4 Conditions 87 and SBt the axes and origin 
Feature S7 deals with objects on different axes. 
Onoe again, this points up the differenoe between 
the two classes of models in their interpretation 
of the axes: the distance models behave no differently 
on the axes than anywhere else in the space, while 
S7 is very reminiscent of the correlation 
coefficient with the axes as used in traditional 
factor analysis, where different axes were regarded 
as representing "totally different" or "independent" 
factors so that no similarity could be given 
between points on them. This interpretation of 
axes, while probably unnecessary and possibly 
undesirable, has been lost from multidimensional 
scaling. It would seem to imply that cross-
modal matohing would be difficult if not 
impossible. 
S8 emphasises again the unique position of 
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the origin in the space. Here, everything is 
to,tally different from the origin: zero similarity 
exists. No such property exists for the distance 
models; on the contrary, it is a well-known (and 
muoh used - see for example, Shepard, 1964, Fischer 
and Micko, 1972; Boijer, 1970b) mathematical fact 
that the properties of distances with properties 
DS and D6 holding can be completely investigated 
by considering only distances to the origin. See, 
for example, Micko and Fischer, 1970, for further 
comment on this; it follows from the functional 
form of equations 05 and D6.* 
*There'has in fact been much misunderstanding over 
this point, with subsequent bad mathematioal and 
methodological errors. Many authors confuse 
"metrics" - functions with properties Dl - 04 and 
07 - with the much less general distances given by 
properties Dl - D7. Without D5 and 06, study of 
behavior around the origin and of isosimilarity 
contours (loci of points all at equal distance 
to the Q,rig-in) is not sufficient, and the 
problem becomes much more complicated. Boijer's 
work particularly is marred by this fault. 
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1.5.5 Condition D7: the triangle inequality 
D7 is the socalled triangle inequality 
and is the most commonly quoted and blindly 
accepted condition on distances. It states 
that the distance on an indirect path between 
two objects is never shorter than the distance 
on a direct path. This makes sense if we can 
indeed add distances - i.e., think of distances 
as paths in the space. But this is not an obvious 
property of psychological space. In fact, the most 
usual interpretation of the triangle inequality 
is something like Shepard's (1962a, p.126) 
nif x is close to z and z is close to y, then 
x must be at least moderately close to y", 
which, as Shepard acknowledges, carefully avoids 
anything about adding measures of "closeness" or 
their opposites. Partly to overcome this, others 
have suggested such conditions as the even 
stronger "ultrametric" inequality (Johnson, 1967) 
(but see section 4.1) 
lD (x,y) <. max {ID (x,z), lD (y,z)} 
which bypass the necessity for adding distances, 
but very little work seems to have been done on 
testing any such inequalities. In the case of. the 
triangle inequality, this is probably largely due 
to uncertainty over what to use as a distance 
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measure and whether the properties of any such 
measure allow it to be added, but this is hardly 
a good reason for continuing blindly to accept 
its validity. In their work, Beals, Krantz and 
Tversky have in fact found ordinal conditions 
implying the triangle inequality so that in 
special oases it could perhaps be tested 
indirectly; but in general the triangle inequality 
is so deeply buried among other conditions of 
their axiomatisation that it would be difficult 
to sort out whether it was in faot the triangle 
inequality failing, if failures did ooour. 
Nonetheless, the interpretation of it given 
above makes it sound very plausible - even though 
there do exist exceptions: Shepard (1964) gives 
the example of "fable" being close to "table", 
and "table" being close to "ohairfl, while 
"fable u is a long way from "chair". Clearly 
this is due to two spaces overlapping - the sound 
spaoe putting !I fable " close to "table", and the 
semantio space putting "table" close to "ohair-. 
Shepard suggests that the separation of the two 
spaoes would be the answer to the problem. 
Thus, in some sense we would hope that while the 
triangle inequality may be violated sometimes, 
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it would hold "most of the time". Thus D7 should 
be taken less as a strict condition for a 
"reasonable n distance to comply with, and more 
only an indication of how we would liket to 
behave. 
It might also be noted that some have 
suggested that similarity should comply with the 
condition 
$(x,y) ~ ,(x,z)$(y,z) 
(e.g. Eisler - personal communication, 1974), an 
analogy to the triangle inequality due mainly to 
the common idea that similarity is an exponential 
decay function of distance. The same comments 
would apply to this as were made in reference to 
the triangle inequality - with the further remark 
that it is even less plausible, as to any psychological 
interpretation given to it of the form given to the 
triangle inequality. 
A last comment on D7 concerns its conditions 
for equality: under what conditions do we have 
10 (x,y) = ID (x,z) + ID (z,y)? 
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Per all the Minkowski distances, the answer is: 
when z lies between x and y on a straight line. 
Por particular M1nkowski distances, there are 
&lOre general condi tiens for equality, but the 
8 additivity on straight lines- condition is the 
most qeneral and most important. It has widely 
been assumed to be desirable (see for example 
Beals, Erantz, and Tveraky, 1968; Restle, 1959) 
but again seems to be attractive more mathematically 
than psychologically. 
1.5.6 Condition D8 
Finally, D8 expresses the idea that the overall 
difference be~een two objects is greater than 
the difference between them on a sinqle salient 
dimension. This ia easily defined in this ease 
because of translational invariance (DS) 1 
the content models have a comparable property only 
when the difference on the single dimension is taken 
with certain restrictions on the values at which 
the other dimensions are held constant: ~ 
direction of the inequality depends on where 
in space the difference on the single dimension 
is taken. The basic concept seems to 
be an intuitively obvious one in some form and 
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has been tested and found to hold in one case 
using schematic faces (Tversky and. Krantz, 1969). 
This test was, in fact, one of a contextually 
dependent version closer to that of the content 
models, and this fact serves as a warning as to 
possible counterexamples to the "pure" form of 
D8. These can occur when different dimensions 
" 11 
are weighted differently in different situations. 
For example, when comparing cars, their colours 
are a relatively unimportant variable; thus two 
cars of the same model but quite different colours 
may be judged '\rery similar - not very different. 
But the two colours when judged in isolation (i.e. 
with all other components zero) will be judged very 
different, so that 08 would apparently be 
violat,ed. 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
As was noted previously, conditions 5 and 6 
are the critical ones. They are critical on two 
counts. Firstly, they differentiate between the 
two models on the highly significant property of 
whether equal ratios of subjective intensities are 
subjectively equal, or equal differences of 
subjective intensities are subjectively equal. 
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Secondly, it can easily be seen that these two 
conditions along with S7 and 58, generate 
counterexamples to the hypothesis that the two types 
of model are monotone on each other. 
On the first count, for intensive or prothetic 
continua, the content models are heavily favoured. 
However, while equal ratios may be approximately 
subjectively equal in prothetic continua, they may 
not be in metathetic or substitutive continua. 
Thus, the distance models may be favoured for 
metathetic continua. In Chapter 3 we will give a 
theoretical treatment that also suggests this. 
Nonetheless, for'prothetic continua, models of 
the form of the content models would seem the 
best. A set-theoretic analysis, giving a more rational 
foundation to these models will be one of the main 
aims of, this thesis. 
The second count - non-monotonicity - has 
vital consequences for multidimensional scaling. 
If in fact a large range of stimuli could be best 
described by a model that was not monotone with 
any model presently used in multidimensional scaling 
(or even, perhaps, any function satisfying the 
triangle inequality - any metric), then the models 
for multidimensional scaling would have to be 
radically revised. 
An example of non-monotonicity can be 
oonstruoted quite simply: 
we have, for any ae:lR, 
]I) (ax,ay) III I a IlD (x,y) 
so that if a O > 1 we have 
n+ for any x,ye::m. .. , 
3D (aOx,aoY) III aOD (x,y) > D (x,y) , 
and py S6, 
J(aOx,aoY) .. J(x,y). 
Similarly, for any aElR n+, a r} e, we have 
by S5. 
J(x + a,y + a) > _(x,y) 
and by OS 
]I) (x + a,y + a) .. ]I) (x,y). 
Now let u .. ao(x + a), v - aO(y + a) for 
any such aO and a. Then 
D (u,V) > D (x + a,y + a) \I: D (x,y) 
and 
$(u,v) .. $(x + a,y + a) > $(x,y) 
i.e., we have (u,v) and (x,y) such that 
]I) (u,v) >lD (x,y) 
and _ (u,v) ~ • (x,y). 
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But, olearly, by choosing instead 0 < aO < 1, 
we can construot u l = aO(x + a), Vi III ao(y + a) 
and 
D (u l ,vi) < D (x,y) 
but $ (ul,v l ) > _ (x,y), 
so that monotonicity is clearly violated. 
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Perhaps the major considerations here are the 
two related questions of the number of dimensions 
of the space and the identification of these 
dimensions. If the new models, when compared to 
the traditional ones, suggest in multidimensional 
scaling solutions that a different number of dimensions 
(preferably fewer) are being used, or that the 
dimensions can be given quite different, but 
equally plausible, interpretations, then previous 
analyses using the old models would have to be 
closely re-examined. If, on the other hand, it 
can be shown that the two types of models rarely 
give very different results, little is lost by 
continuing to. use the more well-established prooedures. 
Some evidence is already available on these 
points (Eisler, 19671 Roskam, 1972), and further 
will be given in this thesis. 
Throughout this chapter it has almost 
always been assumed that objects serving as 
stimuli could be described as points in 
n-dimensional real space. This is probably not true 
for all stimuli. For 1b.is reason "nondimensional" 
models and corr.sponding computing algorithms 
have been developed to analyse stimuli in other 
ways. Most of these use clustering techniques 
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of various kinds. These cluster together very 
s~ilar st~uli, and clusters are inte~reted 
aocording to the common properties of their 
oonstituents (see for example, Johnson, 1967; 
Arabie and Shepard, 1973; Arabie and Boorman, 1973; 
Boorman and Arabie, 1972). They all of oourse 
assume some sort of distance or similarity function 
to determine what is livery similar", but we will 
not be going into these in any detail. This is 
not to imply anything about the relative 
usefulness of dimensional versus clustering 
techniques: both clearly have their place. 
Hopefully though, the models developed here throw 
some light on clustering techniques also. 
Cunninqham and Shepard (1973) have also 
begun the development of a new non-dimensional 
type of algorithm: "maximum. variance 
non-dimensional scaling", whioh is mid-way 
between clustering and multidimensional scaling. 
It is a further generalisation of non-metric 
multidimensional scaling, now allowing any 
monotone function of any metric,instead of 
any Minkowski (or other specified) distance. 
Since it does not give a mapping of points in 
multidimensional space, its main importance seems 
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to be in finding the form of the generalisation 
function although it may also be of some use in 
conjunction with other scaling techniques. One of 
its central features is its insistence on the 
maximal satisfaction of the triangle inequality -
this is one of the conditions used by the algorithm 
to find a solution. In view of the comments made 
in the previous section, the validity of this is 
questionable: the assumptions involved may 
again turn out to be more rigorous than thought, 
and in the wrong direction. In particular, it is 
difficult to see what is hidden beneath the 
maximum variance goal: it'may, for example, 
force many triangle egualities, with subsequent 
effects on the possible forms of the metric. 
Though again, our investigation may shed some light 
on these points, we will not be going into it 
1n greater detail either. 
However, all these 8caling techniques are 
relevant to the present thesis in the following 
way: one of our basic propositions is that 
the distance £uaetion8 used in soa11ng techniques 
are all-too-often assumed general enough to cover 
most ranges of stimuli. Sometimes they are used 
without even c,onsidering in detail their specific 
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form and what it implies. Bere, we are trying to 
spell out some of these details, indicating vhere 
they may be wrong, and suqqestinq a more 
plausible (but likely still incorrect) alternative. 
We want to make specific that even non-metric 
multidimensional acaling involves modelling of a 
very definite nature, logically little different 
from say, the (albeit better specified) models 
of learning theory. 
This thesis vill, then, in the main, be 
investigating two closely related topics: 
\ 
(a> the adequacy of present distance 
functions for modelling psycholoqical 
similarity, either in the form of 
direct judgments or as implicit in 
other behaviour: and 
(b) the adequacy of present distance 
functions for use in psychophysical 
scaling. 
In the precess of this investigation, other related 
areas will naturally arise, including the form of 
the Rqeneralisation gradient", or the relationship 
between similarity and distanoe: the place of the 
prothetio-metathetic continuum distinction in 
similarity judgments1 and the general implications 
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of the similarity models developed to scaling theory. 
Chapter 2 will give a survey of work done to 
date on related subjects. Chapter 3 will give a 
theoretical development of a content model and a 
related distance function with many of the desirable 
properties discussed above. In Chapter 4 some of 
these properties will be investigated to give a 
better picture of how the model behaves, while 
Chapter 5 will attempt to show some of the 
implications for psychophysical scaling. Data, both 
artificial and empirical, will be considered in 
Chapter 6, and the implications for multidimensional 
scaling discussed. Finally, Chapter 7 will present 
conclusions and suggestions for further work. 
1.7 NOTATION AND CONVENTIONS USED. 
In the discussion above, and in the following 
chapters, several terms will ocour repeatedly: modeli 
similarity, dissimilarity, difference, distanoe; 
dimension,attribute, property, characteristic, factor, 
quality, feature, aspect. We will try here to 
clarify their meanings as much as seems necessary. 
A mathematical "model" of some behavior is 
generally thought of as something that explains 
32. 
that behavior in that it reduces that behavior 
to simpler or more easily understood processes. 
In this sense, it constructs the observed behavior 
from more "basic" processes. Thus, for example, 
a paired-associate learning model might reduce 
this type of learning to a series of probabilities 
of conditioning of stimulus elements (Atkinson, Bower 
and Crothers, ~6S, p.aS). This is the strongest 
and best sense of the word "model". 
It is often used, however to name any mathematical 
construct which is claimed to no more than 
describe the behavior in question. It no more 
"explains" the behavior than a physical description 
of a car "explains" how the car works. Certain 
things can be predicted from it, if it is a 
good description, and certain of its primitives will 
perhaps be interpretable in the light of other, 
present or future, knowledge (though by no means 
necessarily). 
This is the sense in whioh "model" is generally 
used in reference to psychological similarity or 
difference. To say that a certain M.inkowski distance 
is a "model of psychological dissimilarity" does 
not mean that we have any deeper understanding of 
the mechanisms of similarity judgments: it only 
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means that we have a more or less accurate way of 
summarising - describing - its behaviOlrin a short 
mathematical formula. Thus, most of the "models" 
of similarity presented here do not and should 
not claim to "explain" anything: they are, at most, 
purely descriptive, and any "interpretation" 
given to their properties is post hoc. "Model" will 
be used here in this, its weakest, sense - to mean 
no more than a description of the behavior 
concerned - unless otherwise expained. It is 
used not because we feel it is a good t~ in the 
context, but because it has been used too often 
to be easily dropped. 
The ooncepts of psychological "similarity", 
"dissimilarit.y", 'tlifference" and "distance" will 
not be defined. They are to be taken as primitives 
without further explanation, except in the case 
of their corresponding direct judgments, when 
they will be defined operationally as the (numerical) 
results of these judgments. Except when drawing 
distinctions between them (as, for example, 
when discussing the relationship between similarity 
and dissimilarity), they will be used interchangeably 
and will be assumed to refer to the same 
psychological process unless otherwise stated. This 
is not necessarily to imply that in all contexts 
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in which similarity occurs, similarity has the same 
form - it probably does not - but within each such 
context the four (or other, equivalent) terms will 
be taken as explained. 
On the mathematical level, confusion often 
occurs over the use of the words "distance" and 
"metric". A metric is usually strictly defined as 
a real-valued function of two variables (not 
necessarily in ]Rn) satisfying conditions D1 - D4 
and 07 of section 1.4 above, (e.g. Ke11ey, 1969, 
p.llS). A distance is sometimes confusingly defined 
to be a metric, but at other times is used in 
other ways. For example, Beckenbach and Be11man 
(1961, p.99-100) define a distance to be one 
conforming to conditions Dl - D7, while its use in 
the theory of convex functions and convex sets is 
very similar (see for example, Eggleston, 1958, 
p.54ff.). We will use the following terminology: 
a "metric n will be defined as above; a "distance"* 
will be a function satisfying Dl-07; and a "distance 
function" will be any function that generally 
measures "apartness" in the space in a way 
analogous to Shepard's (1962a, p.126) concept of 
"proximity measure". A "distance function n - as 
distinct from a "distance" - will not necessarily 
* Our "distance" corresponds to what is also sometimes 
called a Minkowski metric (see Busemann, 1955, p. 94, 
p. 100; Micko and Fischer, 1970). 
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have anyone of the properties D1 - 08. The 
distinction between these three terms must be 
always born in mind, as otherwise bad 
mathematical errors can be (and have been) made. 
The words "dimension", "attribute", "property", 
"characteristio", etc. are probably the set of 
most often confused words in the area we are 
working in. One of the clearest definitions of them 
is given by Torgerson (1958, p.248-249). We will 
be roughly adhering to Torgerson's conventions, but 
without being too rigorous when there seems little 
likelihood of confusion. In particular, we may 
sometimes use "attribute" and "dimension" 
interchangeably, and, more often, but in a different 
context, "attribute", and "property", "factor", 
"characteristic", "quality", "feature", or 
"aspectn. 
Finally some notation. We will list it first 
and then give a few words of explanation. 
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TABLE 1 .. 1 
MAIN NOTATION USED 
SYMBOLS DESCRIPTION 
Lower case la tin Stimulus nAReS, the val.ues 
alphabet (a,b,c, •• x,y,z) of the stimuli in on8-
dimensional space. 
Upper case latin Tbe seta of aspects 
alphabet (A,B,C, ... X,Y,I) correspondinq to the stimuli 
(*) 
(*) 
a,b,c, •• x,y,z, respectively. 
ifbe vector or point in n-
dimensional real apace, 
representing sttmDlus x, 
.sswming such • repr •• enta-
t,ion exist.s. 
The set of aspects in the 
itb attribute of st1Ealus x. 
m 
X - U Xi' xi nx4 - .,i~j. i-I J 
n 
( IIXill)~, the length of 
i-1 
vector (xl'x2, •• xn) in 
Euclidean space. 
The anqle between vectors 
(x1 '%2' •• xn , and 
(Yl'Y2'··Yn)· 
hxCOS'xy' the length of the 
projection On (Yl'Y2' •• Yn) 
of (Xl ,x2 '· .xn) .. 
TABLE 1.1 coJli:lnu~ 
SllI:BOLS 
11 
-
Jl(x,y) (+) 
:J) (x,y) (+) 
Lower case Greek 
alphabet (c,8,y, •• ) 
v,n, C, c., .),2, -, &, A. 
... ,~,3,3-. 
.... , 1ff 
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DBSCRIP'fION 
. 
So1Ie aeaacre (to be defined 
in the context iA which it 
i. used) on the space of all 
aspects. 
The psycholoqical .~larity 
between stilmll x aDd y. 
The psychological 41s8iall-
ari~ between attmull x 
aDd y. 
The real line. 
'!'be rton-neqat!ve real line. 
n-dtmenaional real space (a 
apace of eithez vectors or 
points) • 
'.rhos. vectors or points in 
lR n wl th all COlIIlponent8 non-
l189ative. 
Real numbers (-scalar.-). 
Tbe usual notation of set 
theory, AAB .. (A-B) U (B-A) • 
Respectively: implies; for 
all, there exists, or, for 
some; such that. 
If and. only if • 
TABLE 1.1 continued 
SYMBOL 
X+y 
ax 
e 
FOOTNOTES: 
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DESCRIPTION 
The empty set 
(xl +Yl,X2+Y2'·· .xn+Yn ) (where 
n x,y£lR ) 
(axl , ax2 , ••• aXn) (where XElR n) 
(0,0, •••• ,0) - the origin 
The psychophysical function 
(*) See Figure 1.1: "Notation used in the 
Vector Interpretation of the content 
Models of Similarity". 
(+) Various models for these will be defined 
- see Chapters 2 and 3. 
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FIGURE 1.1 Notation used in the Vector interpretation 
of the Content Models of Similarity. To be 
generalised to n dimensions. 
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Although a formal distinction is drawn here 
between stimulus names and their representations 
in either aspect space or multidimensional real 
space, this will not be strictly adhered to. A 
stimulus x will sometimes be identified with its 
set of aspects, X, or with its vector or point 
representation, (x1 ,x2 , ••• ,xn ) in psychological 
space. A more detailed and rigorous explanation 
than that used here, of the representation of a 
stimulus in terms of its aspects, can be found, for 
example, in TVersky (1972). 
_(x,y) and D (x,y) will represent actual models 
or judgments of PSFcho1ogica1 similarity or 
dissimilarity respectively. When an abstract model 
behaving rather like similarity or dissimilarity 
(distance, difference, etc.) is being referred to, the 
notation .(x,y) aa4 4(x,y) will be used respectively. 
Usually however we shall use $ (x,y) and ID (x,y) , 
implying a modelling process. 
Finally, a note on the space used. In writing 
mn , we do not necessarily imply that we are 
referring to an n-dimensiona1 physical space 1 in 
fact we will usually be referring to n-dimensiona1 
psychological space. We will make it clear in the 
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context what space we are working in, but if 
for example we are in psychological space and 
refer to it as lR n then we are making the 
assumption that the psychological space can be 
represented by lR n. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
SURVEY OF RELEVANT LITERATURE. 
Three main areas will be traversed in the 
following chapters: different models of similarity; 
some of controversies in psychophysics; and the 
use of multidimensional scaling algorithms. The 
latter two areas will be approached only from 
the context of the first, which is the core of the 
thesis. In this chapter we shall therefore first 
look at some of the many and varied formulas 
that have been suggested as suitable representations 
of similarity. Ekman and Sjoberg (1965) 
introduced a major distinction between two classes 
of similarity model: the "Content" models and 
the nDistance R models. Both classes have many 
competing members but they are not exhaustive of 
all models that have been put fo%~ard. Other 
areas of experimental and theoretical psychology 
have produced various other models which either 
fall between, or cannot be directly related to, the 
two classes. A third class of similarity model 
comes from the use of purely arbitrary "similarity 
coefficients", mainly in taxonomic work. Some work 
has further been done 9n comparing models - mainly 
in the Content versus Distance model arena. 
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For more general surveys of similarity models, 
Gregson (1975) is the most detailed, but Luce, Bush 
and Galanter (1963), especially chapters 2 - 5, 
also summarise some very useful material. 
The main controversies we shall be entering 
into in psychophysics will be concentrated around 
the questions of the form of the psychophysical 
function for category scales, and its relation to 
that for direct estimation scales. This will also 
involve discussion of the Metathetic (qualitative) 
versus Prothetic (quantitative) continuum 
distinction, which will also take an important place 
in the central developments of Chapter 3. 
Because of the interrelationship between 
similarity models and multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) (see Chapter 1), we shall be considering how 
our models affect MDS results. We are thus 
interested in the artefactual and misleading 
solutions that such algorithms tend to produce, but 
less interested in their technical details. 
Shepard, Ramney and Nerlove (1972, Volumes I and 11) 
give a good detailed survey of this area. 
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2.1 MODELS OF SIMILARITY 
Similarity has long been recognised as a 
fundamental concept in psychology. For example, 
14ach, (1914, Chapter 14, sections 4-11) discussed 
the invariances of visual stimuli that lead to 
"sameness of form". It took a central place in 
the Gestaltist view of psychology, the flFactor of 
Similarity" being one of Wertheimer's Laws of 
Organisation in Perceptual Forms (Wertheimer, 
1938). This used similarity as a primitive concept 
in describing the more complex ideas of For.m1 
others working largely in the Gestaltist tradition 
investigated similarity in some depth. For example, 
Ternus (1938) looked at identity of features in 
pairs of objects, whi~e Go1dmeier (1972, 1936) 
carried out a major experimental study of similarity. 
Research of a largely qualitative and 
discursive nature is still widespread: for examples 
see Derks (1972); Bindra, Donderi and Nishisato 
(1968); Levy and Kaufman (1973); Lockhead (1970); 
Wallach (1958). It supplies basic data that will 
have to be explained (and largely has not been) by 
quantitative models of similarity. The effects 
of singularity (or pragnanz) and context (set) are 
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shown by these authors (e.g. Wertheimer, Goldmeier, 
Wallach, op.cit.) to be critical ones in similarity 
behaviour, but they have yet to be given a general 
explanation by any current mathematical model. They 
could fona the basis of a systere of axioms from which 
a similarity model \-louId be const.ructedi more likely, 
they will serve to highlight line:s of demarcation 
between areas where different models of similarity 
may apply. 
The use of quantitative mode:ls of similarity 
tightens the structure of any the:orising. It makes 
the ad hoc nature of many theories more obvious and 
clarifies differences in similarity behaviour in 
different contexts. It also makes testing more 
difficult because false disconfirmation of a theory 
becomes much easier; and specification of primitives 
becomes more objective and hence, at times, quite 
difficult. Some of the problems in this area have 
been considered by Fillenbaum (1973): choice of 
stimulus sample, wording of instructions, restrictions 
on responses, interpretation of results, and 
the interactions between all these. However, the 
quantitative models are a definite step forward 
towards making the theories of psychology part of a 
rigorously testable science. 
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2.1.1 CONTENT 110DELS 
2.1.1.1 Models 
A large variety of Content models have been 
10 
suggested, and tested to varying extents. Sjoberg 
(1973) o~t1ines the development, strengths and 
weaknesses of many of them, so W€~ shall often 
refer to him where relevant. 
The first ad hoc model of similarity seems 
to be that of Eis1er and Ekman (1959), put forward 
for unidimensional similarity ~udgments. After 
trying various other formulas, they found that 
$(x,y) = 
min(x,y} 
(x+y) /2 (2.1) 
fitted the data well when x and y were found by 
fractionation.procedures in the continuum of pitch. 
However, they failed to validate this subjective 
scale independently, so the result is questionable. 
Although subsequent validations of the model 
were carried out (Ekman, Goude and Waern, 1961, 
investigated darkness and subjective area; Eisler, 
1960, investigated heaviness) they tested, in effect, 
a different model, as follows. Equation (2.1) can 
be rewritten as 
$(x,y) = 
so, writing 
= 
we have 
$(x,y) = 
2min (x,y) 
max(x,y) 
l+min(x,y) 
max(x,y) 
min(x,y) 
max(x,y} , 
2Qxy 
l+q xy 
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(2.2) 
(2.3) 
It was assumed in the latter two studies that 
subjective estimates of ratios of magnitudes 
would be equal to qxy' so that if the relation (2.3) 
was found to be true, model (2.1) would be 
confirmed. Sjoberg points out that not only is 
this a questionable assumption, but also that 
Eisler in his 1960 study had to make several 
transformations of his ratio data to make the 
assumption hold. 
/ There is thus good reason (see also Franzen, 
Nordmark and Sjoberg, 1972, for further evidence) 
to look at other possible models of unidimensional 
similarity. The most likely alternative seems 
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to be that $ is closely related t.o q ,.. - either 
x.z. 
by identity (Sjoberg, 1973; Hoijer, 1969a, 
1970bi Waern, 1968a) or by a po~'er law (Kunnapas 
and Kunnapas, 1971, 1973). Neither Sjl!,berg nor 
Waern tested the identity relation however, 
and Hoijer (l970b) in fact needed additional 
parameters to make it fiti on the other hand:, 
Fisler and Ekman, in their original (1959) study, 
found evidence for rejecting it. The power 
law relation thus seems more reasonable: 
$(x,y) = (2.4) 
Kunnapas and Kunnapas present evidence supporting 
this and suggest in the 1973 pap~x that the 
ratio estimation is also a power function of q. 
This a.@.- with Luce's (1961; but see also 
Luce and Galanter, 1963b, pp. 255-6) choice theory 
analysis of similarity and Luce and Galanter's 
(1963b, pp. 288-289) mathematical analysis of 
the form of the generalisation function. Both of 
these analyses are based on questionable assumptions 
however: see sections 2.1.3.3 alld 2.1.3.4 for 
further details. 
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We are therefore in the position that 
neither model is very convincing, but, equally, 
neither is very far wrong. Most multidimensional 
content models are designed to rE~uce to (2.1) in 
one dimension; it would seem prudent to develop 
a parallel series reducing to (2.4). 
The unidimensional model was generalised 
by analogy: it was noted (Ekman,. 1911; Sjoberg, 
1973) that the numerator, 2min{x,y) could be 
taken to represant the "sensory experience" 
common to the two stimuli, while the denominator, 
x+y, could represent the total "sensory experience". 
Thus similarity could be thought of as the ratio 
between the common, cxy ' and the total, Txy' 
$ (x,y) = ~ T xy (2.5) 
It remained to specify Cxy and Txy. Two 
basic avenues were followed. The main one was the 
"vector" representation. Here a stimulus was 
thought of as a vector in lR n+ (see Figure 1.1), 
its intensity being represented by its vector 
length, hx and "qualitative variation" between 
stimuli x and y being represented by the angle 
'xy between them. Their projections on each other 
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could be used in various ways to represent 
Rcommon sensory experiences". Note that since all 
these constructs are defined in, and are largely 
meaningful only in" Euclidean spc:lce, the vector 
models represent a type of embedding in Euclidean 
space. 
Some of the more well-known vector models 
are given in Table 2.1, along wH:h their associated 
definitions of "common" and "total". Their 
variety and the apparently contradictory 
character of some of these definitions (compare, for 
example, that of Ekman et al., 1963, with the 
first of Ekehammar, 1972a) is symptomatic of 
their weak intuitive basis. It should be also noted 
that all reduce to (2.1) in the unidimensional case. 
That of Goude (1966) is somewhat different 
in form to the others. Instead of defining 
similarity in the usual content 'foiay, Goude regarded 
it as complementary to a difference measure. He 
defined difference to be the ratio of what was not 
in common (taken to be the distance between 
vector termini) to the total. 
Same of the models have bad mathematical 
flaws, as pointed out by SjAberg (op.citJ. 
TABLE 2.1 
SOME VECTOR CONTENT MODELS OF SIMILARITY 
Notation as in 'l'able 1.1 and Figure 1.1 with 
De! ini tions of: 
Common Total 
!lem,ents ~ 
Cl '1'1 
Cl '1'2 
see T2 
text 
C2 '1'2 
Cl '1'1 
Cl '1'2 
Cl - Min(pYl<.b,,) + min(l'"y,hy ) 
. C2 • 2luin(pxy'pyx) 
C3 • 'l"2C05fxy 
lU!.al 
'11 • hx + hy 
'l' -~ + 2h hyCOSt"y 2 b" Y " 
$(".yl - C/'l' 
C08t xy 
cO.~"Y if P"y .::. hy and Py" .::. h"l 
1 
- 1 - tan (t,,/2) 
coecpx.y 
I COBtxyCOS (txy/ 2) 
COB~xY COS~xy 
(0) ;~:!!~i:!:~on ~r:~:~e;~at the fact~r COS'xy was raised to the mth power. 
Reference 
EKman and Lindman 
hi~", ~ .. " l{unnapaa and Lindman 
(19.3) 
Goude (1966) 
Eis1er (1967) 
Ekehammar (1972.) 
U1 
.... 
EkehalM1ar (1972.) 
There seems little 
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For example, that of Ekman and Lindman (1961) is 
insensitive to changes in quantitative variation in 
parts of the space, while EkehaIDInar' s second model 
(Ekehammar, 1972a) is totally insensitive to intensity. 
For vectors at a fixed angle, Ekehammar's first 
model gives a minimum similarity (intuitively, it 
should be a maximum) when the veGtor lengths are 
equal. 
The other avenue followed in the interpretation 
of 'bommon" and "total" is perhaps; more 
intuitively obvious and straightfor~lard, but, for 
practical reasons, less used. This considers 
stimuli primarily as sets of aspects or properties. 
Then, by defining a measure, rn, ~or example, but not 
necessarily,. the counting measure} on these aspects, 
we can define 
C
xy = ~ (X{)Y) • 
The most logical definition of totality would be 
(2.6) 
and this has been recognised by Gregson (1970),. 
although he uses it in a slightly different form. 
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However, Eisler, obviously generalising the 
unidimensional model of similarity, equation (2.1), 
takes 
Txy = ~(X) + ~(Y) 
(see Eisler, 1964, 1967). 
Thus we have the two similarity models 
respectively, 
$(x,y) = 
and $(x,y) = 
!.(XOy) 
!!(XUy) 
2!!(XhY) 
!! (X) + !! (Y) 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
The question is now, how to define m so that 
equations (2.8) and (2.9) can be applied in 
practice. Eisler (1967) avoids the issue by merely 
decomposing the right hand side of equation (2.9) into 
"communalities", 
!!!(Xtly) 
!!! (X) 
and ~(xny) 
m(Y) 
(cf. Bush and Mosteller, 1951; and section 2.1.3.5). 
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Greqson, in a treatment that does little to 
clarify the question, assumes a structure on the 
space that is equivalent to a dimensional 
structure, so that he can write 
= 
n 
r m(x.nY.) 
· 1- ~ ~ ~= 
and assumes that m is the counting measure, although 
it is difficult to see how this can be applied in 
continuous spaces. He then state~s that 
and m(X.UY.) 
- l.. ~ 
(which is only true if x~ C y, or Y. C x.~ i.e. 
... ~ ~ -- ~' 
a prothetic continuum, or nest.in~f sequence of 
sets), so that 
$(x,y) = 
n 
r min [m (X. ) ,m (Y . ) ] 
· 1 - ~ - ~ 1= 
n 
r max ~ 0'::' ) 1 m (Y . ) ] 
· 1 ~ - 1 ~= 
(2.10) 
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Eis1er (1964) has given a comparable treatment 
for the one dimensional case of his model. A 
clarification and extension of the arguments 
leading to this type of result will be the subject 
of Chapter 3. 
Gregson also includes dimensional weighting 
in his model, but this could of course be incorporated 
in any dimeftsiona1 model. 
Roskam (1972) has also investigated the set 
theoretic approach using Eis1er's model, and states 
definitions that would lead to a similar result 
to equation (2.10). He, too, fails to give any 
rigorous explanation for his definitions however. 
Another suggestion of Roskam's is that one should, 
instead of (2.9) put 
$(x,y) = exp [m (Xny) J 
exp [~(m (x) + !!! (Y) ) ] 
where exp (a) a = e. This gives 
n 
$(x,y) = exp [-~ L I m (X.) - ~ (Y i) I J 
i=l J. 
so that $ is a monotonic function of the City-Block 
distance. The attractiveness of this result seems 
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to be the only justification for its highly 
questionable derivation. 
Three other models having a base in Content 
model theory are worth aoting. Micko (1970) 
reinterpreted the vector content models using ~e 
locus of all projections of a vector onto a 
variable vector of constant length - the "halo" 
of the vector - as a measure of the stimulus 
it represents. He could define "common" and 
"total fl in a way quite analogous to the set 
theoretic approach, and his final result, using 
Eisler's interpretation of the set-theoretic 
content model (equation 2.9) was 
$(x,y) = 1 d(x,y) (2.11) 
d(x,e) + d(y,e} 
where d could be any distance. In the case 
of the Euclidean distance, this becomes 
$(x,y) = 1 
= 1 
IhX2 + h 2 - 2h h cos~ y x y xy 
hx + 1:1 .y 
n 2 l;z ( L: (x.--v.) ) 
. 1 J.. ~1. 1.= 
n 2 ~ n 2 ~ 
( l: x.) .,. (l: Yl..') (2.12) 
i=l 1. i=l 
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Hoijer (1969a,b) has put forward an additive 
model based on the assumption that the unidimensional 
similarity judgment is equal to the ratio judgment: 
D (x,y) = 1 1 n r 
n i=l 
min(xi'Yi) 
max(xi'Yi) (2.13) 
Its objectionable properties include its apparent 
assumption that D equals 1 - $, and its additive 
nature. 
Waern (l968a,b, 1969, 1970b, 1971a,c) has 
proposed a multiplicative model of similarity 
$(x,y) 
n ni 
= 'If ($(x. ,y.» 
. 1 1. 1. 1.= 
where $(xi'Yi) is the unidimeDtonal similarity 
on the ith dimension. If 
$ (x. , y.) 
1. 1. 
a. 
= (;~ ) 1 
1. 
(x. < y.) 
l l 
then -log$(x,y) is the (weighted) City-Block 
distance in log-transformed space. Waern has given 
it a Content model interpretation., and tested it, 
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but its major failing is that it is always 
zero when one of the points is on an axis. 
2.1.1.2 Testing of the Models 
While the original unidimensional similarity 
model, equation (2.1), was developed using a scale 
of the relevant continuum (although not 
independently validated), subsequent tests have 
used the equation (2.3), effectively only testing 
the relationship between ratio judgments and 
similarity judgments. This method was generalised 
for the multidimensional vector models, adhering 
to the principle that psychological phenomena 
could be usefully investigated only at the "proper 
level" (Ekman, 1961). However, this in itself 
involved yet another modelling assumption: that 
the multidimensional ratio judgment (viz., "report 
the proportion (q) of a standard percept that 
is contained in a given percept, and vice versa": 
Ekman, 1963) was equal to the ratio of the pro-
jection on a vector and the length of that vector: 
= 
h 
x 
h y 
From such judgments, since 
cOS<l>xy (2.14) 
= 
the angles 'xy could be estimated, and since 
= 
h 2 
x 
-2 
hy 
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the lengths hx could be estimated (subject to 
certain norma1isations - see, for example, Ekman, 
1963; " H Backstrom and Goude, 1966; Eis1er, 1967; 
Lund, 1974). Although these assumptions have 
considerable empirical support (e.g. Ekman, 1965), 
they can produce rather unorthodox results 
(e.g. Ekman, 1963), and put an extra, seemingly 
unnecessary, burden of modelling assumptions onto 
similarity modelling. 
Not only have these ratio modelling assumptions 
often been incorporated into tests of the similarity 
models, but, even where this has not been so, the 
models have usually been tested in only the 
simpler, special case of purely "qualitative" 
variation: i.e. it is assumed (see fourth column 
of Table 2.1) that all vector lengths are the same, 
so that the only variation is in angle. Stimuli 
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are chosen, and/or subjects instructed, so that they 
will (hopefully) perform accordingly. Examples can 
be found in Ekebammar (1972b): Ekman (1965); 
Ekman et al. (1963, 1964). Some of their results 
dODat: appear to bear out the equal-length 
assumption (especially Ekman, 1965, and Ekebammar, 
1912b). An additional difficulty is that, as can 
be seen from Table 2.1, most of t.he models are not 
very different under only "qualitative" variation, 
so this is not a good way to compare models. 
However, an important underlying structure 
seems to be revealed by this simplification. To 
test the model with qualitative variation only, 
stimuli are usually chosen that, in an intuitive 
way, vary only qualitatively: E;~n et.al. (1963, 
1964), and Ekman (1965) use words denoting 
emotional states or personality traits, smells 
of the same intensity, and colours of constant 
brightness: Ekehammar (1972b) uses Rorschach cards; 
while geometric figures and letters have also been 
used (e.g. Ekehammar, 1972a). These all represent 
continua which are often thought of as Umetathetic tt 
lqualitative, substitutive). Therefore, what is 
really happening is that it is being recognised that 
a different model is needed for metathetic continua 
than for quantitative (prothetic) continua. Thus 
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equations (2.1) or (2.4) apparent:ly are not 
expected to apply to unidimensional metathetic 
continua. The main exception appears to be in the 
continuum of pitch, which is usually taken to be 
metathetic, and on which continuum equation (2.1) 
was originally tested. Evidence against (2.1) on 
the pitch continuum was found by Franzen et. al. 
(1972), so it remains controversial. Some 
discussion relevant to the applicability of (2.1) 
to different types of continua can be found in 
Eisler (1960, 1964), and Ekman, Goude and Waern 
(1961). 
On the other hand, in practice unidimensional 
metathetic continua rarely occur in the results of 
the relevant experiments mentioned. They are 
always split up into two or more, apparently 
prothetic, continua. Either the method of data 
analysis (usually Factor Analysis) is at fault, or 
the models do not account for metathetic continua 
very suitably. (See also Ekman and Sjoberg, 1965; 
'1'orgerson, 1965; and Kicko, 1970 for comments on 
this problem). 
The surprisingly good fit of Ekman and Lindman's 
model can be interpreted in the light of this 
discussion: in a large part of the space it 
reduces to 
$ (x,y) = cos.xy 
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and is often used in this form regardless. This 
is, or is nearly, just the form o~ the "qualitative" 
special caseaf the other vector models. Two 
experiments giving good agreement with the model -
Ekman and Lindman (1961), and Lund (1974) - in fact 
only test the model in spaces that could easily be 
regarded as "qualitative". Thus Ekman and Lindman's 
model may not be valid for spaces of prothetic 
continua. 
An additional difficulty with using ratio 
judgments is that they are rather difficult for 
the subject to understand and give. In fact Lund 
(1974) suggests that subjects cannot follow the 
instructions correctly and "tend to interpret all 
variations as qualitative". This may possibly be 
cleared up by use of the prothetic/metathetic 
distinction as above; or it may be the case that 
the findings of Kunnapas and KUnnapas (1971,1973), 
that unidimensional similarity and ratio judgments 
are in fact almost the same thing, is also true 
for the multidimensional case. 
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Thus, the vector models have many problems. 
In his major study comparing most of the vector 
Content models so far suggested, Lund (1974) 
concluded that that of Ekman and Lindman was the 
best, but that they all had basic inadequacies, for 
both theoretical and practical reasons. Most 
findings are in accord with this: no vector model 
is very good; but equally none is very far from 
e! ther the data or each other. 'l~he conclusions of 
Ekehammar (1972b, testing his two models and those 
of Ekman and Lindman, and of Ekman et.al., 1963) 
that the models "give only negli9il:ie differences 
in outcomes for the same data", and of Waern 
(l970b, testing, among others, the models of Gregson, 
Ekman et.al. 1963, and Eisler, 1967) that "all 
similarity models here compared are equally far from 
the 'true I similarity model", are typical. The models 
capture enough of the data properties to be 
worthwhile, but not enough to be good models. 
Greqson's model has rarely been tested, except 
in the sacalled "Quadratic Similarities" situation 
(Greqson, 1970, 1972), and here the results were not 
very encouraging. However, in her comparative study, 
Waern (1970b) concluded that Gregson's model was one 
of the best of a rather mediocre collection. 
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An unpublished study on ·'!:similarity learning" 
(Field, 1974) and one by Rosenberg (1974) also 
give indirect support to the model. A general 
method for testing the model has been to substitute 
physical stimulus descriptions for the .(Xi ), 
m(Y.) terms (see equation (2.l0)) and solve for 
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dimensional weights. As Waern points out, this 
is a strong test of the model if it is successful. 
The use of magnitude estimations in this way, 
although it imposes a fixed dimensional structure 
on the stimuli, would seem to be the best way to 
test any such model with a mininnun of modelling 
assumptions .. 
The other Content models mentioned here 
have also had only limited or no testing. Micko's 
has yet to be tested directly, probably due to 
the highly complicated instructions required, but 
a reanalysis of Ekman and Lindman's data using 
it gave fewer ftimensions (Micko, 1970). Eisler's 
(1967) set theoretic model also had problems with 
instructions. Roskam's revision of Eisler's model 
has only been tested by use of MDS (Roskam, 1972), 
but he also compared the scaling results with 
magnitude estimation scale data :in order to 
validate his findings. 
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Boijer has tested his own model fairly 
extensively, including its additi.ve structure, 
comparative dimensional weighting (Boijer, 1969a) 
and order effects on similarity (Hoijer, 1970a). 
He also claims to have investigated its metric or 
non-metric nature (Hoijer, 1969b, 1970b), but 
this is to a large extent invalidated by his 
confusion between metrics and distances (see 
Hoijer, 1969b). 
Waern t s model is fairly easi.ly tested, at 
least for its superficial properties, since it 
requires only unidimensional and multidimensional 
similarity estimations. This assumes that the 
dimensions are known to the experimenter and obvious 
to the subject, so that greater s;ubtlety would be 
needed to test it more thoroughly. Support for her 
model is equivocal when she tests it with these 
(and other) considerations in mind: Waern 
(1968a,b, 1969, 1970b). 
Finally, it should be noted that all the 
Content models, with the occasional exception of 
Gregsonls and Boijer's, have been tested only on 
grouped data. 
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2.1.2 DISTANCE MODELS 
2.1.2.1 Models 
The Euc1idean Distance model was the first 
model used in quantitative similarity research. 
It underlay Thurstone's work, and Richardson (1938) 
used it specifically through the techniques of 
Factor Analysis made possible by the theorems of 
Young and Householder (1938) (see! also Torgerson, 
1958, Chapter 11; Gower, 1966). It was also the 
distance used by Coombs, although he recognised 
that others were theoretically possible (Coombs, 
1964, p. 202). 
The first worker to question its use was 
apparently Attneave, who compared it with the purely 
additive City-Block distance which had previously 
been given a physiological basis by Landahl (1945): 
.. Note that IIDistance" is not used here in the 
strict sense of Chapter 1, but in the rather 
indefinite sense of Ekman and Sjoberg (1965). 
lD (x,y) 
n 
= 1: Ix. -y.' 
. 1 l. l. l.= 
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He found (Attneave, 1950) that this distance fittecJ 
be~er than the Euclidean one, but since the study 
compared only the two models, it did not 
positively confirm either of them. 
In the search for a more general Distance, the 
Minkowski (or ~p) distance was suggested (e.g. 
Torgerson, 1958, p. 293; Kruskal,1964a): 
D (x,y) = 
n 1/ 
( 1:lXi - y. I~) a, a > 1 
i=l l. 
(2.15) 
This is the City-Block distance ~men a = 1 and the 
Euclidean distance when a = 2. 
Micko and Fischer (t"licko and Fischer, 1970 i 
Fischer and Micko, 1972) have ghren another 
generalisation of Distances by constructing them 
from a function on the directions in lR n, inter-
pretable as an "attention distribution" in the space. 
The Minkowski distances are special cases of these 
distances, which include most di~;tances (the 
"(general) Minkowski metrics R ) in the sense defined 
in Chapter 1. Micko and Fischer (1970, p. 128) 
I 
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point out that nit seems likely that subjective 
spaces are not always [general] Minkowskiann because 
of the assamptions it implies about their affine 
structure (05 and 06 of Chapter 1). They discuss 
such distances, it appears, only because they are 
mathematically more tractable than a general 
metric; but even then they give little justification 
for assuming the triangle inequality (07). 
A different generalisation comes from suggest-
ions (e.g. Shepard, 19601 Indow, 197~ that, even 
if psychological distance is not Euclidean, it 
may be at least locally Euclidean. - i. e. Euclidean 
within small areas (volumes, hypervolumes) of the 
space. This suggests that subjective space may be 
a Riemann (Indow) or Finsler (Shepard, 1964) space. 
These are locally Euclidean; an example (see 
Shepard, 1960) is the surface of a~here in 
Euclidean space. Except in the study of the 
metric of binocular visual space (e.g. Luneberg, 
1950: Blank, 1953, 1958), these metrics do not 
appear to have been taken seriously enough to 
warrant testing. 
The widest generalisation of Distances has 
been due to the axiomatisation by Beals, Krantz and 
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Tversky (Beals and Krantz, 1967; Bea1s, Krantz 
and Tversky, 1968; Tversky and Krantz, 1970) of 
distance functions. They noted that the Minkowski 
(power) metric has such properties as 
decomposabi1ity (distance is a funct.ion of independent 
contributions of components), int.radimensiona1 
subtractivity (each such contribution is a function 
of the absolute value of the scale difference), 
interdimensiona1 additivity (distance is a function 
of the sum of the contributions), and se.entel 
additivity (there is a path between any two points 
on which the distances are additive), in addition 
to the defining properties of a metric. They found 
necessary and sufficient ordinal conditions for 
similarity or distanoe to be monotonic with such 
distance functions, and show tha~ the Minkowski 
metric is "the only additive difference metric which 
is also a metric with additive segments" (Tversky 
and Krantz, op.cit., p. 588). Hence, these 
conditions are critical to the acceptance of a 
Minkowski metric; hawever,they go further by saying 
that the properties of intradimensional subtractivity 
and interdimensional additivity"may be taken as 
defining properties for psychological dimensions" 
because they are present in a ~arge class of 
multidimensional similarity mode1s R (op.cit., p. 595). 
Since they have looked only at models that are 
distances, and mainly Minkowski distances, this 
conclusion seems rather rash. As we shall see, their 
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axiomatisation nonetheless provides a method that 
would not otherwise be available for testing 
these models. 
Various other Distance models have been 
sU9'gested but either seem to haVE! little merit 
above those that they generalise or have not been 
tested in any generality (e.g. Gregson, 1966, 1968; 
Roskam, 1968~ p. 29 and pp. 77-98; Young, 1973). 
One other problem closely related to the use 
of Distance models should be noted here. Since 
Distance models model (if anything) dissimilaritI, 
and similarity seems to be the more natural 
judgment for subjects to make (although 
dissimilarity judgments are of course quite often 
used - e.g. Byroan and Well, 1967, 1969; TVersky 
and Krantz, 1969), the function relating 
dissimilarity to similarity is a critical one if a 
model of similarity is to be constructed. We shall 
call this function the "a1Bila.Lty ~radieatn 
(cf. Shepard, 1958b). For Distance models, the 
similarity model consists of the distance function 
~lus the similarity gradient. To a large extent 
the two functions are independent of one another. The 
main point of both the non-metric MOS programs, and 
the work of Beals, Krantz and Tversky, is of 
course to avoid this issue (although the former can 
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also throw light on it - see also CUnningham and 
Shepard, 1973), but for an accurate model of 
similarity it cannot finally be overlooked. 
In so far as similarity is closely related to 
generalisation, the similarity gradient would seem 
to be closely related to the more classical 
generalisation gradient. Sbepard (1957, 1958a,b) was 
one of the first to investigate this function 
rigorously. He found both empirical (but see_ 
Krantz, 1967) and convincing theoretical arguments 
supporting the exponential decay function: 
$ = -D e 
In particular, generalisation was an exponential 
decay function of Euclidean distance. Various other 
authors have followed him, supporting the exponential 
form of the similarity gradient, either prag-
matically (e.g. Waern, 1968a,b, 1969, 1970a,b; 
Roskam, 1972) or for other, but ()ften less convincing, 
reasons (e.g. Luce, 1961). Its main advantage seems 
to be that it is bounded between zero and one for 
positive arguments, so that the unbounded distance 
function can be mapped into the bounded similarity 
function (see Chapter 1). It a1!so has pleasant and 
familiar mathematical properties, and both it 
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(e.g. Luce and Green, 1972) and its inverse, the 
logarithmic fundion, are probably the most commonly 
used non-linear functions in psychology. Helm, 
(see for example Coombs, 1964, p. 488; and Belm, 
Messick and TUcker, 1961) has also made the 
interesting observation that by exponentia11y trans--
forming dissimilarity judgments, MDS results can be 
simplified, probably because Distance models 
overestimate large distances. 
The other main contender is, predictab1Yr the 
linear function. Most often it is used in the form 
(interpreted as ·complement-) 
D - 1 - $ 
(e.g. Junge, 1960, Goude, 19661 Hoijer, 1969a,b7 
Eis1er, 1967; Micko, 1970) which makes sense if D 
is also bounded, between zero and one, but is 
nonsense if, as is usual, D is cl distance which is 
not scale-invariant: Waern (1970a,b) also points 
out that it may lead to violations of the triangle 
inequality. The alternative is to allow any linear 
transformation (with negative sl()pe) - see for 
example Roskam (1972), Haem (1910b) -
D = -a$ + B (a,. 8>0) • 
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e must then be chosen so that D can at least attain 
its maximum value within the particular experiment. 
The theoretical objections to this are substantially 
no different to those for the "complement 11 
transformation. Unless D is bounded, the linear 
gradient would not seem viable (see also Waern, 
1970a,b; Rosenberg, 1974). 
2.1.2.2 Interpretations and Testing 
Since the Distance mode~s have a mathematical 
origin, some effort has gone into discovering 
just what it means psychologically if one of them 
fits a certain body of data. The analyses of 
Micko and Fischer (1970) and Fischer and Micko 
(1972) show that most distances can be interpreted 
in terms of a particular attention distribution, 
by the observer, over the ci.recticms (If quali ties" ) 
in multidimensional space. This has not been 
used in interpreting empirical results (and the 
analysis is not a unique one), but it largely 
coincides with findings on comparisons between the 
City-Block and Euclidean models. It has for some 
time been noticed (e.g. Torgerson, 1958, p. 292; 
Shepard, 1964) that the City-Block distance holds 
when the dimensions on which the stimuli vary are 
"simple, obvious and compelling" (Torgerson) or 
"analyzable" (Shapard). Euclidean distance was 
more sui table when the dimensionl:; were less obvious 
or "homogeneous". The strongest support for this 
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is in two studies by Hyroan and Well (1967, 1968). In 
a somewhat different, but not irreconcilable finding, 
Wender (1968) found that the Min);:owski parameter 
increased with the difficulty of judging the 
similarity between stimuli. 
The mere fact that an interpretation could 
be found for the parameter of the Minkowski models, 
however, is not necessarily a sign that the models 
are good ones: independent testin(] must be the 
final criterion. In fact, surprisingly litt:e of 
this has been done. Until receni:ly, studies of 
Distance models themselves - ratiler than studies 
in which different distance models are compared -
were relatively infrequent. This is in contrast to 
research on Content models. On 1:he other hand, 
researchers here have sholom much more awareness of 
individual differences. 
The best single study is pr()bably that of 
Shepard (1964), who also reviewed some of the 
evidence for the Euclidean model.. By u;ing 
isosimilarity contours, with both direct similarity 
estimation and confusion probabilities, he 
was able to show that the triangle inequality was 
credible for individual subjects but not for 
group data. In another study using confusion 
probabilities, Krantz (1967) tested a "rational 
distance function U he had constructed from 
psychologically plausible postulates, and found 
strong evidence to reject its being a metric 
{see section 2.l.3.3}. 
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Many other studies tend to t:est the 
hypothesis that the model is Euclidean against the 
hypothesis that it is not. Although other tests, 
to identify any non-Euclidean model, are usually 
carried out (e.g. Attneave, 1950; Ryman and 
Well, 1967, 1968), these are more disconfirmations 
of the Euc1idean model than positive evidence for 
any alternative. In addition it would often seem 
that the statistical methods used and/or the 
choice of the similarity gradient: (see previous 
section), may confound the results. Luce and 
Galanter (1936b, p. 303) give a similar warning. 
The two alternative methods are: 
(I) The use of non-metric MDS tE~chniques: and 
(2) Investigation of underlying properties of the 
Distance models. 
The first alternative is in many ways not much 
better than that previously discussed: it can 
consist merely of a comparison between the lack of 
comfort (stress) of two Procrustean beds. It can, 
however, be used in a more positive way, especially 
if it is used in comparison with non-Minkowskian 
models (Lund, 1974; Roskam, 1972: Eisler, 1967). 
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The technique, on its own, usually compares goodness-
of-fit values, numbers of dimensions, and interpret-
ability of dimenSbns. This may be very unreliable, 
as different models can give equally good fit on 
all these criteria - see section 2.2. Bearing 
this in mind, strong but equivocal support is given 
to the City-Block and Euc1idean distances by this 
method. 
The second alternative is largely motivated 
by the mathematical work of Bea1s, Krantz and 
Tversky. Some of the ordinal conditions they give 
for existence of a suitable distance can be tested 
experimentally, and they have given a lead in 
doing this. Tversky and Krantz (1969) tested 
interdimensiona1 additivity and "strongly confirmed 
ita in the context of their experiment. Wender 
(1971) tested decomposability and intradimensiona1 
subtractivity and rejected them.* In the same spirit, 
Fenker (1972) gave a counter-example to inter-
dimensional additivity. Again, support for the 
Distance models is equivocal. Be~cker and Pip~l 
(1974) have suggested this may be: due to the 
perceptual structure ·of the stimu.1i, so that 
Distance models would apply only in certain 
contexts: where there is a "nest:ed" structure. 
* Similar results were found by Krantz and 
Tversky (1975). 
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Finally, a few content model workers have 
tested Minkowski models by combining unidimensional 
similarity judgments and by other cleverly con-
trived model testing procedures (e.g. Waern, 1968b, 
1969, 1970b, Hoijer, 1969a). Hoijer (1969b, 
1970b) has also tried to use isosimilarity contours 
to distinguish between various models, including 
Distance ones. His results were largely invalidated 
by his confusion between metrics and distances 
rendering incorrect much of his contour analysis. 
In summary, Distance models, despite their 
widespread use, have yet to be fully tested. What 
rigorous tests have been done, are by no means 
unanimous in their support, and t:here are clear 
cases for rejection of the models. The similarity 
gradient still needs to be fully investigated. 
2.1.3 OTHER MODELS 
The models in this section are from other 
branches of psychology or other l:;ciences. In some 
cases they do not pretend to be models of psychological 
similarity; in the others their validity relies 
largely on that of the underlyin9 theory from which 
they arise. 
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2.1.3.1 A Set Theoretic Model 
Restle I in his set theoretic! trea 'bnent of 
judgment and choice behaviour (Restle, 1959, 1961) 
suggested that similarity \-,as a measure of the 
aspects co~mon to two stimuli: 
$(x,y) = ~(xny) 
(Restle, 1961, p. 32) for some m such that: for 
all X,Y 
(i) ~(X) > 0; 
(ii) me!) = 0; 
(iii) Xny = ~ ~m(XUY) = m(X) + m(Y), 
although (iii) is usually replaced with 
(iv) (Vi # j, x.nx.=1» ~!!( V K.) = 
1. J i=l 1. 
r m(X.). 
. 1- 1. 1.= 
(op.cit., p. 10). In addition, he assumed the 
distance bet\veen two stimuli should be a metric, 
and defining 
~31 
ID (x,y) = m(XAY) 
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(Restle, 1959; op.cit., p. 43) he: was able to show 
that JD was a metric. 
Rest1e also defined such constructs as linear 
arrays, bet""eeness, and dimensions (see Rest1e, 1959} , 
(a) Y is between X and Z (bxyz ) iff 
XOYflZ = XOynZ = i 
(In this case, ID (x, z) = ]) (x,y) + ID (y, z)J 
(b) A linear array: if 
X* = 
y* = 
are two n-tup1es of sets such thalt 
(i) x. ex., y, CY. Vi.. <: j 
~ - J ~ J 
(so that X*, y* are families of nested sets); 
= X. U y '+1 V Z, L* ~ n-~ 
n 
= <:t.>. 1 is ~ ~= 
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a linear array of sets. A linear array is the 
only array with b, 'k for all members with i ~ j < k. 
1.) 
Z is its ~i X*, y* are its polar arrays. Two 
linear arrays are parallel if they differ only 
in their cores. A dimension is a set of parallel 
linear arrays. These may have cores that themselves 
form linear arrays i in which case ''le can have an 
n-space. 
With this apparatus, it can be shown that 
D is in fact the City-Block distance (see 
Beeker and Pipahl, 1974). 
Thus Restlels models are much more closely 
allied to the Distance models tham to the Content 
models; this is mainly because he emphasises 
the need for ID to be a metric and for it to he 
additive on arraYSi in fact he rejects a 
content-model-like distance function, 
D(x,y) = 
~(X~y) 
m (XUY) 
, 
put forward by Galanter (1956), for not being 
additive. 
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This all side-steps the question of the 
validity of a set theoretic model of behaviour. 
Luce and Galanter (1963b, p.297) comment that "it 
seems no more intuitively acceptable to us to 
assume the existence of sets of aspects and a 
measure over them than to assume directly the 
existence of distances between pairs of stimuli, 
which is what the aspects and measure are intended 
to justify"; and again (p. 303), "Because we 
have no experimental identification either of 
aspects or aspect measures, it is anyone's guess 
whether [Restle's] notion of distance has any 
relation to those that have arisen in the response 
models". These views may be somewhat extreme: 
Gregson's similarity model and Tversky's (1972) or 
Restle's (1961) theories of choice seem to be 
indirect evidence for the validity of the overview 
set theory supplies. Certainly, we do not have to 
accept Restle's particular notion of distance. In 
the future, set theory could conceivably be given 
a more direct interpretation - for example, in terms 
of neural excitation. 
In this section it could additionally be briefly 
noted that the models of Arabie and Boorman (Arabie 
and Boorman, 1973; Boorman and Arabie, 1972), while 
defined on sets of stimuli instead of sets of aspects, 
82. 
and not strictly relevant to the present research, 
have some similarity to Restle's. 
2.1.3.3 Models from Choice Theory 
In his theory of individual choice behaviour, 
Luce (195~,p. 47 ff.) considered interactions of 
continua, and in a subsequent paper (Luce, 1961) 
spelt out some of the consequences of his choice 
theory for similarity theory. Although his theory 
of choice has been found inadequate in many 
situations (e.g. Rumelhart and Greeno, 1971; 
Tversky, 1972), his analysis will still be valid 
in some circumstances and is one of the very few 
axiomatic derivations of a similarity model. 
The theory is formulated in terms of 
PT(xJa), the probability that x will be chosen, 
from the set T, to be most similar to a. By 
Luce's choice axiom, we can write 
= 
v(x,a) 
L v(y,a) 
YES 
for any seT. The scale v can behave like a 
(2.16) 
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similarity scale, and we shall henceforth 
denote it by $. Conditions are found for symmetry 
in its arguments. Luce then asserts, giving 
little justification, that $ must be related to a 
metric which is additive in one dimension. After 
rejecting 1/$ as a possible transformation, he 
shows that -log$ has reasonable properties. Next, 
by assuming that disaimination probabilities 
satisfy the choice axiom, Luce shows that, in one 
dimension, 
$(x,y) = min(v(x},v(y}} max(v(x),v(y» 
where the one-place v scale denotes the 
discrimination scale. Subsequently, Luce and 
(2.17) 
Ga1anter (1963b, p.255) questioned the assumption 
1eaang to this result, and suggested without further 
comment that 
~(x,y) 
J
. a 
_ [min(V(X),V(y» 
- max(v(x),v(y)} (2.18) 
where a was to be estimated from the data, was more 
likely (cf. K~nnapas and K&nnapas, 1971, 1973; and 
section 2.1.1.1). Luce also gave a similarity 
analysis of bisection methods (see section 2.3). 
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Krantz (1967) generalised Luce's analysis 
by assuming that there exists a strictly 
increasing function F and a dissllnilarity scale 
w, such that 
P(x,y;z) - F[w(y,z) - w(x,z)] (2.19) 
where P(x,y;z) = p{ }(x;z). He made three other x,y 
assumptions which were psychologically testable 
and which implied that the distance function 
d(x,y) = ~[w(x,y) + w(y,x) - w(x,x) - w(y,y)] 
was a pseudometric. Taking 
-1 F(~) = (1 + e-t ) i w = -logv 
we have Luce's choice model (equation (2.16»; it 
is also closely related to Shepard's (1957, 1958a) 
generalisation models (see section 2.1.3.5). With 
triadic data, Krantz was able to show 
conclusively that, at least for these choices of 
F and w, the two critical assumptions, including 
(2.19), implying that d was a pseudometric did not 
hold; neither did the triangle inequality hold. 
Krantz concluded that his attempt to construct a 
"rational distance function" (sbict1y, in our 
terms, a "rational metric") had failed; he 
attributed it to its inability to "take into 
account the influence of 'irrelevant' 
dimensions". It does cast doubt onto both 
Luce's and Shepard's analyses. 
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Rumelhart and Greeno (1971) have also used 
similarity to explain certain faults in Luce's 
choice theory. Similarities were not defined 
however and were used merely as parameters to be 
slved for. Their final values showed great 
variation between subjects, which called the 
validity of their interpretation as similarity 
measures into question. The model tested has been 
largely superceded by Tversky's (1972). 
A comment about the general 'validity of choice 
models of similarity is in order here. It is a 
question of fact whether or not the scales (e.g. 
of preference or discrimination) 'Used in choice 
theory are closely enough related to, say, 
magnitude estimation scales, for choice theory 
models to be used in other contexts. A study by 
Cooper (1973) for example, indicated that preference 
space was somewhat different from similarity spaces. 
Other studies (Freedle, 1971; Steinheiser, 1970) 
seem to indicate that the two spaces do not 
differ significantly in some situations. 
2.1.3.4 Generalisation 
The generalisation function plays an 
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important part in theories of many areas in 
psychology and is obviously closely related to 
similarity. Luce and Galanter (1963b; pp. 284,288) 
give an analysis of the generalisation function 
as it relates to magnitude estimation scales in 
psychophysical scaling. They sho'" (p. 288) the 
following: 
If x,y,z are in one dimension and 
the generalisation function ~ is such that 
1. r,;(x,y) = 1;(l,y/X)xc5 .. Vx,y>O; 
2. r,;(x,z) = 1;(x,y)1;(y,z), V'x,y,z 3e.it:hei 
x~>z or z~>x; 
3. 1;(x,y) = r,;(y,x), Vx,y>O~ and 
4. r,; is continuous in each of its arguments; 
then there exists a constant r,; such that 
(
min(X'Y)j- 15 
r,;(x,y) = 
max(x,y) 
This obviously corresponds closely to their 
choice theory suggestion for one-dimensional 
similarity. Again, though, some of their 
assumptions seem (as yet) tomve little psychological 
basis. 
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As mentioned before, Shepard (1957, 1958a,b) 
did a thorough empirical and theoretical investi-
gation into the gene~isation function. 
Although some of his empirical work has been 
questbned (Krantz, 1967), his general findings 
were that generalisation is compatible with an 
exponential decay function of Euclidean distance. 
Bush and Mosteller (1951), ill a model for 
stimulus generalisation and discrimination, 
suggest the measure 
$(x,y) = ~(xnY) 
!!(y) 
for similarity. This is asymetrical (cf. 
Eisler's, 1967 , "communality ratios" - see 
section 2. 1. 1.1) and thus does no·t seem a viable 
model of similarity. 
A paper relevant~ the cross-validity of 
discrimination models is Bechtel (1966). 
2.1.3.5 Identification 
In a choice model of identification (summarised 
in Luce, 1963~ pp. 113-115), referring mainly 
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to work by E.F. Shipley in which similarity takes 
a central part, it is assumed that -109$ is a 
metric - or that it behaves like a "psychological 
distance". Thus: 
1. Yx,y, 
2. Vx, 
3. Vx,y, z, 
_(x,y) = $(y,x) 
_(x,x) = 1 
J(x,z) > $(x,y)${y,z) 
It is sometimes also assumed that if the 
stimuli can be viewed as having distinct compon-
ents, then the overall distance is related to 
the distances on the components in the same way 
as a Euclidean distance. Luce comments that 
these assumptions "all arise from preconceived 
notions about the intuitive meanillg of the $ 
scale and from considerations of lnathematical 
simplicity; they are neither obviously necessary 
nor clearly dictated by data, even though their 
consequences have received some empirical support". 
The same can be said of most of the"_tructions 
of section 2.1.3; an additional danger is that 
the "intuitions" and "preconceived notions" may 
all stem from "common-sense" experience of 
Euclidean distance so that the basic assumptions 
effectively become little more than a hidden 
assumption of Euclidean distaJlce (cf. Luce and 
Galanter, 1963b, p. 303). 
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Luce also notes that the models in this area 
are closely related to Shepard's generalisation 
models. 
2.1.3.6 Coefficients of Similarity 
A huge variety of more or less arbitrary 
coefficients expressing similarity in various 
forms have been constructed over the decades~ 
Most of them were not in any way designed to be 
formal models of psychological similarity, but 
they are of interest firstly because they tend 
to give some intuition into what various 
people have thought of as reasonable for expressing 
similarity (some are remarkably like various 
formal models of similarity), and secondly because 
many of them, when they are inner products, can 
be factor analysed. Hence they could conceivably 
serve, as have done the standard factor 
analytic models, 
or 
n 
1: x.y. 
. 1 1 1 1= 
n 
1: x.y. 
. 1 1 1 1= 
/ 
n 2 j n 2 I x. 1': y. 
. 1 1 . 1 1 \ 1= 1= 
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as models of similarity {see Ekmal1 and Lindman, 
1961: but also Roskam, 1968, pp. 99-110}. Some 
have been developed for clustering techniques 
{e.g. G1eser, 1968; Lance and Wil1iams, 1966, 
1967}, others for taxonomy {e.g. ;Jaccard, 1912: 
Bray and Curtis, 1957; Gooda11, 1966, Gower, 
1967} and others are types of correlation 
coefficient (e.g. Cohen, 1969; Block 1970; 
Vegelius, 1973~. 
'legelbs (1973) gives an excellent survey 
of several correlation coefficients and their 
properties: but see also Cohen, Block, and 
G1eser. 
More relevant to the present work are Bray 
and Curtis {l9S1} who used the coefficient 
C = 
where the {xi}n 
i=l 
n 
2 I: min (x . , y. ) 
. 1 1 1 1= 
n 
I: x. + 
i=l 1 
n 
E y. 
. l' 1. 1= 
and {y.}n are test scores 
1 • 1 1= 
on two different groups. Compare this with 
equation {2.9} and the discussion following it. 
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Lance and Williams discuss the Bray-Curtis 
coefficient along with some more conventional 
ones in their 1966 paper, and in their 1967 paper 
discuss also the ·Canberra metric" 
nix. - Yi l 
L -~---
i=l x. + y. ~ ~ 
or 
nIx. - y. f L ~ ~ 
i=11 iil +J Y i I 
(cf. Gregson, 19661 Hoijer, 1969), and Gower's 
distance measure (Gower, 1967) 
n 
L 
i=l 
Ix. - y., 
~ ~ 
wi 
where wi is the range of attribute i. 
A number of authors also discuss, in various 
forms, the measure (cf. equation (2.8» 
= 
or its complement 
= 
!!!(X{)Y) 
m(XUY) 
!!.(X~Y) 
m (XUY) 
(Galanter, 1956: Gibson, 1965: Jaccard, 1912). 
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A notable feature common to all these coefficients 
is their normalised nature; this differentiates 
them sharply from the distance model type of measure. 
The more sophisticated coefficients (see 
especially Goodall, 1966; but als() Gower, 1967, 
Lance and williams, 1967) also r~se problems 
that are shared with models of similarity: how 
to decide which dimensions to include in the 
measure; the related problem of how to weight 
the dimensions, especially when they are over 
different ranges or have differen'!: units;. and how 
to treat discrete, non-quantifiable data. 
2.1.4 COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
One of the few investigations not suffering 
from many of the faults of testing outlined in 
sections 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.2.2 is that of Waern (1970b) 
who compared the following models: City Block 
and Euclidean (with both exponential and linear 
transformations), Ekman's et.al. (1963), Eisler's 
(1967), and Gregson's. By experimental design 
and various tests, she was able to conclude from 
five experiments involving tw~or three-dimensional 
stimuli, that City-Block distanc. was best, with 
Gregson's model a close second. The transformation 
could not be aefinitely decided. 
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SjOberq (1973) in his largely theoretical 
comparison of the Distance and Content models, 
discusses usefully many of the problems in similarity 
unexplainable by either: the effE~ct of different 
contexts and ranges of stimuli i 1:he possibility 
of non-dimensional structures; thE~ effect of 
instructions on the structure and the weighting 
of any dimensions; the relation of similarity 
to dissimilarity, appositeness, identity, matching, 
and classification. He differentiates between 
the two classes of model on several grounds, 
including the problems of: scale consistency; 
interstimulus comparability; and dimensions unused 
by some subjects but used by others ("unique dimen-
sions"). Sjoberg comes down in favour of the 
Distance modEisi his reasons seem to be largely 
ones of practicability however, t:rue only because 
of the lack of clarity in the use of the Content 
models, and the great amount of mathematical 
development behind the Distance models. He does 
point the way, though, to some of the problems 
that will have to be solved to find a good model 
of similarity. 
The most important of these problems are 
probably the effects of different, contexts and 
ranqes of stimuli, and the problem of unique 
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dimensions. The context problem is already being 
studied; the work of Byman and WE~ll shows that 
different models will be necessary in different 
contexts; it is yet to be seen h(~ different 
they will eventually have to be. Ekman et. al. 
(1963, 1964); and Becker and Pipahl (1974) also 
discuss this. However, the considerations of 
these authors by no means cover all the problems 
of contextual effects. Torgerson (1965, p. 383) 
gave an example where doubling the stimulus range 
left the range of similarity judgments constant: 
similarity apparently changed according to the 
context. In certain circumstances this is easily 
explainable for the Content models by their property 
S6 (see Chapter 1); it is quite inexplicable 
according to the Distance models. There are still 
plenty of context effects the Con'tent models do 
not explain (see Waern, 1971b; Wallach, 1958; 
Goldmeier, 1972: Ternus, 1938): far more 
sophisticated models than any considered here are 
obviously still needed. 
However, the Content models do allow for an 
additional type of context effect not allowed 
for by Distance models - in the problem of unique 
dimensions. If "irrelevant n dimensioRs (usually 
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ones that do not vary over that sample) are present 
then the intradimensional subtractivity of the 
Distance models means that they c,ancel and may 
as well not be there. This does not happen with 
the Content models however: it may be that correct 
recognition of "irrelevant" diro~nsions may explain 
some problems of ~ontext (see also Hoijer, 1969a: 
Goodall, 1966: Fenker and Brown, 1969; Shepard, 
1964 for further references on "unique dimensions n ). 
It may also partly explain why multidimensional 
scalings with Content models often have higher 
dimensionality than with Distance models (see 
section 2.1.1.2). 
The other problems listed by Sjoberg have 
been studied in certain aspects by other authors 
not previously noted: for example, Johnson (1967), 
Waern (197lb), CUnningham and Shepard (1973), 
Arabie and Shepard (1973) on non-dimensional 
structures; Hoijer (1969), Fillenbaum (1973) 
on effect of instructions; Derks (1972), on 
matching; Bechtel (1966), Cooper (1973) on scale 
consistency: Fenker and Brown (1~H;9), and 
Lockhead (1970) discussconsidera1:ions relating 
to stimulus comparability_ 
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In summary, surprisingly litt:le rigorous, 
detailed testing of models appears; to have been done. 
On the Content model side, the only ones we can 
definitely count out are those of Ekman and Lindman 
(1961), and Ekehammar (1972a), for mathematical 
reasons. Paradoxically, on empirical grounds, that 
of Ekman and Lindman seems to be one of the best, 
though this Inay be only for spaces of metathetic 
continua. Gregson's appears promising, but not 
fully tested.. The other Content models are only 
mediocre although they usefully rE~f1ect some properties 
of similarity. Thus the line of l~easoning represented 
by Gregson's model seems worhh developing. 
The most likely on the side of the Distance 
models are the Minkowski distances with parameter 
from 1 to 2, inclusive, although few others have 
been seriously considered. Their main attraction 
has been mathematical properties such as additivity 
on straight lines, the triangle inequality, and the 
behaviour under affine transformations of the space. 
None of these properties as yet have much psycho-
logical support, though they are 'co a large extent 
untested. Their attractiveness may be due to one's 
Euclidean-based "intuitions U about what a distance 
should be like, and is therefore unreliable. 
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Problems also exist in that the two different 
schools tend to use different methods for testing 
their models, which to some extent make them 
difficult to compare. Ekman, for example emphasises 
testing models "at the proper lev.~l If (Ekman, 1961) 
and this has been largely adopted by the Content 
model school. Distance model tes1cing tends to be 
only comparative and Procrustean, although the 
ordinal techniques of Beals, Kran'cz and Tversky 
are an exception. Different models may be necessary 
for prothetic and metathetic continua. 
tie might finally remark that none of the 
similarity models, except Hoijer's (1969a) and 
possibly Waern' s (l968a) obey Lucl~' s Principles 
of Theory Construction (Luce, 1959a). This is 
only typical of the generally chaotic state of 
the psychology of similarity. 
2.2 PROBLEMS OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 
Since the beginnings of general use of MDS 
teehniques (e.g. Torgerson, 1958), and particularly 
since the advent of the Shepard-Kruskal non-metric 
MDS algorithms, there has been a 1widespread and 
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growing awareness of their weaknesses, artefactual 
results, and technical problems. Shapard, Romney 
and Nerlove (1972) set out a wide range of 
techniques with many of their technical details 
and problems; we shall not be going into this 
here. The technical problems include the effects 
on the final configuration and itls fit to the 
data of choice of initial configuration, stress 
formula, mono tonic transformation and minimisation 
method. Such papers as Young (19'13), Guttman (1968), 
Arabie (1973), Roskam (1970a,b) give some ideas 
on these. t'le are more concerned h.ere wi th a 
question that assumes that these problems have 
been satisfactorily resolved, or at least that 
they can be made as irrelevant as possibl~ by, for 
example, keeping to a fixed, reasonably satisfactory, 
set of such options. We shall be concerned with the 
effect of an algorithm's modelling assumptions! 
how do they affect the final configuration? 
Generally, one would expect -the model used 
to affect the solution in three w,ays: 
(1) It will affect the goodness of fit 
(stress): 
(2) It will affect the number of dimensions 
required for a reasonable fit; 
(3) It will affect the interpretability 
of the final configuration (and its 
dimensions). 
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It is generally assumed, at least in practice, 
that good results on all three of these criteria 
- namely, low stress, low number of dimensions, 
and good interpretability - is evidence for the 
validity of the model used. There are however, 
indications that this is not necessarily so. 
Koopman and Cooper (1974) discuss an 
equivalence between the Minkowski a-distances with 
parameter, a, between 1.0 and 2.0, and those with 
parameter, a, between 2.0 and~. They show that, 
in two dimensions, identical (in the case of a = 1) 
or almost identical sets of inteppoint distances 
can be reproduced from two different configurations, 
one in Minkowski a-distance space, the other in 
Minkowski a*-distance space where 
a* -
Thus, for example r the City-Block (a= 1) and 
Uominance" (a* =~) spaces are in this sense 
equivalent, while Euclidean (a= a* = 2) space 
has no equivalent Minkowski space. They also 
100. 
show that the City-Block space in m dimensions 
has a corresponding Dominance space in 2m- l 
dimensions with the property set out above. 
Setting aside the question of interpretability 
of the dimensions or configurations of the alternative 
spaces (although one might cynically suggest 
that evidence seems to show that an interpretation 
can be found for almost anything - see Armstrong 
1967), the implications of this are twofold. 
Firstly, a low stress for any particular Minkowski 
model in two dimensions does not znean necessarily 
that that model truly represents the way the subject 
is behaving; nor that the configuration it pro-
duces is the correct one: at least one alternative 
model and configuration exists. Secondly, a low 
dimensional solution for a City-Block model does 
not mean necessarily that the City-Block model 
is true or that the configuration is the correct 
one: the Dominance model 'with a higher dimensioned 
configuration is just as possible. 
These implications not only have obvious 
practical importance, but they also serve as 
counterexamp1es to any supposed one-to-one 
relationship between models and configurations. 
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Good stress and low dimensionality are not 
sufficient evidence for the validity of a particular 
model. Attempts to determine " true 11 dimensionality 
or "true" goodness of fit by use of regressions 
on Monte Carlo data to find the relation between 
stress, number of points, and dimensionality 
(e.g. Young, 1968; Spence and Graef, 1974), until 
this point is resolved are merely begging the 
question. 
Eisler (1967) and Roskam (1972) give a counter-
example on the interpretability criterion. Two 
scalings of similarity data from an experiment 
by Eisler on simple point stimuli gave two different 
but equally interpretable two-dimensional 
configurations. (The stress values are not directly 
comparable since different stress formulas were 
used in each case). In other words, two different 
models gave quite different but equally 
plausible solutions. Thus not even interpretability 
in MDS solutions may be relied on as a guide to 
whether a model is correct. 
We can conclude then, that on modelling 
assumptions alone - leaving aside any consideration 
of the better studied effects of technical 
options - none of the three usual criteria for 
acceptance of a model in MDS are reliable. Independ-
ent validation of the model is still needed. 
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2.3 PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOPHYSICS 
In Psychophysics, as in MOS, there are large 
problem areas with which we shall not concern 
ourselves. Those of relevance here are Weber's Law 
and its proposed subjective counterpart, Ekman's 
Law; the prothetic versus metathetic scale 
distinction; and the relation between confusion, 
category and magnitude scales. Members of the 
content model school have made several attempts to 
relate the unidimension81 similarity model to 
these problems, and we shall be re-examining some 
of them from this viewpoint in Chapter 5. 
2.3.1 EKMAN'S LAW 
Ekman (1961) suggested a subjective analogue 
of Weber's Law: 
hx = (IX + a 
where B is near zero, which Stevens (1966) called 
"Ekman's Law". This has been given a similarity 
derivation (e.g. Ekman, Goude, and Waern, 1961) by 
assuming that "a j.n.d. is constant on the 
similarity continuum", so, using equation (2.1} 
a' = $(x, x+6x) 
~a' a constant). Hence, 
so, if 
we ha7e 
l-2a' 6x=-- x 
a' 
a = 
1-2a' 
a' 
6x = aXe 
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x (2.20) 
a is presumably to be fitted from data to account 
for the usual distortions for x near zero. A 
parallel argument holds if we assume that 
equation (2.4) holds instead of ~.l). The 
basic assumption is of course summarised in the 
lefthand equality of (2.20); it is open to 
experimental~st, but it does not seem to explain 
much more than does Ekman's Law itself. 
We assumed of course that x here was in sub-
jective space - this would seem reasonable. If 
it is in physical space, the above "derivation" 
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gives Weber's Law. Also x must be on a prothetic 
continuum: see the comments in the following 
section. 
2.3.2 PROTHETICNESS AND METATHETICNESS 
Stevens and Galanter (Stevens and Ga1anter, 
1957; Stevens, 1957) introduced a distinction 
between metathetic and prothetic continua, 
defining them largely in operational terms: the 
j.n.d. size increased up the scale on prothetic; 
but not metathetic continua: category scales 
are concave downwards on magnitude scales on 
prothetic continua - they may be linear on 
metathetic continua; "time order error" exists 
only on prothetic scalesi and the hysterisis 
effect probably only occurs on prothetic scales. 
Rest1e (1959, 1961) has given a theoretical 
foundation to the two types of scale: he showed 
that the only types of scale with the "betweeness 
property" (see section 2.1.3.1) present everywhere 
were the substitutive or metathetic scales. The 
prothetic, quantitative, or intensive scale is a 
special case of the sUbstitutive scale, in which 
nothing is substituted for what is removed: it 
forms a sequence of nested sets. Thus there is 
a continuum between metatheticness and protheticness 
(see also Eisler, 1963, 1964). 
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It is difficult~ relate this inter-
pretation directly to scaling. Gregson's similarity 
model is one attempt; another is found in 
Becker and pipahl (1974), who derive the City-
Block model from Restle's theory, assuming 
metathetic continua. They then try to interpret 
the stimuli in two experiments (Wjender, 1971; 
and Tversky and Krantz, 1969) in view of the fact 
that only the second experiment found that 
psychological distance was consistent with a City-
Block distance. They conclude 1ha,t "the nested 
structure assumption" may be necessary for the 
decomposability condition to hold. While their 
interpretation is worthwhile, it is hardly 
unambiguous and needs further clarification. 
2.3.3 CATEGORY VS MAGNITUDE SCALES 
The operational criterion of protheticnes8 
that has been given the greatest ~attention by 
similarity theorists is that of the concave 
downwards relation between category scales and 
magnitude scales. In fact the relationship between 
the two scales varies a great deal, depending an 
various conditions including stimulus distribution 
or spacing, and stimulus discriminability down 
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the scale. For a logarithmic spacing of the 
stimuli, the relationship itself is almost 
logarithmic, as is a "pure" category scale suggested 
by Stevens and Galanter (op.cit.). The 
relationship between the magnitude and confusion 
scales is also logarithmic (e.g. Stevens, 
1960b,1966). Torgerson (1960) suggested a near-
logarithmic relationship for category scales and 
rejected the discrirninabili ty condition; he 
also noted a complementary rela ticmship between 
category scAles of opposite dimensions and a 
reciprocal one between the corresponding pair of 
magnitude scales. From this observation and an 
additional assumption, Eis1er (1962) showed that, 
if this was a general law, the l~Jarithmic 
relationship must hold; he also gave an alter-
native derivation in terms of dis(::riminabi1ity. 
The mathematical purity of the logarithm 
also attracted derivations in tenns of 
similarity judgments. The theory here says 
that categories are used by the subject to divide 
the stimulus range into intervals whose exemplars 
are evenly spaced on the similarity cont'nu\lID)~ 
Thus if the range is [x,yJ and is to be divided 
into n categories, exemplified by x l ,x2 , •• ,xn 
respectively, where x = Xl and y = xn ' we have 
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Bither of the unidimensional similarity models 
(equations (2.1) and (2.4» then implies 
V .. e{l,2, •• ,n} 
1.,) 
Ekman, Goude and Waern (1961) stated without 
proof that this result showed that the 
logarithmic relationship held; Junge (1960), 
(2.21) 
with the help of the assumption of Steven's Power 
'Law and the questionable assumption (which he 
calls a "banal truth") that D = 1 - $, gives a 
proof. 
However, a related assumption to equation 
(2.21) gives questionable results. If we assume 
that the bisection judgment is also simply dividing 
the interval so that the bisection point is equi-
similar to the two end points, then we have equation 
(2.21) for n = 3, so 
= !.2 Y 
where x 2 is the bisection point; so 
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Luce, (1961) points out that, even with hysterisis 
effects ignored, this value is too low, and 
overcomes this with bias parameters. Restle J196l, 
p. 216) in a related discussion gives evidence 
from Stevens and Galanter (op.cit.) that the 
middle category of a category scale is generally 
quite close to one-third of the (physical) 
distance from the smallest to the largest stimulus. 
He wives the rather unintuitive explanation that 
each stimulus consists of both "smallness" and 
"largeness ll aspects; this, using the set theoretic 
interpretation, gives the required result. 
Restle's observation and the logarithmic relation 
are incompatible; for further discussion see 
Chapter 5. 
One important point should finally be made: if 
the similarity analyses given in this section and in 
section 2.3.1 are at all correct, then since their 
~esults are true only for pro~et1c continua, the 
unidimensional similarity models on which the 
analyses are based can be true only for prothetic 
continua. A different model of (unidimensional) 
similarity will be needed for metathetic continua. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE FUNCTION 
The distance models are weak as to their 
empirical background; the YeCtor content models 
are weak as to their mathematical tractability. 
In addition, the latter have such a weak intuitive 
structure that their resulting variety 
makes modelling a sophisticated curve-fitting 
exercise rather than the construction of a 
soundly based theory. 
In this chapter ",e will cons"cruct a non-
Minkowskian distance function with some basis in 
both set theory and empirical data. It will 
have an obvious but complex re1at:ionship to the 
Minkowski family. We will develop variations on 
existing models of similarity, and. will show 
that the ~iinkowski distances do have a place in 
similarity modelling. 
Our starting point will be the set-
theoretic interpretation of the content models, 
for which Gregson's model has given some 
empirical foundation. To develop them, we shall 
follow Rest1e's used set theory (see Rest1e, 
1959, 1961), but extend it to an infinite case. 
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Sections 2.1.3.1 and 2.3.2 give a brief summary 
of some of his results and some warnings about 
their validity. We shall base the development 
on Gregson's interpretation of the content model 
(e.g. Gregson, 1970; and section 2.1.1.1) which 
will be denoted by $G: 
$G(X,y) = !!. (xny) 
m(XUY) 
(3.1) 
and Eisler's (Eisler, 1967~ and section 2.1.1.1) 
interpretation, to be denoted by ;~E: 
= 
2!!(Xny) 
~(X) + m(Y) 
(3.2) 
They will be developed in parallel in the context 
of the two different types of continua: prothetic 
and metathetic. Although Restle's analysis 
makes the first a special case of the second, we 
will find that the extremes of protheticness and 
metatheticness can give quite different models. 
In all cases, we will be working in the 
space of "relevant aspects". This means in 
practice that aspects of the stimulus sample 
that are for some reason ignored by the subject 
will not be considered in our analysis. 
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An important property of the content models 
is that they are sensitive to all attributes 
present in the stimulus descriptions whether 
or not the stimuli all take the same value on 
a given attribute; thus an important question 
is how to decide which attru.t.es are Wre\1.eYantR, 
or have an effect on the final judgment represented 
by the model. We are effectively begging this 
question by our choice of stimulu,s space. Further 
comments on this will be found in section 3.3. 
In a given context, the measure m will be 
assumed to conform to the usual properties of a 
measure (see, for example Restle, 1959; or 
Halmos, 1950, p.30): properties (i), (ii), and 
(iv), as set out in section 2.1.3.1. It will 
represent a subjective assessment of the "size" 
of the sets of aspects of the stimuli. There may 
be inter-individual or temporal (,e.g. Eisler, 1960, 
p. 78) variation in the measure, but we will not 
discuss this in detail. Effectiv,ely, our assumptions 
here represent a transfer from assumptions about 
the nature of the distance function to (perhaps 
more basic) assumptions about the nature of the 
measure on sets of aspects. In themselves they 
have little justification apart from the results they 
imply and their attractiveness mathematically and, 
perhaps, intuitively. 
3 .. 1 'ftI£ MODEL ON PROTBE'rIC comINUA 
3.1.1 The Model 
. . ~'- ~ 
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Consider a space a: of IIfrelevan~ aspeot.s llt , 
constructed as follows: 
Let there be n sequences of sets, a l' 
1-1,2, ••• ,n, where 
(i.e. a i is a family of neet-ed sets; in the first 
ease it i8 an ~.ncrea.l!!i sequence, in the second 
it 161 deereasin2.") 
\I ,,.j; i , j t; { 1, 2, It • , n} , 
'then define the space as 
11. 
Cl .. {x; X .. U "i~ Xi I; Cl l' 1-1, ••• ,n} 
1-1 
113. 
This space is thus a set of unions of n 
disjoint prothetic continua. Each set in it is a 
unique union of sets, one from each continuum: 
Suppose some set XE([ has two different such 
compositions - i.e. suppose one union is not 
unique 1 then 
n n 
x = U Xi = 
i=l U X i' i=1 
I 
where Xi,x . Ea . ~ ~ 
for i-1,2, •• ,n 
Take any such j. Then 
n I 
X. = (U Xi) n X
J
,; 
J i=1 
n 
i. e. U (X .OX.) = 
i=1 ~ J 
n I 
U (X fX
J
.) 
i=1 
But, by P..;. (c) , X.OX. = XI .nx. = 1> if ~j. 
~ J ~ J 
Therefore (3.3) reduces to 
X.tlX. = X .OX. 
J J J J 
or X. = X I .iI X • , so X
J
' C X I J' • 
J J J 
(3.3) 
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By an exactly parallel arquaent wit.h X' j' we can 
show that 
, , , 
X' j • x,nx j' so X j C X j. 
Thus X' 'j • Xj a contradictioll. 
, 
Hence Xi· Xi i - 1,2, ••• ,n 
so the If two 11 decomposi tion. are t.he same. 
The space closely resembles cl ca~sian product 
of values in n d~ensions. Assumption P.(a) above 
implies that eaoh "dimension ll can have either a· 
finite or infinite number of members: that is, the 
dimension can be anything from discrete (discont.in-
\lOu.) and finite, to continuous. Assumptions P. (b) 
and P. (0) will bed15cussed later. 
Taking any X in the space, then 
for samea1 ,u2, ••• ,Qn. However, we shall use the 
simpler notation 
-
i 81 1,2, ••• ,a. 
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so that 
n 
X = U X. and xl.nxJ. = ~, i,j == 1,2, •• ,n, i~j. . 1 1 1= 
Hence, if m is a measure as defined previously, then 
m(X) = 
n 
1: m (X.) • 
. 1- 1 1= 
Now, since each a:. is a family of: nested sets, 
1 
it is easily seen that 
and m (X.\j Y .) == max (m (X. ) ,m (Y • ) ) , 
- 1 1 - 1 - 1 
for i=1,2, ••• ,n and any X,Ve<X. 
But 
and 
n n 
X~Y = (U Xi) n ( U Yi ) i=l i=l 
n 
= U (x.ny.), using P.(c), 
. 1 1 1 1= 
XUY == 
= 
n n 
(\) X.) Ij (U Y.) 
i=l 1 1==1 1 
n 
U (XiUY.) 
i=l 1 
which are still disjoint unions. Hence 
and 
n 
~(X~y) = .Llmin(m(Xi~'~(Yi» 
1= 
II 
m (XUY) = .t max(m(Xi)'~(Yi» 
1=1 
Applying these to the defining equations 
(3.1) and (3.2), we get, respectively, 
SG(X,y) = 
n 
t min(mCX.),m(Y.» 
. 1 - 1 - 1 1= • 
n 
.t max(~(Xi)'~(Yi» 
1=1 
n 
2 t min(m(x.),m(Y.» 
... - 1 - 1 1=.1. $E(X'Y-' = .....;;;;-n~------
t (m(X.) + m(Y.» 
i=l - 1 - 1 
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(3." ) 
C3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
We now simplify the notation by taking 
literally the cartesian product analogy mentbned 
above. Thus we put 
X. = m(X.), 
1 - 1 
i = 1,2, •••• ,n 
and so on for all members of cr. Note that 
X. > 0 for all X and i. Rewriting (3.6) and 
1 -
(3.7) using this noucion, we have 
$G(X,y) = 
n 
t min <le. , ~. ) 
. 1 1 41 1= 
n 
t max (x. , y. ) 
i=l 1 1 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
and 
Now 1 t is easily seen that for any a .. B £ It, 
(I +S-lu<i"!81 
min(a,fU .. -----
2 
CI+s·fa-~f 
max(a,.fH - ----
2 
, 
so substituting back6nto (3.9) and (3.10), 
and 
n 
t.!a.[Xi+Yi - IXi-Yi lJ 
.. ' . __ . 
n 
t (xi+Yi' 
ial 
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(3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
If we divide both numerator and denominator of 
both these equations by we find: 
n 
E 'x. -y.1 
· 1 l. l. 
1 - l.= n 
E (x.+y.) 
· 1 l. l. $G(x,y) = l.= n 
E IX'-Yi 1 
· 1 l. 
1 + l.= 
n 
L (x'+Y.) 
· 1 l. l. l.= 
and 
n 
E Ix.-y.' 
$E(X'Y) 1 - i-I l. l. == n 
E (x .+y.) 
• 1 l. l. l.= 
n 
(Note that if E (x .+y.) == 0, both models are 
. 1 1. l. l.= 
undef ined) • 
It is now obvious that the function 
J) (x,y) 
-
n 
*!x.-y. , 
. 1 l. l. l.-
n 
E (x'''''i) 
. 1 l. l.-
is a critical one: we have 
and 
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(3.13 ) 
(3.14) 
(3.15 ) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
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It is clearly a distance function in that it 
measures napartness~. However, (3.15) implies 
that it. is not always non-negative when x, ytJR n+ • 
Although our definitions of the xi and Yi (equation 
n+ (3.7» imply that x,yelR , it would seem useful, 
at least mathematically, for it to be non-negative 
in the whole of JR n. 
Two 9eneDlisations to provide for this 
suggest themselves: 
Dl (x,y) 
and 
n 
t [tx11+ly.l] 
i-l l. 
n 
I Ix.-y I 
i-I l. i c ____ _ 
Both reduce to (3.15) when x,y£,Jjt n+. 
But (3.18) and (1.19) suggest a further 
generalisation, along the same lUles as the 
Minkowski distances: taking a>o, 
(3.19) 
and 
J) (x,yJ; = 
IS 
][)2S(x,y) -
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n 1 (3.20) 
+ ( E Iy I B) IS 
i=l i 
(3.21) 
respectively. Aqain, both reduce to (3.15) when 
n+ 
x, yelR and B= 1. 
These are oUt' ttpsycholoqical distance functions" 
for prothetic continua. 
3.1.2 Discussion 
Fuller discussion of the properties of these 
functions can be found in Chapter 4, but a few 
comments are in order here. 
Firstly, what do the xi represent? 
Oriqinally (equation (3.8» they were introduced 
merely as notational simplifications. However, 
if Restle's theory has any basis in reality, 
what we called the xi must be measurable. His 
theory in fact says that prothetic continua 
(which we assumed in assumption P.(b» are 
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intensive or quantitative continwl, the xi should 
represent the subjective magnitude of the stimulus 
x on the ith continuum or dimensic)n. Further, 
since ~i - 0 at zero intensity on the ith 
dimension, negative values of xi now have a 
special meaning - if they are permissab1e: they 
may not be. This also implies that the xi-scales 
are at least ratio scales. 
Secondly, what does the par~neter 6 mean? There 
is no obvious interpretation, but mathematically 
it represents an increasing merging of the separate 
dimensions - perhaps in the sense that they 
increasingly (but independently) '"cross comnion ground'-. 
Initially, for 8 - 1, we assumed (P.(c» that the ~ 
dimensions were totally disjoint; larger a may in-' 
same way represent larger intersections between. the 
dimensions - though not larger dependence between 
them. Alternatively, it may represent changes 
in the form of the measure,~. ~mpirically, we may 
find it has a similar interpretation (in terms of 
ana1yzabi1ity of stimuli) to the Minkowski-distance 
parameter. Note however, that we do not yet restrict 
a to being greater than or equal to unity, as is 
generally true in the Minkowski case. 
Thirdly, the general form of ~8 and D 213' at 
least for e > 1, is of a normalised distance. 
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We shall often refer to them in this way. However, 
this also suggests further generalisations of the 
distance function which may be carried out 
virtually ad infinitum: take any metric on lR nand 
normalise it in some way. The examples given 
here suggest two ways immediately: if d is the 
metric, then two normalised metrics from dare 
and 
d(x,y) 
d(x,e)+d(y,e) 
d(x,X) 
d(x+y,e) 
The trian~ inequality always means the first is not 
greater than 1.0; the second is not necessarily as 
well behaved: for example, if x = -y (if points not 
in m. n+ are permitted) the denominator is zero. The 
first runs into problems of zero denominator only 
when x = y = e, (this follows from the facts that, 
since d is a metric, it is non-negative, and 
d(x,y) = 0 0 x = y): we shall define either 
normalised metric to be zero in this case. 
Finally, the distance function can be related 
to other content models. By derivation, we have 
n+ (at least for x,y£lR ) 
= 
1-ll1l 
I+D 11 
Goude's (1966) model (see table 2.1) is 
j h 2 +h 2 - 211 h coscP 
x X x X xX 
J 
By elementary Euclidean geometry, this can be 
rewritten as 
_ (x,y)·. 1 -
. GD 
n 2 ~ ( 1: (x. -y. .) ) 
i=l ~ 1. 
n 2 J;i { 1: (x. +y.) ) 
. 1 ~ ~ ~= 
so = 1 - D 22 
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(3.22) 
Lastly, and, mathematically, most interestingly, 
Micko I S interpretation of the vec·tor content models 
gives, in the most general form, 
$ (x,y) = 1 -
M 
(Micko, 1970, p. 220: 
d(x,y) 
d(x,e)+d(y,e) 
see section 2.l.l.l~ where 
d is any distance on lR n. Thus as a special case, 
we have 
= 1 (3.23) 
for any a > 1; otherwise Micko's models form a 
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subset of the qeneralised "normal:Lsed. metrics" suggested 
in the previous paragraph. Thus '"e have several 
tie-ups between the present distance functions 
and some content models which have already been 
partially investigated empirically. It Ss also of 
interest that D 11 is the Bray-Curtis measure 
(see section 2.1.3.6). 
3.2 THE MODEL ON METATHETIC CONTINUA 
We shall look at the two models (3.1) and 
(3.2) on metathetic continua of a special kind -
those in which all member sets arl~ of equal measure. 
It is by no means a general case, but it is at the 
opposite end of the metatheticness - protheticness 
oontinuum from protheticness, easily produces 
interesting and SU9'gestive results, and is reasonably 
plausible. Other metathetic continua _ill be 
briefly discussed later. 
3.2.1 The Model 
Consider a space lB of "rele'vant aspects", 
constructed as follows: 
For i 11: 1,2, ••• ,n, let 
]8i , {B ' Qe{2i} = : ia 
(3.24) 
lB i " {S " ae"i} - " ia . 
where 
M. (b) a<a' ... Bia' c. Bia~ 
and Bi~' c. Bi'a ) 
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d.e. 18i and 1131' , the "polar arrays", are families 
of nested sets which are, respectively, increasing 
and decreasing). 
M. Cd): 
+ for some mi elR • 
= 
= 
Now define, for i=1,2, ••• ,n, 
lB. == {D. : B.- B',' lJ B." 1 :La :La 1a :La 
and further assume 
M. (e): 
• ,
IXm • 
l. 
'V i,j e{l,2, .... ,n}, !,rj 
(3 .. 25) 
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Then, finally, the space itself can be defined: 
n 
E = {X:X = U X.; x.em .,~i=1,2, ••• ,n}. 
i=l 1 1 1 
Thus, the space, lB, is a family of unions of 
n disjoint metathetic continua, the 13 i. Each 
set in lB is a unique union of sets from each 
continuum, so again we have a dimensional 
structure. Assumption M. (a) serves exactly the 
same purpose as P. (a); we take the interval 
[D,l] instead of the whole non-negative real line, 
+ E , solely for reasons of convenience related to 
M. (d), as will be seen below. Assumption M. (b) " 
along with defining equations (3.24), sets up 
the two "polar arrays" on each dimension which 
together define, through (3.25) the metathetic 
continuum. Assumptions M.(c) and M. Ce) 
together act in the same way as assumption P.(c) 
to prevent overlap between dimensions. 
Assumptions M. (c) and M.Cd) make up the 
"measure equality" assumption, that on each 
dimension lB i , all sets have equal measure: 
Let XielB i; then, by (3.25), for some 
Bl elB.', 
~a 1 
B'.' dB ~, 
1a 1 
so 
1.e. 
-
lD_(Xi ) - m(B' U S" ) - la ia 
- m(S' ) + m(B H ) by M.(c) and 
- ia - ia 
since m is a 
measure. 
-
by assumption 
M .• Cd) • 
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(3.26 ) 
This means that the "size R (l.e. measure) of-
a set Oft one of the metatbetic dimensioDs making 
up the space is not a measure of its position on. 
~t dimeosion. 
In spite of the space beinq nmetathetic", 
the basic structure is still the same as in the 
prothetic case: any set in lB can be expressed 
as a ~ union of sets from 2n prothetic 
continua: 
2n 
X - U Xi' where, for some xi£fli if i2.n (3.2.') i-I 
Note that for each X, each xi is unique 
by a unique union property proved in section 
3.1.1. 
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Thus the families lB i and :e i are the 
disjoint prothetic arrays corresponding to the 
a i of section 3.1.1. We can therefore 90 throu9h 
an identical process to that section to qet 
equation (3.15) in the form 
D(x,y) - (3.28) 
Now, by (3.27) and M.(d) we have, for i<n 
Thus 
and 
Therefore (3.28) becomes 
D(x,y) = 
= 
and putting n. 
~ 
D(x,y) = 
where 
n 
2 1: m~ Ix.; - y ~ I ... 
i=l·· • 
m. 
~ n 
1: 
i=l 
n Jx. - y·1 ~ ~ 1: m. j=l J 
= m. I~ m. ~ fj=l ) 
n 
for i=1,2, ••• ,n, 
I: n.lx. - y., 
i=l ~ ~ ~ 
n 
1: n. = 1. 
. 1 ~ ~= 
Thus, the psychological distance :function for 
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(3.29) 
the metathetic case is the (weigh·ted) City':"'B1ock 
distance. Compare also the distance of Gower 
(1967) - see section 2.1.3.6, The similarity 
models for metathetic continua therefore are 
(by equations (3.16) and (3.17) respectively) 
n 
1 - 1: n.lx. 
- Yi/ i=l ~ . ~ $G(x,y) = n (3.30) 
1 + 1: niJx. 
- Yi' 
. 1 ~ ~= 
n 
1 - I: n./x. - y.1 
i=l ~ ~ ~ = (3.31) 
The obvious generalisation of (3.29), 
following equation (3.20) more than equation 
(3.21), is to the Minkowski distances - call 
them]M e - although we may possibly also take 
o < e < 1. Thus the Minkowski models are 
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theoretically reasonable "psychological distance 
functions" for equal-measure metathetic continua. 
The fact that they are a special case of the 
D.Ls (or D:2s ) models suggests, however, that the 
latter are the more basic models in this area of 
psychology. 
It should be remembered that the Xi do not 
have the same meaning here as the Xi in the general 
model of section 3.1.1. By equation (3.27), in 
conjuction with M.(d), Xi is the proportion the 
* increasing polar array set, B', , is of the total 1xi 
set X (= B,x ~ on the metathetic continuum. It 
1. i 
also in a sense represents "how far" the set is 
along that continuum (see Figure :~ .1). In the 
metathetic case, Xi does not represent the 
measure of the set Xi as it does in the prothetic 
case. For any metathetic continuum in fact, a 
* Which of the polar arrays is to be taken. as 
"increasing" is largely arbitrary, but must somehow 
be fixed. 
M· I 
- ...................................... ~. -
(·1-odM· 
J 
/' 
lB·" I 
/ 
18.' L 
exM· I 
/ 
, . 
/ 
/' . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
0 Q( 1 
... 
~ l ~ 
"9. B. Bi1 10 ICX 
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FIGURE 3.1: The equal-measure metathetic continuum. 
Each set B. on the continuum is a disjoint union of 
two sets: 19ne, of size am., from the (increasing) 
polar array JB.', the other~ of size (I-a) m., from 
the (decreasi~g) polar array ID.". 1 
1 
m (B. ) = m (B'. U B'! ) = m. 
- la - la la 1 
If x.. = B. , we write a = x .• -~ la 1 
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relation analog-ous to M. (d) will ~Jive the measure 
of the total set Xi from the value xi· Also in this 
metatbetic case the xi are bounded to unit 
rang-e, thus bounding D (-ne); this is essential 
if equations (3.30) and (3.31) are not to be 
negative, and has wide implications as to permissable 
generalisation functions (see section 2.1.2.1). 
3.2.2 Discussion 
The first question that comes to mind about 
this result is: what, empirically, is an "equal-
measureD metatbetic continuwo? The equal-
measure property is very reminiscent of the equal-
intensity (or equal vector lenqth) assumptioD used 
to simplify vector models (see section 2.1.1.2). 
While the two cases may not be identical (for 
example, since all the vector content'models are 
based in Euclidean space, M.(d) would probably 
be replaced with 
m (B' ) ia == - am.), 1 
the same intuitions are involved. The continua 
used to test the vector models under the equal 
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tntensity assumption are therefore examples 
that could be used here, a~ least approximately. 
Some are (Jiven in section 2.1.2. 2:1 another would 
seem to be the Conservatism-Libercl1ism scale in 
Land (1974) (see also Stevens, 1966). "rhis 
equal-measure restriction does not seem too 
unrealistic. 
To use Lund t s continuum as an example, the 
soale would be made up of bra, prEtsumably prothetic, 
continua t • Conservatism " and "Liberalism". Each 
point on the scale would be of e~lalftinten.ity·, 
consisting of a certain proportion of Liberalism, 
and a certain proportion of Conservatism, one of 
which we measure to 9ive. the scale value. Of 
course, the interpretation of this example - on a 
purely subjective continuum - aay not be typical of 
psychophysical scales whose metatbetieness or 
otherwise Rlay be determined larqely by physioloqica1 
factors, and which therefore require a physioloqical 
interpretation (8.9- pitch: see St.evens and 
Galanter, 1957). 
A large part of the construct.ion of the 
previous section is only a matter of definition. 
As long as they are bounded with unit range, 
there is no reason why the Xi -seal.es sbould 
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directly measure proportionality. Since only their 
differences are actually used (equations (3.30) 
and (3.31», they can therefore be translated 
by any amount. In practice, of course, the 
xi-scales can also all be multiplied by any positive 
amount - so they are interval scales - but we 
shall use the convention that any such 
multiplication will be absorbed into the weights 
The status of these weights is obviously 
dependent on that of the measure lll. In so far 
as m varies between observers, as it may well do, 
the weights obviously may change. Thus the 
weights have a similar interpretation to that given 
by Carroll (1972) or Gregson (1972), for example. 
The measure may of course vary in other ways: see 
section 3.3. 
The present case of metathetic continuum is 
a very special one, although it may in fact be 
empirically quite common, or at least a good 
approximation to many others. Using the line of 
reasoning given here, it is obviously possible to 
derive results for any such metathetic continuum -
at least in Restle's sense: see Restle (1961, 
p. 50 ff.) for examples. Their forms are not in 
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general as straightforward as the one given here, 
but they may be found useful at some stage. 
Eisler (1963) in fact suggested tbat such results 
were necessary, suggesting that n~rotheticne.s· 
should be quantifiable. Although he gave no such 
quantification, Restle'. analysis immediately 
suggests some: for example, usinlg the notation of 
this chapter, the index 
( lill 
) Aa+O 
n 
for a general metatbetic array {Xa:a£O} is zero 
for protnetic continua and unity for the equal-
measure metatbetic continua defined in section 
3.2.1. 
3 .. 3 O'l'HER COMMEN'l"S 
Obviously, certain aspects will be common 
to the prothetic and metathetic cases. Firstly, 
both have been given a dimensional structure.. It is 
obvious from the derivations that this is by no 
means necessary, though very convenient. It is 
possible to generalise the models to non-dimensional 
and/or discrete (discontinuous) spaces. Whether 
this can be done usefully is a different matter; 
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we shall not investigate it here. One should 
always bear in mind, however, that the interpretation 
of the dimensions in the two cases is different -
see section 3.2.1. 
Secondly, the dimensions are based on 
Restle's theory of arrays. Restl,e' s arrays always 
have a "core" which would represent, in our terms, 
irrelevant aspects. By considering only the 
space of relevant aspects, we avoid the problem of 
having to consider the core, but it may still 
need to be taken into account in some situations. 
It may particularly be relevant to context effects. 
Being common to all stimuli but disjoint from 
their relevant aspects, its effect would be to 
add the sQlIle amount to both numerator and 
denominator of all our models. (ref. equations 
(3 • 6) and (3. 7) ) • 
Thirdly, the whole structure is based on 
the form of the measure function m. Its 
properties must have an all-perva.sive effect on 
the construction, so they must be closely examined. 
It is merely a mathematical nicety, for example, 
that we accept a priori the property 
xnY = ! • ~(XUY) = m(X) + ~(Y). 
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Any nUl.'lll.'Jer of replacements for thJ.s could be thought 
of, tbe most appealinq perhaps betnq 
for some a ~ 1. This would give (~onsistently: 
larqer results that the corresponding models 
using' D 2af it 'WOuld of course cdncide with D la' 
]I) 213 and :Ma when e - 1. 
A final property the two tl'PGS of model 
have in oommon is the form of the stmilarity 
qradient: Greqson1a model gives the relation 
and Eisler's 
I-D 
(3.35) 
(3.36) 
(3.35) seems to be a new uninvestiqated form for 
the similarity <,;radient. We shal.l look at some 
of the consequences of these equations in sub-
sequent chapters. 
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Finally, two comments on the relationship 
between the two spaces. Firstly, although we 
draw the distinction between protheticness and 
metatheticness, as already noted, the former is 
but a special case of the latter. Equally, 
metathetic spaces can be thought of as a particular 
type of prothetic space, as can be seen from the 
construction of section 3.2.1: a metathetic 
continuum consists of unions of sets from two 
prothetic continua. What differelltia,tes the two 
types of space is the degree of correlation (in a 
loose sense) between pairs of prothetic continua. 
A meta thetic continuum is in a SelrlSe a pair of 
highly (negatively) correlated prothetic continua. 
In intermediate cases it may be difficult to 
say whether the space is prothetic or metathetic. 
This leads to the second comment: we have 
dealt in our models only with sp~ces· consisting 
only of prothetic continua or only of met at he tic 
continua. In real life, it is more likely that 
some of the dimensions will be of one type and 
some of the other. For example, whelrl. comparing 
consumer goods, one compares them both on their 
prothetic attributes (e.g. price, life expectancy, 
weight), and on their attributes which are 
probably metathetic (e.g. "quality", convenience, 
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aestheticness). In such a case, we would have 
a mixed model, such as 
for Gregson's model, where the xi and Yi refer 
to equal-intensity metathetic continua for 
i a l,2, ••• ,nl , and to prothetic continua for 
i=nl +l, ••• ,n2 • In research, experimenters, 
perhaps subconsciously, often seem to try to 
avoid such situations by instruction or by 
choice of stimuli. It should nevertheless be 
borne in mind. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROPERTIES OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE BUNCTION. 
In this chapter, an initial investigation 
into the properties of the D la and ]) 2 a distance 
functions will be presented. If these functions 
are found to have any relevance, a far more 
thorough investigation would be in order. The 
one given here does not pretend tC) be general: 
it is aimed mainly at putting these functions and 
the Minkowski distances, ]Ma' into perspective, and 
to provide a rough picture of their properties so 
that some intuitions about them can be built up. 
4.1 THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE 
4.1.1 Properties discussed in Chapter 1 
We shall first see how ]) le and ]) 2a' and the 
correspondinq similarity models for SG and SE' 
fare with respect~ the conditions 01-08 and Sl-S8. 
In each case we shall state the relevant condition 
and then, if necessary, prove or disprove it 
for each case and discuss the result. Some of the 
more technical proofs from this ohapter have been 
put in Appendix A. 
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4.1.1.1 Properties Dl-D8 
Dl: 0 ~ D (x,y) < co 'V x,Y£lR n 
This is clearly true for both D 1 a . and D 213 • 
n+ In fact, for x,y£JR (actually, when x and y are 
in the same "quadrant"*) we have that 
o < D (x,y) < 1. 
In; the case of D 113 this is true because of 
the Minkowski Inequality (e.g. Beckenbach and Bellman, 
1971, p. 25) and is true for all x,y£JR n, x,y,feJ 
in the case of D 213 it is obvious. However this 
breaks down 
(a) when x == y == e,.1n. which case we define 
D 113 (e,e) == D 213 (e,e) = 0 (4.1) 
and (b) for D 213 when x and y are not in the same 
"quadrant". In this second case, D 26 may be 
greater than unity, and in the most extreme case, 
when x == -y, its denominator is zero, so that 
D213 is undefined. It is difficult to interpret 
this psychologically especially since unit is the 
upper bound ("total dissimilarity") in lR n+ • 
*We shall use "QUadrant" (in quotes) to mean the 
n-dimensional counterpart to the ~adrant in two 
dimensions: i. e • those parts of lR in which, for 
l~i~n, all ith coordinates have the same sigA. 
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An important reason for want.ing the unity 
upper bound is so that similarity is non-negative 
when calculated from D by either similarity 
function (3.35) or (3.36). (This applies equally 
to the Minkowski model of section 3.2.1). Thus 
the unboundedness of D 2S may be an argument 
against it - although its bad characteristics only 
appear for points not in lR n+, which we may not 
need. 
02: D (x,x) = 0 'tI x£lR n 
This is clearly true for all x t e; our definition 
(4.1) completes the condition. 
03: D (x, y) = 0 • x = y 
It is clear that this condition is true for both 
D IS and D 2S since if either distance function is 
zero, we must have 
which implies that x = y. Note though that we can 
find arbitrarily small values of DlS(X,y) and 
Daa(X,y) by taking x and y sufficiently far from 
1 
the origin, keeping (Ilxi - Yi 1a ) la constant 
(see comments on 05 below). 
04: D (x,y) = D (y,x) "yix,ye:lR n 
This is obvious. 
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D5: ID (x + a, y + a) a: ID (x,y) 'Vx,y,ae:lR n • 
Clearly, this is not generally true for ID 18 or 
D 28. In fact, if x, Y14 are in the same "quadrant 11 
(e.g. x,Ytae:JR n+), it is easily seen that, if 
a"e, 
(and similarly with y) 
and 
so that, for all x,y,a in the same "quadrant", 
D U~ (x + a, y + a) < D la (x,y) 
(4.2) 
ID 2a-+ a, y + a) < ID 28 (x,y) 
(A more general case for J) 28 is when a is in the 
same "quadrant" as x+y. More general, but less 
easily stated, conditions exist.) 
This is directly compatible with SS, and, as 
discussed in section 1.5.2, is psychologically more 
reasonable in the prothetic case than D5, It 
also implies that the coordinates of x and y 
cannot be on interval scales for consistent similarity 
judgments. 
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06: D (ax,ay) ID laiD (x,y) \./ n ~ x,~ ,ae:lR. 
This is not true of D la or D 213. We show it 
the proof for D 2 a is virtually identical: 
D 18 (ax,ay) 
= D la (x,y) 
Again, this is compatible with condition S6, which 
was seen to be more reasonable psychologically, in 
section 1.5.3. It also suggests t:hat the co-
ordinates of x and y are on a ratio scale. 
07: J) (x,y) ~ D (x,z) + D (z,y) \ix,y,ze:JR n • 
For almost every a, counterexamples to 07, the 
triangle 'inequality, can easily be found. The general 
pattern of violations seems to be as follows:· 
*These comments, unless otherwise stated, are 
derived from a computer investigat:ion of violations 
of the triangle inequality and have yet to be 
rigorously proved or disproved. 
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a) Comparing models, with 13 constant, for 
a~l, the difference D (x,y) - D (x,z) - D (z,y) 
is smaller for D 113 than for D 213. Thus there 
are less violations of the triangle inequality 
for D la than for D 213' and violations, when 
they occur, are not as great for D la. For 
0<13<1, the situation is not as sunple, but the 
reverse often applies. 
b) Varying 13, the greatest violations as measured 
by D (x,y) - ID (x,z) - D (z,y) occur when 13<1 
(recall that for 13<1, the Minkowski distance functions, 
:M B' also disobey the triangle inequality). For 
1.5<13<3, violations are at their smallest. 
In fact for D 113 and 13,&2, violations are quite minor 
and difficult to find; for D 12' no violations 
have yet been found. Violations are again 
larger for large 13 greater than 3, but they do 
not reach the same magnitude as for B near zero. 
c) The worst violations occur when two of the 
points in a triple are on different axes or in 
opposite "quadrants". 
On the whole, except for D 113 with 
13>1.5, violations can be quite large (to the 
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extent that they would probably be statistically 
significant in an experimental situation 
represented by these models). But in an experi-
mental situation, they may not be very ubiquitous 
if the experimental design does not provide many 
points near different axes or in <)pposi te 
"quadrants" since violations not ()f this type 
generally give D (x,y) - ID (x,z) .• D (z,y) 
under 10% of D (x,y). For D 113' 13~1.5, 
virilUally all violations are, in this sense, well 
below 10%. 
A final important point here is that for 
6,::1, D 113 obeys the triangle ineq11ality for 
triples on straight lines (colinear triples). 
This is proved in Appendix A. It is not generally 
true of ID 213 - eounterexamples are easily found 
- although it is of course true for D21 for 
n+ points in lR , since then D 21' = ID 11. The 
special case of points on lin~s through the origin 
is dealt with in more detail in section 4.2. 
D8: ID (x,y) > D (xl.' ,Y,), 
- l. Vi = 1, ••• ,n, VX,YElR n. 
(Recall that xi was defined rather untidily as 
n (0,0, ••• ,O,xi , ••• ,0) ElR , where 
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examples and counterexamp1es to OS: are easily 
found (e.g. x - (2,4), y = (6,5», so it does not 
hold in general. However, as remarked in Chapter 
1, it can be made to hold under cE~rtain conditions 
if D8 is redefined. The line of reasoning here is 
that 08 expresses the idea that overall 
dissimilarity between two stimuli is always greater 
than the dissimilarity between any two stimuli 
which, while having, respectively, the same 
values as the original pair on OnE! attribute, differ 
on.}.y on that attribute. However l!::his is only 
meaningful if either the values of the other 
"constant" attributes are specified, or these 
values are irrelevant. Because o:f the 
intradimensiona1 subtractivity of Minkowski distances, 
the latter of these meaningfulness conditions 
applies, so the values of the constant attributes 
do not need to be specified: they are usually 
set at zero, as in the definition of Xi above. 
In the case of ID 1 f3 and ID 2 f3' however, this condition 
does not apply, so one must specify ·che constant 
values. 08 then must be conditional on where 
these constant values are in the space. We shall 
do this by reformulating 08 as follows: 
Let X,YElR n J let i£{ 1,2, ••• tn} • Let 
a (i) ElR n be such that a (i) i - o. Then for which 
a(i) is it true that 
D (Xi + a(i), Yi + a(i» < D (x,y)? (4.4) 
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For the Minkowski distances, the amswer to this 
question is: for all a (i) ElR n. E'or:ID 16 and D 26' 
answers of varying rigour are available, but the 
simplest conditions are, respectively, 
and 
E la(i)jl6 
j~l 
> 
-
> 
These conditions are sufficient but not 
necessary. In addition, for D 11 we have the 
stronger (but still not necessary) condition 
L la(i).1 j~i J > min { L I x . I , L I y.1 } j~i J j~i J 
The proofs of conditiOns (4.5) and (4.6) are 
quite trivia11 the proof of (4.7) is given in 
Appendix A. 
4.1.1.2 Properties Sl - S8 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
We now turn to the corresponding similarity 
models for $G and $E. It will be recalled from 
Chapter 3 that there are at least two possible 
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transformations of the dissimilarity model which 
give plausible similarity models (see equations 
(3.35) and (3.36»): 
Fl(X) = 1 - x 
and F 2 (x) == 1 - x 1 + x 
o < x < 1 (4.8) 
o < x < 1 (4.9) 
Both of these "similarity gradients" are non-
negative, strictly decreasing, and bounded by unity 
in the interval in which they are defined here 
( x : 0 < X < 1). From this it follows that 
many of the properties of D la and D 26 are para-
llelled by corresponding properties of $E and $G' 
where 
= or (4.10, 4.11 resp.) 
= or (4.12, 4.13 resp.) 
Note that, when they were originally stated 
in Chapter 1, the properties SI - S8 were stated only 
for points in lRn+. In the discussion following, 
it will be seen that many hold, for $E and $G' for 
all of lR n. 
SI: 0 ~ $(x,y) ~ 1 n+ 'ix,yelR • 
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The abovementioned properties of Fl and F2 make 
n SI true for D la' for all x,yeJR , since we have 
that 0 ~ ID la < 1. As remarked in the comments 
on 01, however, D 213 may be greater than unity, in 
which case we would have $(x,y) < O. Thus for 
SI to hold for Fl (D 2(3) or F2 (D 2(3)' x and y must be 
restricted so that D 2e (X,y) < 1. One such restriction 
n+ is x,yeJR • 
S2: $(x,x) = 1 w n+ v xeJR • 
Transformations Fl and F2 along with property 02 
give this immediately, for all xelR n. 
$(x,y) 1 . n+ S3: = • x = y, Vx,yelR 
Since both Fl and F2 are strictly decreasing, and 
hence one-to-one, S3 follows from D3 for all 
n x,yelR • The comments given in the case of 03 also 
apply here, however. 
S4: $(x,y) = $(y,x) v n+ v x,yelR • 
Again, this follows directly from D4, and is true 
for all x,yelR n. 
SS: $ (x+a,y+a) > $,(x,y) u n+ vx,y,aelR I aJ'e. 
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It was shown under 05 that if x'YP are in the 
same "quadrant ll , a"e, then for both lD 16 and D 2a' 
D (x+a,y+a) < D (x,y) • 
Since F1 and F2 are strictly decreasing, ss 
follows as the special case when the "quadrant" is 
mn+. The comments given in the discussion of 05 
also apply here. 
S6: $(ax,ay) = $(x,y) , n+ + t/x,ye:::R , ae:JR • 
It was shown under 06, for both D 1 a and D 2 a 
that lix, ye:lR n, ae:m, 
ID (ax, ay) = D (x,y) • 
Since,either $ is a function of one of Dla or 
D 2a , S6 follows, for all x,ye:lR
n
, ae:lR. 
87: $(x,y) = 0 if x,ye:lR n+ are ft'iUi •• ferent 
axes. 
$(x,y) = 0 is clearly equivalent, under transform-
ations F 1 and F 2' to D (x,y) = 1. Using our 
previous definition of xi'Yj (see 08), let 
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x = xi' Y = Yj' i ~ j (i.e. x and Y are on different 
axes in m. n). Then 
ID 113 (x,y) = 
This is equal to 1 only if 13 = 1, unless x or Y 
is the origin. But 
]) 213 (x,y) = = 1. 
Thus 67 is true (for all x,y£m. n on different axes) 
for the similarity models (4.11) and (4.13), and 
for the models 
= 
= 
1 - D 11 
1 - ID 11 
1 + ]) 11 
However, a weaker property, corresponding to 
S7 can be proved for the models corresponding to 
Dll3 (i.e. (4.10) and (4.12». From Holder's 
inequality (see Beckenbach and Bellman, 1971, p.19) 
it is easily seen that 
n 1/ 
{ l: a a} a 
i==l i 
> 
I-a 
T n . 
from which it follows that 
D la {x,y} == 
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\iae:JR n+, a > 1. 
I-a 
> 2-a- a > 1 
for any x,y defined as above. The number 2{l-a)/a 
equals 1 when a == 1 and is always greater than 
0.5 when 1 ~ a <~. This puts a lower bound on 
dissimilarities between points on different axes, 
distinctly differentiating the Dla space from, 
say, a Minkowski space where points on different 
axes can be arbitrarily close together. 
The corresponding properties for models 
(4.l0) and (4.l2) are respectively, for x and y 
on different axes, and a > 1, 
-
$E{x,y) < 1 - 2(1-a}/a 
-
and 
$G{x,y} < 1 -
2{l-a}/a 
- 1 + 2{1~a)la 
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Note that 
1 < a < 00, 
1 _ 2(1-13)/13 
and 1 + 2 (1-13)713 ~ 1/3 1 < a < OG. 
Thus S7 holds (in all of ~n) in letter for models 
(4.11) and (4.13), and in~irit for (4.10) and 
(4.12) for a > 1. 
S8; $(e,x) I: 0 Yxem. n+ 
Since D la (e,x) = 0: IXi I a) lIa = 1 
(1: IXi I a) % + 0 
and 
D 2$ (e,x) 
O:lxi - ol f3 ):Va 
= 1 = (1:lxi +Ol a )lIa 
and F1 (1) = F 2 (1) = 0, we have S8 for all x£~n. 
4.1.1.3 Other Properties from Chapter 1 
From knowledge of the relationship between $ 
and D, it is clear that all our $ models have 
the property corresponding to the revised condition 
08: i.e. 
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under the conditions discussed. 1~qua11y, both 
D models have the properties corresponding to S7 
and S8: 
D 28 (x,y) - 1 if x,ytJR n are on different axes, 
D 1a (X,y) > 2(1-8)/8 if x,yelR
n are on different axes, 
8 .:: 1~ 
and D (e,x) .. 1 \;}xeJR n. 
No obvious similarity counterpart to D7, 
the triangle inequality, suggests itse1f7 the 
inequality 
$(x,y) ~ $(x,z}$(z,y) Vx,y, zelR n (4.14) 
.. n_ioned in Chapter 1, does not hold for any of the 
four models: counterexarnp1es are easily found. 
However, since this inequality, which we shall call the 
"similarity triangle inequality", is the only one so 
far seriously suggested as a desirable one for simi-
larity to obey, a little more investigation into its 
relationship to the distance triangle inequality, D7, 
seems appropriate. 
It turns out that this relationship is heavily 
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dependent on the properties of the functions Fl or 
F2 (equations (4.8), (4.9»). It is easily seen 
for both Fl and F2 that 
F(a+b) ~ F(a)F(b) V'a,b,o<a,b~_l (4.15) 
with equality only when a = 0 or b = O. Now suppose 
that we have a triple (x,y,z), x,y,Z£lR n , which 
under the distance function D disobeys the triangle 
inequality 07 so that say, 
D (x,y) > D (x,z) + D (z,y). 
To ensure that $ is well defined (namely, non-
negative: see equations (4.10) - (4.13» we shall not 
allow points that give D (x, y) > 1 (as may occur with 
D 2B' or for D IB with a < 1). We shall also 
assume that z ; x and z ; y so that n (x,z) ; 0 
and D (z, y) ; O. Thus 0 < D (x, z ) + ID (z, y) ~ 1 
and since Fl(a) and F2 (a) are strictly decreasing 
functions for 0 < a ~ 1, we have 
F(D (x,y») ~ F(D (x,z) + D (z,y» 
< F(D (x,z) )F(D (z,y» (using (4.15» 
for either Fl or F2 • Thus 
$(x,y) < $(x,z)$(z,y) 
(from equations (4.10) - (4.13». So any violation 
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of the triangle inequality for the distance 
functions immediately implies a violation of the 
similarity triangle inequality for our similarity 
models. These are not the only violations of the 
similarity triangle inequality: enough additional 
ones exist that similarity models based on D12 
still have violations. 
One might note here that it can even be seen 
that Fl and F2 applied to the Minkowski distances 
as in Chapter 3, lead to violations of the similarity 
triangle inequality. For example, if x,y~ are 
distinct points lying on a straight line so that, 
say, :M a (x,z) = J.1 a (x,y) + :M B (y,z), then since 
equality occurs in (4.15) only when a = 0 or b = 0, 
we have 
(recall that in Chapter 3 the distances were restricted 
to being not greater than unity) so that a violation:, 
of the similarity triangle inequality occurs on 
straight lines. 
For the model F (D 12), the similarity triangle 2 
ineqqality does have a special significance however: 
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on straight lines, similarities are multiplicative -
that is, if y lies between x and z on a straight 
l1ne in lR n then, if $G == F2 (D 12)' 
The proof of this is given in Appendix A~ it is 
also true for the one dimensional case of the F2 (D la ) 
models: see section 4.2. 
This leads naturally to a short discussion of 
the conditions for equality of the triangle inequality 
D7. Firstly, the two distance functions do not 
have segmental additivity: that is, for a pair of 
points x,ye:m n , there is not necessarily a point 
zem. n with D (x, y) = D (x, z) + D (y, z) • This means 
that one of Beals, Krantz and Tversky's (1968, for 
example) most important axioms does not hold. Secondly, 
neither of the distance functions are additive on 
straight lines. Additive triples are generally "nearly" 
linear, but they can be far enough from linear for 
assumptions such as those made by Shepard (1957) or 
Beals and Krantz (1967) to aause significant errors. 
The behaviour of the various models under the 
various conditions of the two triangle inequalities 
is summarised in Table 4.1. 
TA.BLE 4.1 
THE TRIANGLE INEQUALITIES 
The behaviour of the Normalised Distance Functions and their corresponding Similarity 
Functions with respect to various conditions of the two triangle inequalities. 
Notation I '1'.r. - the triangle inequality (07)1 :D (x,y) < lD (X,lI) +:D (z,y) 'Ix,y,Z€lR n 
S.T.I. - the similarities triangle inequality 14.14): J(x,y) ~ J(x,z)J(z,y) \(x,y,Z£lR n 
Unless otherwise stated, "Yes" indicates a proof for the entry ElXistsl "No" indicates that 
eount.~.x.mplo. have bean found (thouqh 1t may hold in .om. 0 •••• ). 
For more detailS of the models, see equations (4.8) - (4.13). 
Oistance 
Trans- :D la (1'1;012) :D 12 :D 28 Condition formation 
General T.I. 
-
No Yes!·) No 
T.I. on straight lines Yes, if e :> h l 
- Yes NO No, if e 3: 1 
T.r. on straight lines through origin 
-
Yes Yes No 
General S. T. 1. Fl No No No 
F2 No No No 
S.T.I. on straight lines Fl No No (§) No 
F2 No Yes(+) No 
I 
S.T.I. on straight lines through origin Fl No (§) No (§) No 
F2 Yes(+) Yes(+) No 
---
Footnotes (*) I have yet to find either a proof or counterexample for this. 
(+) The Similarity Triangle Equality (eqtn. (4.16» holds here: if y is between x and z 
on the line, then ,S(x,z) =,Sbc,y)J(y,z). 
(§) It is possible to prove that the S.T.I. holds here only trivially (see Appendix A). f-' 
U1 
00 
!l> 
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The "ultrametric inequality", 
D (x, y) < max {D (x, z), D (y f z)} \J x , y , Z (4.17) 
mentioned in Chapter 1 as a possible alternative to 
the Triangle Inequality cannot apply here: 
consider any three real numbers a, B, y. Suppose 
(without any loss of generality) that y is the 
biggest of them: i.e. y > max(a,a). Then if the 
ultrametric inequality applies to these numbers for 
all possible arrangements of them (i.e. 
a ~ max (a ,y) 1 B ~ max{a,yb y ~ max{a, S}) we must 
have y = max{a,B} so that y ~ a or y = B. 
This shows that when (4.17) holds, the 
distance function D must have th~e very distinctive 
property that for any triple of points, at least two 
of the three interpoint distances must be equal. 
This is clearly not true for D IS' D 213' or :M s. 
Finally, as to the criteria of Beals, Krantz and 
TVersky mentioned in Chapter 1, it is clear that, 
because of the way they are normalised, both DlB 
and D2S are neither interdimensionally additive, 
intradimensionally subtractive nor decomposable. 
As notedpreviollsly, the¥ do not have segmental 
additivity either. This suggests that some of the 
axioms used by these authors are not necessarily 
reasonable ones. 
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4.1.2 Other properties 
4 • 1. 2. 1 Relationship between D 113 and D 213 
By the Minkowski Inequality, for B ~ 1, 
so, by definition of D le and D 213' 
D le (x,y) < D 213 (x,y) '1· n x,yelR , 13 > 1. 
4.1.2.2 Isosimi1arity contours 
Locii of equal similarity from a given point 
(isosimi1arity contours) have been used extensively, 
both in mathematics and psychology, both directly 
and indirectly. For the Minkowski distances, the 
contours are well known: they vary continuously, 
as 13 gOBS fram 1 to ~, from an n-dimensiona1 diamond, 
to a hypersphere (for 13 = 2), to an n-dimensiona1 
cube. The intermediate contours take the form of 
"f1attened fl hyperspheres or "rounded ll hypereubes. 
Tha two-dimensional case is given in Figure 4.1, for 
e = l, 2, ~. 
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2 
1 
o 1 2 
(a) 'City-Block' metric: 8 = 1 
2 2,------------, 
1 1 + 
o 1 2 o 1 2 
(b) 'Euc1idean' metric: 
S 2 
(c) 'Dominance' metric: 
f3 = 00 
FIGURE 4.1 Isosimilarity contours for some Minkowski 
distances, Jv1 s. All are centred at (1,1) and have 
radius = 1. See text for further details. 
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The contours for the z>Unkowski distances can 
be plotted without reference either to centre or 
radius of the contour: any contour is "typical" 
for a given e. This is because the translational 
property, D5, means that all contours of equal radius 
are of identical size and shape in the space, and 
the expansion property, 06, means that the contour 
of radius a about a given point is simply an expansion 
by a factor of a of the contour of radius 1.0 about 
that point. 
Neither of these properties are true for DIe 
and D 2S • Except in the special case when a ~ 2 
(see section 4.1.3), the form of the contour depends 
on the relative values of the coordinates of its 
centre. In almost all cases, the shape changes with 
radius. Figure 4.2 gives some re!presentative contours 
for e = 1 with different radii and centres, for e = 2 
with different radii, and an example for e = 00. The 
contours for e a 00 are rather complicated, being very 
irregular polygons often with many sides, the exact 
number varying with the centre and the radius. The 
full range of them is therefore not given. 
Two obvious features of the contours in Figure 
4.2 are that they are not wholly symmetric about 
their centres (they tend to "bulge" away from the 
origin), and they are not always convex, particularly 
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FIGURE 4.2: (a) Isosimi1arity contours for D 11 - The 
five rows give contours of radius .1, .3, .5, .7, .9 
resp.; the three columns give contours centred on 
(1,1), (2,1), (1,0), resp. Note the scales on the axes. 
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FIGURE 4.2: (b) Isosimi1ari ty contours for D 21' The 
five rows give contours of radius .1, .3, .5, .7, .9, 
resp.; the three columns give contours centred on (1,1), 
·-(2,1), (1,0), resp. No:t.e the scales on the axes. 
0·5 
1-5 
-0-5 
2-25 
0 4·5 
-2,25 
-5 20 
-12'5 
FIGURE 4.2: (c) Contours for 
D 12' centre (l,O), radii 
.4, .6, .9, resp. 
1-5 
0·5 1------1.5 -O~ 
7·5 165. 
-25 
FIGURE 4.2: (e) Contour, 
centre ,}, for ID loo' 
radius 0.5. 
7·5 
• 
-2·5 10 
-5 
FIGURE 4 _ 2 : (f) Contour, 
, } for ID 200' 
radius 0.5. 
4-2 
FIGURE 4.2: (d) Isosimilar i ty contours for JD 22' centre 
(I,l), radii .1, .5, .9 resp. 
Again - note the scales on the axes. 
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for D la when the radius is near 1.0. These features, 
along with their lack of translational invariance, 
mean that traditional proofs of distance properties 
do not hold (e.g. Eggleston, 1958, p. 54ff; Beckenbach 
& Bellman, 1961, Chapter 6). 
One point about the shapes of the contours for 
the normalised distances in comparison with those 
for the corresponding Minkowski distances is in general 
immediately striking: they are quite recognisably 
fairly simple distortions of each other. The distortion 
decreases (see section 4.1.2.3) as the radius gets 
smaller. This could explain some empirical results 
where Minkowski models were found to have about ,as 
good a fit to data as content models (e.g. Waern, 
1970b). It also gives support for a reinterpretation 
of many experiments said to give results favouring 
a distance model. In particular, Greqson's and Eis1er's 
set theoretic models may be expec'ted to give ordinal 
results rather similar in certain aspects to those 
of tl).e City-Block model, and many vector content models 
may have results near those of a Euclidean model. 
These effects will be especially noticeable for 
experiments using isosimilarity contours and other 
(particularly ordinal conditional) indirect methods. 
'l'he D 22 contours are extreme eXaJllples of this: 
They are merely circles (spheres, etc) whose centres 
have been displaced. The displacement increases with 
the radius. 
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4.1.2.3 Local behaviour 
It has been previQusly noted tha"t: the form of the 
D 18 and D 28 distance functions is of the form of a 
normalised Minkowski distance, where the normalisation 
depends only on the two points (stimuli) whose 
dissimilarity is being measured. This usually means 
that the closer two points are together, the nearer to 
equal will be their contributions to.the normalisation. 
Extending this to a collection of points which are 
closely grouped, their interpoint dis!:dmilarities will 
be nearly proportional to the corresponding Minkowski 
interpoint distances. The only real exception to this 
is for points clustered around the origin, when 
points may be in opposite quadrants so that their 
contributions may be mutually opposing. 
Therefore in general we can say 'that - except 
for near the origin - local behaviour of the present 
distance functions is Minkowskian. I·t should be 
remembered though that what constitutes "local" 
changes around the stimulus space. "Local" points 
may be further apart (under the Minkowski distance) 
far away from the origin than near to it. 
For example, the local behaviour of ID 11 and 
D 21 is City-Block (:M 1)' and of D 12 and D 22 is 
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Euclidean (N 2). This is clearly seen in the contours 
of the previous section: for very small radii, the 
contours become increasingly like the corresponding 
Minkowski ones: D 11 and D 21 contours become like 
City-Block contours (symmetric~l, di~nond-shaped)i 
D 12 and D 22 contours become like Euc:::lidean contours 
(circles). The further the centres of the contours 
are from the origin, the larger the normalised distance 
contour will be when it begins to look like the 
corresponding distance contour. 
The fact that D 12 and D 22' in particular, are 
locally Euclidean, has important implications, as 
this property has been assumed by sevleral authors in 
various mathematical analyses (e.g. Shepard, 1957, 
1960, Indow, 1974:l.; Luneberg, 1950; Blank, 1953; 
see also Luce, 1963, pp. 113-115 ) • D 12 and D 22 are 
important if only that they are credible examples of 
distance functions which do not satisfy the triangle 
inequality or segmental additivity, but which are 
locally Euclidean. 
4 .1. 3 D 12 and D 22 
Because of their close relationship to Euclidean 
distance, the '!No distance functions ]) 12 and D 22 are of 
special interest. Like Euclidean distance within the 
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Minkowski family, these functions have distinctive 
properties, some of which are retained from Euclidean 
distance. 
4.1.3.1 Locally Euclidean 
As was explained in section 4.1.2.3, D 12 and 
D 22 are locally Euc1idean. 
4.1.3.2 Invariant under rotations about the origin 
D 12 and D 22 are invariant under rotations of 
the space about its origin. This is txue because 
Euclidean distance is invariant under rotation about any 
point in the space so that the numerator of both 
functions is rotationally invariant, while both 
normalisations, being dependent on thE~ position of the 
origin in the ,space, are rotationally invariant 
only about the origin. 
One conseqt1ence of this property is that the shape 
of the contours for D 12 and ID 22 are dependent only on 
the radius, and not on the relative size of the 
coordinates of the centre. This means that one need 
study only contours whose centres are on a single axis~ 
For example, in two dimensions, a D 12 contour of 
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radius a, centre (a,O) (on the x-axis) has extreme 
points the x-axis of I-a and (a1+a,0) for on (al+«,O) I-a 
a < ~, and 1-2a
2 
(a2 (1-a l ) ,0) and 
l+a (al_a'O) for a > ~ 
(for a > ~, a concavity between 1-2(11 (a2 (l-a2 ) ,0) and 
I-a (a1+a'0) is present). The corresponding D 22 
I-a 
contour has extreme points (a1+a'0) and 
(ai~:,o) (it is a circle, centre (i~::a, 0) 
radius 2(i~a2)) By rotating the space about 
the origin, the contours about any point in the 
(two dimensional) space can be found from these two 
sets of contours. 
4.1.3.3 Vector representation 
The previous property means that D 12 and 
D 22 are representable in terms only of the 
lengths of the vectors corresponding to the points, 
and the angles between the vectors. We have, for 
x = (x!x2 '·····,xn ), y = (y~2' ••••• 'yn)' 
n 2 ~ n 2 ~ Calling ( t xi) and ( t y. ) , nand hy. respectively, i=l i=l 1 x 
the cosine rule gives 
where 'xy is the angle between the vectors x 
and y (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1). So 
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(4.18) 
A further interestinq simplification is now possible. 
Let z = x-y and consider 'xz' 'Y3' and hzC=lMzCx,y) 
= Ch 2 + h 2 - 2hxh COSt )~). Then by the cosine 
x y y xy 
or sine rules it is easily shown that 
and 
h = h COSt + hzcos,xz x Y xy 
hy = hxcos+xy + hzCOsfyz. 
Adding these equations gives 
(hx + hy) (I - cos'xy) = hz{cos+yz + cos'xz) 
so that, for hx ~ 0, ~ ~ 0, 
h 
z 
D 12 (x,y) = ~+~ = (4.19) 
The two results corresponding to (4.18) and (4.19) 
for D 22 are somewhat less aesthetic: 
D 22 (x,y) 
h 2+h 2 - 2h h • 
= (x y x yCOS XI 
h 2+h 2 2h h ~ x Y + x yCOSVxy 
) (4.20) 
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and, by the sine rule, 
sin2• +sin2• -2sin, sin$ cost ~ 
D ( ) ( .. yz xz yz xz XI) (4.21) 22 x,y= 2 2 
sin·4> +sin cl> +2sin+ sin, cos+ yz xz yz xz xy 
as long as sin,yz and sin+
xz 
are not both zero. 
The two results (4.19) and (4.21) show clearly 
that the dissimilarities D12 (x,y) and D 22 (x,y) 
are independent of the absolute magni tnde of the 
vectors of x and y. They are dependent only, in a 
sense, on the Rsbape" of the triangle formed by the 
two points with the origin (when that triangle exists) • 
For hx = hy ' it is easily seen that 
'xy D l2(x,y) = sine 2 ) 
'xx D 22 (x,y) = tan ( 2 ) 
4.1.3.4 Triangle inequalities 
(4.22) 
(4.23) 
It has already been noted (see sections 4.1.1.1 
and 4.1.1.3, and Table 4.1) that D 12 appears to 
satisfy the triangle inequality (this can be proved 
at least for points on straight lines) and so 
appears to be a metric, and that F 2 (D 12) satisfies 
the similarity triangle equality - that is,the 
similarities are multiplicative on straight lines. 
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4.2 THE ONE-DIMENSIONAL CASE 
Suppose we have two points x,y on a straight 
line through the origin in lR n. Then for some a£lR n 
such that a l = 1, we have, for all iE{1,2, ••• ,n}, 
and 
Thus 
D la (x,y) 
Xi = aixl 
Yi = aiYl 
. n Q 110 
(t Ix.IP) P+ 
. 1 1-1.= 
and, similarly, 
(4.24) 
(4.25) 
It is immediately obvious that (4.24) and (4.25) 
are, respectively, just the one-dimensional forms of 
D la and D 26: 
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krl D 26 (x,y) &:: Ti+YT 'v'x,y£lR • 
Thus, on any line through the origin our two models 
reduce to their one dimensional forms, both of which 
are independent of a. 
The one-dimensional cases therefore have some 
wider significance. They will also prove important 
in Chapter 5 when some problems in (one-dimenSbnal) 
psychophysics are considered. In addition, 
the one-dimensional cases have several interesting 
properties which have implications spreading to 
the general case. 
4.2.1 Incompa tibili ty vi th Minkowski distance,s 
The first use we shall make of the one-dimensional 
case is to give a further, more dramatic, illustration 
of the incompatibility - within a monotone 
transformation - between the Minkowski and normalised 
distance functions. A proof has already been given 
in Chapter 1 (section 1.6) but the following example 
reinforces that proof. 
+ We shall restrict ourselves to ~ where, for 
x ~, y, both normalised distance functions are equal 
to (x<-y) / (x+y). This is just an increasing 
function (F2 in fact) of the ratio x/y, \'lhere 
x~: i.e. 
x <. y 
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(4.26)* 
Now suppose we have a Minkowski distance function 
~ which is a monotone increasing function of D : 
x ]M (x,y) = G(F2 (y»' G increasing (4.27) 
In one dimension 
~ (x,y) = H(y-x), H strictly increasing, 
(4.28) 
x ~ y 
so, substituting from equations (4.27) and (4.26), 
x H (y-x) = F (-) 
Y 
\Ix < y (4.29) 
where F = G(F2 ) and so is increasing. Since this 
is true for all 0 ~ x ~ y, the most obvious counter-
example appears when we put x = O~ then 
H(y) = F(O) v + v YElR : 
that is, H is a constant. This contradicts the 
definitions of H in equation (4.28). One might 
object that zero values do not often occur in an 
empirical setting, but this does not matter since 
*Nbte that this also implies that ID !.):..) =]) (x,y) , 
. x Y 
which has importance in scaling theory (see 
Torgerson, 1960; Eisler, 1962 ). 
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a parallel counterexample can be constructed for any 
value of x. So there is no monotone transformation 
that can relate the normalised distance functions 
D to the Minko,"lski distance functions :M, or, more 
generally, to any intradimensionally subtractive 
distance function. 
The implication to be drawn from this is that 
if the present models do represent dissimilarity or 
(monotonically transformed) similarity judgments, non-
metric multidimensional scaling using a Minkowski 
or other subtractive model will give invalid results. 
4.2.2 The Triangle Inequalities 
It is proved in Appendix A (see section 4.1.1.3) 
that F 2 (D 12) obeys the similarity triangle equality 
on straight lines. If one considers this property 
on lines through the origin, the argument given in 
the introduction to section 4.2 shows that in one 
dimension F2 {D le) also obeys the similarity triangle 
equality: that is if $ = F2 (D le ), 
$(x,z) = $(x,y)$(y,z) x > y > z 
or, equivalently, 
(4.30) 
DIe (x,z) =D le (x, y) +D 113 (y, z) -D le (x, z) D 113 (x,y) D 113 (y, z) 
(4.31) 
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r:quo. tion (.1,. 31) ShOl'1S that, further, D 1 a in one 
dimension not only obeys the triangle inequality but 
also never obeys the triangle e~~ality - is never 
additive - except trivially, since for 
x;-fz, x;-fy, yy:.z, Dle(x,Z)Dle(x,y)Dla(Y'z) > o. 
~he same is not true of D 2e unless its domain 
is restricted to either only non·-negative or only 
non-positive values. In these two cases, the two 
models are of course the same. Otherwise, violations 
of both triangle inequalities occur (under D lB' the 
dissimilarity between points on opposite sides of the 
origin is always 1.0 - this guarantees the triangle 
inequality) • 
It is worth noting here that the commonly 
assumed condition of the triangle equality (additivity 
of distances) on straight lines is an extremely 
restrictive condition if assumed simultaneously with 
the condition of similarity triangle equality 
(multiplicativity of similarities) on straight lines, 
which is a temptation. It can be shown that such an 
assumption must lead to the model 
$ = e -('ID for some et > 0 
and, if in addition D is assumed to be intradtmension-
ally subtractive, 
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$(x,y) = e-ylx-yf for some y > o. 
This latter model is not in accord with several 
of the important conditions for similarities given 
in Chapter 1. This suggests that, for prothetic 
continua, the additivity, multiplicativity and 
subtractivity conditions should be treated with 
caution. The former model also shows that unless 
one accepts the exponential form of the similarity 
gradient, if the similarity triangle equality on 
straight lines is assumed (as it is, for example, in 
the models due to Gregson, and to Kunnapas and 
KUnnapas, quoted in Chapter 2) then additivity on 
straight lines will never hold. 
4.2.3 Unidimensional similarity 
To look at the models of unidimensional similarity 
corresponding to our distance models, we shall again 
restrict our domain of stimuli or points to being 
non-negative, since it is in this domain that such 
models have always been defined. In this domain, the 
two dissimilarity models are identical. This is not 
to restrict the possible applicability of the present 
models to the whole of ::R. 
The two unidimensional models are, for 
+ x,y£lR , 
so, 
1 _ Ix-yt 
$G (x,y) = F 2 (D (x,y» :: i + (~~ir 
X+y 
!x-y! $E(X,y) - Fl (D (X,y» e 1 - x+y 
$G(X'y) :: x+X-Ix-yl :: min(x,I) x+y+ x-y max(x,y) 
$E{x,y) = x+X-lx-II = .2min (x, 1) x+y x+y 
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(4.32) 
(4.33) 
Equation (4.33) is the Eis1er-Ekman unidfmension-
a1 similarity equation. The alternative unidfmension-
al similarity equation suggested by various authors 
(see sections 2.1.1.1, 2.1.3.3 and 2.1.3.4) is that 
$ is a power function of the ratio between physical 
stimulus values. Equation (4.32) states that $G is 
simply the ratio between subjective estimates of the 
stimulus values. Thus, if the subjective estimates 
in question obey Stevens' Power Law, then (4.32) 
states that $G is a power of the (physical) stimulus 
ratio, with exponent equal to Stevens' exponent for 
that particular continuum. Data analysed by 
K!nnapas and K~nnapas (1973) does not support this 
value of the exponent. Thus (4.32) needs modifying 
by some power transformation (e.g. Kunnapas and 
n • Kunnapas, OPe cit.)1 with or without mod1fication, 
though, it on the whole retains the same basic 
mathematical properties and is worth investigation. 
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4.3 SUMMARY 
It seems useful to summarise here the more 
important "gross features" of the distance functions· 
D 18 and »28 that we have found, and to pull 
together the strinqs of the chapter in order to 
clarify the perspective and intuitions which it set 
out to obtain. 
For D U~ the most important features 
correspondinq to those in Chapter 1 are: 
\:j x, y£:It n 
(ef ~ S1) 
(4.34) 
DIe (x+a,y+a) < D 18 (x,y) if x,y,a are in 
the same "quadrant" of lR n, a ~ e (4.35) 
(cf. SS) 
D le (ax,ay) == D l8(X'y) \fx,y£lRn,Cl£:il (4.36) 
(cf. S6) 
and for D 28: 
0 < D 28 < 1 
\.j n+ } .~ x,y£lR 
- ) (4.37) 
. n 
0 < D 28 < at \1 x,y£E , x~-r··· ) 
-
(cf. SI and Dl) 
D 28 (x+a,y+a) < D 28 (x,y) if x,y,a are in the 
same "quadrant" of lR n, a~e (4.38) 
(cf. SS) 
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D 2e (ox, ay) = D 2a (x,y) \-/ n v x,yeE ,oelR (4.39) 
(c.f. S6) 
These properties, along with others discussed in 
the chapter, lead to the following general description 
of the two distance functions. 
D le and D 2a are normalised distances or 
normalised distance functions. This means that in 
certain important portions of the space, in the case 
of D 2e' and in the whole space, in the case of 
D la' they are bounded above by 1. o. It also gives 
two important characteristics to the functions. 
Firstly, pairs of points which differ by the same 
vector have a decreasing dissimilarity as they get 
further from the origin of the space (see (4.35) and 
(4.38». A particular example of this is that grid 
lines in cartesian coordinate space will appear to be 
closer together as they get further from the origin. 
Loosely: distant pairs of points are less dissimilar 
than close pairs of points. 
Secondly, linear expansions of the space about 
its origin make no difference to interpoint 
dissimilarities. This is in distinction to the 
distance property (06) which increases dissimilarities 
in proportion to the expansion. Loosely: pairs of 
points in equal proportion will be equally dissimilar. 
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Shepard (1960) suggested that psycholoqical 
space might turn out to be conceived of most simply 
as an embedding in a Euclidean space, like, for 
example, a sphere. In two or three dLmensions, the 
present distance functions are very reminiscent -
though not completely accurate representations - of 
the distance function imposed on two- or 
three-dimensional Euclidean space by perspective in 
monocular vision. This may at least be a fruitful 
analogy from which to work. 
D l~ and D 26 fail to be distances through 
properties (4.35) and (4.36), and (4.38) and (4.39), 
respectively. HoweVer, they fail additionally, with 
the probable exception of D 12' in that they do not 
in general satisfy the triangle inequality. In many 
cases, though, especially for D 18 and B > 1.5, the 
violations of the inequality are small enough for it 
to be a reasonable approximation and insight into 
the way these functions behave. For D It) the triangle 
inequality is obeyed on straight lines. 
A stronger and more important pOint about their 
distance properties, as far as non-metric MOS is 
concerned, is that neither distance function can be 
expressed as a monotone function of any distance: and 
so, in particular, Minkowski distance. 
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Finally, D la and D 2a impose a particular 
structure on the axes and origin of the space .. 
Every point in the space has a dissimilarity of 1.0 
from the origin: all points are "totally different" 
from the origin. Dissimilarities between points on 
different axes are also 1.0 in the case of D 2a' 
and near to 1.0 in the case of D la: loosely, axes 
are totally, or very, dissimilar.. 'rhis could be 
interpreted as independence of dimensions. 
Turning briefly to the similarity models, with' 
the two similarity gradients 
F 2 (X) = 
I-x 
l+x o < x < 1 
o < x < 1, 
both models reduce to, respectively, the Gregson 
and Eisler-Ekman similarity models when points are 
restricted to the positive "quadrant". F2 (D 12) 
on straight lines, and the one-dimensional case 
both obey the similarities triangle inequality, 
$(x,y) > $(x,z)$(z,x) \fx,y,z. 
In other respects the similarity functions Fl(D la), 
F2 (D la)' Fl (D 2a) and F2 (D 2a) have properties 
parallel with D la or D 2a. 
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On the whole, D 1/3 is - at least mathematically 
- the more attractive of the two functions: it is 
bounded and well-defined (except at the origin) and 
more closely obeys the triangle inequality than 
D 2/3 - It also has the pleasant property that 
Ropposite points are opposite": points on opposite 
sides of the origin, and colinear with it, are 
totally dissimilar - have a dissimilarity of 1.0 -
under D la-
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CHAPTER 5 
SOME PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOPHYSICS FROM A SIMILARITY 
VIEWPOINT 
In this chapter, the models of Chapter 3 will 
be applied to a few of the more theoretical 
problems of psychological measurement not directly 
related to the psychology of similarity itself. 
Most of them have not arisen from a purely theoretical 
context, but from the interaction between various 
models and the data the models are supposed to 
describe or explain. 
The data are mainly drawn from unidimensional 
psychophysics and we shall be dealing with the 
problems of category scales almost exclusively. 
Two other areas will be covered briefly at the end 
of the chapter, more to exhibit the uses and 
weaknesses of present and other models than to 
make a substantial contribution towards solving 
the particular problems. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 3 that we 
have three basic dissimilarity models: 
lit (Ilxi-Yi,a) a 
D 1 a (x, Y) = ----""-:;J;%-r--------;;'Jl~ 
(IIXilB) a + (tIYi 1a) a 
Jh 
tlxi-YilB a 
and D 213 (x,y) = 
Ilx.+y.,a 
1. 1. 
for prothetic continua, and 
:M a (x,y) 
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Vx,y£lR n 
Yx,y£lR n 
\j n 
v x,Y£lR , 
IXi-Yi l < 1, i=1, ••• ,D1 
n+ 
n£lR , Ini = 1 
(5.1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
for equal-measure metathetic cont.inua, where a > 0 
in each case~ Note that :If a (x,y) ~ 1. 
We also have two "similarity gradients" which 
may transform the dissimilarity models into 
similarity models: 
Fl(X) = I-x 0 < x < 1 (5.4) 
-
and F2 (X) 
I-x 0 < x < 1 (5.5) = l+x -
Fl and F2 are strictly decreasing (and hence one-
to-one) • 
In this chapter, models (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) 
will be used mainly in their one dimensional cases~ 
for these we shall use the notations 
Ix-yl D 2 (x,y) = Ti+YT 
:J( (x,y) = Ix-YI < 1 
187. 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
respectively. For X,YElR +, D 1 = D 2; we shall in 
that case sometimes put D = D 1 = D 2. 
5. 1 BISECTION, AND CATEGORY SCALES 
5.1.1 Bisection. 
In the bisection experiment, two stimuli 
(generally unidimensional: say x and z) are 
presented to the subject who is asked in some way 
to indicate a third stimulus (y) which is 'halfway 
between" or ·produces equal intervals with" the 
first two (e.g. Stevens, 1960a, p.39). 
The notion ·halfway", if taken literally, 
makes sense only if the distance function is 
additive since it implies that we have, for a 
distance function d, 
d(x,y) = d(y,z) = ~d(x,z) 
so that 
d(x,z) = d(x,y) + d(y,z). 
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This (as has been pointed out in Chapter 4) is not 
in general true for D land D 2' although a 
partial exception will be discussed below. For 
+ + 
example, if x,z£lR , x < z, then for y£lR to be 
such that 
D (x,y) = ][) (y, z) = lsD (x, z) 
we must have 
y-x 
y+x = 
z-y 
z+y = 
z-x 
2(z+x) 
which can only happen if x = y = z, a trivial case. 
We must therefore make use of the "equal 
intervalU notion (which coincides with the "halfway" 
interpretation if the distance function is additive) 
by taking the bisection point, xz, of x and z to be 
defined by 
d(x,xz) = d(xz,z). 
+ + For x, z£lR , or -x, -z£lR , and x, z~O, z > x, this 
gives, for D 1 and D 2' 
xz = liz (5.9) 
which is clearly unique. With the restrictions on 
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x and z given above, this gives a consistent bisection 
operation (see, for example, Restle, 1961, p. 197-199; 
Marks, 1974, p. 249ff; Pfanzag1, 1968, p. 84). 
Problems occur though when we have z > 0, x < 0, 
or when x = 0 or z = O. If the latter occurs - say 
x = 0 - then 
D 1 (X,y) = D 2 {x,y)=l 
so clearly no bisection can take place since we have 
defined D 1 (0,0) = D 2(0,0) = O. We must therefore 
exclude the origin from consideration as a standard 
stimulus in the bisection operation. 
The other problem occurs when x and z are on 
opposite sides of the origin: x < 0, Z'> O. It 
can then be shown that, uniquely, 
xz = 0 (5.10) 
when D 1 (x,xz) = D 2 (x,xz) = D 2 (xz,z) = D 1 (xz,z) = 1 • 
. This means that a consistency test cannot be carried 
out, since we have excluded the origin as a candidate 
for either of the two stimuli to be bisected. This 
does not mean that the bisection definition is 
inconsistent: it means only that consistency does not 
have a real meaning. 
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To avoid these problems, we shall therefore 
consider only points in lR + in this section 
(section 5.1). We still have the difficulty af it 
is a difficulty) that any interval with the origin 
as endpoint cannot be bisected~ this appears to be 
an integral part of the model D which should be 
taken as a prediction of a certain behaviour. This 
section, then, deals only with positive, unidimen-
siona1 stimuli, unless otherwise stated. 
No such difficulties appear, in the metathetic 
case, with :M. The unique bisection point there is 
of course 
xz = (x+z)/2 (5.11) 
no matter where x and z are in lR (as long as 
Ix-zl < 1). 
An interesting point, using -the above definition 
of bisection, which may re~e the two models D and 
:M, is a consequence of the normalised nature of the 
two models D IS and D 2B. 
When we talk about the one-dimensional case, we 
generally take it to mean one dimension on one of the 
axes of a multidimensional space, so that other 
dimensions have zero values. But with the normalised 
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distance functions, it makes a difference to talk 
about one dimensional cases not on an axis. One 
such case that immediately comes to mind is the line 
parallel to an axis; in two dimensions 
La = {(x,a) : xelR} for some a£:m. 
In this case we have that if xa ' Za£La' 
xa = (x,a) za = ~,a), Z > x, then 
although of course, for any B, 
Suppose now we wish to find the bisector, 
(5.12) 
(5.14) 
xaza ==(xz,a) of the points xa,za on La: then for 
DiB we have, from (5.13), 
Z - xz 
XZ - x 
= (5.15) 
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The solution to this is not easily obtained1 but 
suppose we let faf get very large; then the 
denominators of both sides of (5.15) qet closer 
and closer to being equal to 2.Ial, so we can cancel 
giving the limiting case of 
-
z - xz = xz - It 
or 
xz = 
x+z (5.16) 
-r 
An identical result follows from (5.14). 
This is of course the same result we found for 
:M (equation 5.11): in other words 
lim 1 a I -tr., (bisector under E 1 B or D 2 B) = bisector 
under :M (5.17) 
What then does "a" represent? Looking back to our 
original construction in Chapter 3, "a" is related 
to the ncore" of elements in common to all stimuli. 
What (5.17) says is that as this core becomes more 
and more dominant - perhaps as the core becomes 
more and more "obvious· .~ prothetic dissimilarity 
becomes mathematically more and more like metathetic 
similarity. In the limit it becomes additive, or 
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in a sense which will become clear in the next 
section, linear. Empirically this could lead to 
confusion between the prothetic and metathetic cases. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that 
equation (5.9) for the bisection point has been 
rejected by various authors (e.g. Luce, Stevens 
and Galanter) because (a) it is inaccurate and 
(b) it does not take account of bias and hysterisis 
effects. A10ng with Lace (1961) one could include 
additional parameters to take these objections 
into account, but one would like to avoid that if 
possible, since it seems rather ad hoc. A better 
answer may be through the previous discussion of 
"core": the subject's perception of the size of 
the core may vary with order of presentation or with 
payoffs. 
However, a third answer may come from an 
observation of Restle's (Restle, 1961, p.2l6) on 
category scales for prothetic continua, that "i£ 
the subject is given enough categories to prevent 
artificial bunching, if he judges a d~ension 
which can be estimated quite accurately ••••• , and 
if the stimuli are spaced equally in physical 
amount to minimise distortions from context, one 
finding is consistent - the middle category is 
used for a stimulus which is one-third of the way 
from the smallest to the largest stimulus". 
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To Restle's experimental preconditions, we might 
add that of uniform distribution of sttmuli 
presented (see Parducci, 1965); but if we take 
the middle category to be approximately the same as 
the position of a bisection judgment, as seems 
plausible (see Restle, op.cit., but for contrary 
evidence, see Adams and Paqot, 1975), this observation 
leads directly to the hypothesis (for prothetic 
continua) that 
X + 
z-x 
xz = -3- = 2x+z -3- \j x, z£lR +, z>x (S.lS) 
This form of bisection equation is basically quite 
different from equation (5.9) and needs a new 
approach to the interpretation of what the bisection 
judgment consists of. Note that it is not a 
consistent definition in that 
(x iz) (xz z) ;: xz, 
but this is in accord with results quoted by Marks 
(op.cit) • 
The value represented by equaion (5.18) is 
dependent on two other values: one of the endpoint 
stimuli, and the absolute difference between them. 
This suggests that the difference between the 
endpoints is an integral part of the bisection judgment. 
A possible way it could be incorporated into a 
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judgment process is as follows: the difference 
itself is to be regarded as a stimulus; in other 
words, the zero point is moved from the origin 
to the smaller or lesser of the two stimuli to be 
bisected. The bisection judgment is then to find 
a stimulus with a dissimilarity of one-half to this 
"differenc~" stimulus. To restore relativities, 
when the bisector is found, the origin is restored 
to its original position. 
Mathematically, this process is represented 
by 
D (xz - x, z - x) = J:i 
Solving this for xz gives 
or 
(z - x) - (xz - x) 
(z - x) + (~ - x) 
+ 
'\ix, z£1R ,z > x 
= J~ 
(5.19) 
1 
xz = x + 3 (z - x) (5.20), 
the required result. 
However this is not nearly as straightforward 
as it may appear. Can a difference be used by a 
subject as a stimulus as easily as the process would 
assume? Can a subject. shift the origin in this way? 
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Why should the origin be shifted to the smaller 
stimulus: why not to the larger stimulus, with a 
reversal of the direction of the dimension? Why 
should the judgment involve dissimilarity and not 
similarity? The ratio (Gregson's) unidimensional 
similarity model gives a differen~ result (it 
'halves the interval). And finally, but perhaps 
most importantly, the dissimilarity models have up 
to now been assumed to be in psychological - not 
physical - space. The result (5.20) is thus for 
psychological space, whereas Restle's result (5.18) 
was for physical space; since the psychophysical 
function, whatever it is, often deviates significantly 
from identity, the two results may in fact be hard 
to reconcile. 
A few preliminary answers might be given along 
the following lines. The "shifting of the origin" is 
not necessarily an actual process carried out by 
the subject: it is more a conceptual way of looking 
at the process for mathematical convenience. On the 
other hand, i~ may be a quite s~p1e process of 
ignoring all "small" aspects of the stimuli. The 
question of why the smaller stimulus should be used is 
not easily answered - it may be more "natural" to 
subjects in some way_ The dissimilarity-similarity 
question is not a real one if the Eis1er-Ekman similarity 
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model FI (D) is asswned, since this gives identical 
results to the dissimilarity mOdel; usually 
though, similarity is considered a more "natural" 
. judgment to make than diss~ilarity. Lastly, the 
relevance of the question of the space we are 
dealing with depends on (a) the form of the 
psychophysical function, and (b) ·the way (and 
whether) the difference judgment is made. 
We shall for the present ignore these important 
objections for the purely pragmatic reason that 
the approach gives good results. The next section 
will provide further evidence for this attitude. 
Finally it should be noted that the above 
analysis was for the prothetic continuum case. An 
exactly parallel analysis can be carried ont for 
the metathetic case being studied here, with the 
result (using the same controversial assumptions 
as before) that the bisection judgment should halve 
the interval between the two stimuli. 
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5.1.2 category Scales 
Category scales are generally thought of as 
approximating to "equal interval" scales (e.g. 
Stevens and Galanter, 1957, p. 377) in ~he same 
sense as the bisection judgment divides an 
interval into two "equal intervals". The subject 
is instructed in same way to make category widths 
"psychologically equal". As explained in 
section 2.3.3, several workers, including Ekman, 
Goude and Waern, (1961) and Junge (1960), have already 
given this a similarity interpretation by equating 
"psychologically equal" with "of equal similarity". 
Under the present models for prothetic unidimensional 
continua (and any other models which are simply 
functions of the stimulus ratio), this means that all 
pairs of stimuli equally spaced on the category 
scale are in equal ratio. From this simple basis, one 
can construct the category scale without any further 
assumptions, and show that it is logarithmically 
related to the psychophysical scale on which the 
similarity judgments are based. 
In fact, of course, subjects are rarely instructed 
to consider all possible intervals: rather, they 
are asked (if asked explicitly at: all) to in some way 
"partition a segment of the continuum into equal 
intervals" (Stevens and Galanter, op.cit.). In 
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other words, they are asked to make equal only the 
intervals either (depending on on~s interpretation) 
between adjacent category boundaries (lL~ens), or 
between consecutive category "exemplars" (""hich 
w~ shall define as the stimuli corresponding to the 
respective category labels.) There could therefore 
be some debate over whether boundaries or exemplars 
should be the critical values used or solved for: 
in practice it would probably make very little 
difference to the fit of a model. Thurstone used 
limens (see Torgerson, 1958, for example), we shall 
use exemplars because they seem more natural and 
less abstract in the context of similarity judgments. 
Stevens and Galanter (op.cit. p. 392) showed 
exemplars could be found by subjects when asked for; 
this procedure is c10sely related to that of 
r.quisection (e.g. Torgerson, 1958, Chapter 6); and 
see also Reed (1972), for evidence on use of 
exemplars. 
In Appendix B it is proved that, 'for the 
exemplars, the category scale is logarithmically 
related to the stimulUS values. The important point 
about this particular proof is. that it needs no 
more than the equal ratios assumption for its 
conclusions: no extra assumptions are required 
(compare the proof of Junge, 1960, or Eis1er, 1962). 
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It also makes clear the fact that the logarithmic 
scale is valid only for the actual category 
exemplars: intermediate stimuli are, by some 
decision rule, put by subjects into categories. 
These are then averaged by the experimenter to give 
a non-integral scale value which ~Till depend on 
the decision rule used and the distribution of 
discriminal processes of the subject (compare the 
much simpler, but deceptive, proof of Wagenaar, 
1975). Of course, if consecutive exemplars are 
relatively closely spaced, then a logarithmic relation 
will be a good approximation for all values. 
K(x) 
The scale then becomes 
1 
(n - 1) 
n 
I09(~) 
b log (a) 
x < a 
+ 1 a < x < b (5.21) 
x > b 
where K(x) is the category scale value of stimulus 
X, and a,b are the exemplars of the first and last 
(nth) categories respectively. 
The exemplars a aDd b will nl:>t necessarily be 
identical to the extremes of the stimulus sample: 
subjects may set up their own, perhaps according to 
various experimental conditions such as stimulus 
density, and frequency and order of presentation. 
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They can be estimated from the results of a 
category-·scaling experiment. Using Stevens (1957) 
and Stevens and Galanter (1957) as bibliographies. 
of category-scaling experiments, -this estimation 
was carried out approximately on a number of such 
experiments. The results are given in Table 5.1 
along with an F-ratio expressing the linearity 
between the scale data and the scaling model with 
the tabulated end exemplars. It will be seen that 
the fit is generally good, and highly significant 
if the usual hamoscedastic normality assumptions are 
true of the data. The estimated end exemplars 
ar~ plausible, though deviating widely at times fram 
the actual range of stimuli presented. 
The second possible model of category scales 
corresponds to that leading to equation (5.20), for 
the bisection model. This suggests that a category 
scale is essentially a dissimilarity (or similarity) 
scale such that, using the notation of equation (5.21), 
x < b 
(5.22) 
x > b 
Stimulus 
Continuum; Stimulus Spacin, Range 
~Ieight; Equal 90-400 
Equal 200-400 
Equal 200-900 
Equal 90-400 
Equal 50-100 
50-100 
TABLE 5.1 
F-ratios and fitted parameters for two Category Scaling Models. 
Data used is all referred to in Stevens (1957) and Stevens and 
Galanter (1957: referred to below as "SG"). For details of 
models see text. 
LOg MOdel I,Slmllarity-scale Model I No. 
'Estima ted' IIEstima ted of 
End Exemplars F-Ratio End Exemplars F-Ratio kl,'f. catcg's Data Reference 
58,498 8648 I1 0,488 4331 3 9 Helson (1948,p.305) 
141,444 3880 146,45.5 12930 3 9 Helson (1948,p.301) 
155,729 17137 147,717 3449 3 9 " 
64,553 3364 8,536 1238 3 9 " 
45,108 7376 47,113 6367 19 10 Guilford and Dingman (1955)* 
" * 
Equal 33,132 7376 32,137 7332 19 15 
Equal 84-108 
I 
77, 110 628 80,113 462 5 I 3 SG(Fig SA: Fernherger's resultst Egu2l.1 50-850 82,981 530 5,904 3490 7 II Nash (1950 ) 
Equal 50-8':>0 I 80,,823 6110 3,814 404 7 9 " Equal 50-850 81,833 1239 4,822 381 7 7 " 
Eaual 50-8':>0 90,999 455 38,908 704 7 5 " 
50-850 4364 " Equal 107,760 68,747 1705 7 3, 
Veg 43-292 I 61,325 846 42,329 772 9 11 Canter and Hirsch (1955, Fig. 1)+ Equal 43-292 
I 
42,370 286 36,329 1249 9 11 " 
Log 43-292 40,295 3315 26,289 636 9 11 " 
Equal 84-108 79,112 1494 82,116 492 5 3 SG (Fig 5A: Wever & Zena: da tal + 
Equal 88-104 82,109 361 85,112 136 3 3 " + 
Duratior::: 
"'"'0" r" ,,-. . .5,4.8 795 I 
.3,4.4 5766 11 7 Stevens (1957, Fig 1)+ 
Bunched down 250-1000 230,1268 366 223,1209 980 3 5 Postman and Miller (1945) 
" 250-1000 ' 225,1370 553 207,1294 7936 3, 5 " • ".1. 
" 250-1150 I 225,1393 443 280,1307 3116 3 5 " 
" I 250-1400 I 226,1633 207 203,1468 760 3 5 " 
" I 250-1500 225,1735 304 198,1531 2668 3 5 " 
Equal ~.25-2.5 .4,3.1 563 .4,2.9 1454 8 7 SG(Fig 2A: their data)+ 
Equal .25-4 .5,4.5 560 .3,4.1 2182 14 7 " t Log 0.4-4 .5,4.3 824 .3,4.0 1790 9 7 SG(Fig 2B:"their data) 
Bunched upwards .25-4 .7,4.9 404 ,6,4.6 609 8 7 + 
Loudness; Log 1-64 1. 6,63 702 0,37 736 11 7 SG(Fig 8B: numerical sC~le)+ 
Log 1-64 1.7,59 230 0,39 458 10 3 SG(Fig 8C: 3 pt. scale) +' 
Log .7-64 1. 7,93 468 0,49 490 12 100 SG(Fig 8C: 100 pt. scalet 
Equal 2-46 4,49 440 1,47 1051 8 7 SG(Fig 9A: sone spacin~) 
"Pure" 1-64, 2.4,70 562 0,50 598 9 7 SG (Fig 9A: "adjusted") 
S finds Exemplars 3-34 4.4,36 772 3,34 1423 5 7 SG(Fig 9B: S adjusts stimuli)++ 
Equal 3-34 4.8,38 2068 4,35 4480 11 7 SG(Fig 9B: S assigns category) 
? .4-64 .8,69 1223 0,27 107 5 7 SG(Fig lOA: Reger's scale)+ 
Bunched upwards .4-64 1. 2, 98 242 0,45 86 5 7 SG(Fig 10A)+ 
Bunched down .4-64 .6,79 438 0,27 186 5 7 " + 
Length; Bunched to ends 3-112 12,118 553 7,110 2303 15 11 SG(Fig 1) + 
Nll.'nerousness; Log 15-74 13,88 2406 10,84 1473 21 9 Guildford (1954, p.203) 
~; Bunched down 4-81 5,83 828 1,69 724 7 
" 
5 SG(Fig 3B: their data) + 
Footnotes: 
~S-point scale was used in this experiment, of which only 10 pts, were actually 
used significantly often. l:he first result above rescales to a 10 pt. scale; 
the second uses the actual data. 
+ These use data merely estimated from the refere'nced graph. 
+ 
+ 
N 
o 
N 
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Our prev.,ious experience would suqqest that "$" 
here is $E1 in this case the model is 
1 x < a 
K(x) = x-a 2 (n-l)x+b_2a + 1 a < x < b (5.23) 
n x > b 
This is concave downwards, as required. We shall 
refer to it as the "stmilarity-scale model" of 
category scalinq, to distinguish it from the ~lbeit 
similarity based) loqarithmic model (5.21). 
Aqain, exemplars a and b were estimated from the 
data, as shown in Table 5.1. They are, aqain, 
plausible thouqh at times widely diverqent from the 
respective stimulus ranqes. 
The fit of the similarity-scale model is 
also very qood, the F-ratios beinq in qeneral at 
_ hiqhly siqnificant levels. But there is very little 
to choose between it and the loqarithmic model. 
There seems to be little pattern in the fits of the 
two models; the only immediately identifiable' 
tendency beinq for the worst fits to occur when 
the number of available cateqories is very hiqh 
(i.e. 100) or rather low (i.e. 3 or 5). 
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In view of the previous discussion of bisection, 
and the general discrediting of the logarithmic model 
(see, for example, Stevens, 1966), the similarity-
scale model of category scaling seems attractive. It 
may perhaps be taken as indirect evidence· for the 
Eisler-Ekman model of unid~ensional similarity, 
over that of Gregson - but only if and when all the 
assumptions it requires for its construction are 
validated in some way. Its approach is quite similar 
to one of the models of Helson's Adaptation Level 
theory. In fact, if the category scale is taken 
to be a scale of dissimilarity from a single 
"Adaptation Level" stimulus, then the model is 
K( ) = k 1x-al x x+a 
(where a is the n Adaptation Level" and k is a 
suitable unit) which is formally identical to that 
given in Relson (1948, p 303). Although the present 
similarity-scale model has two interpretable 
parameters instead of Helson's one, the close relation-
ship between the two models may mean that our model 
suffers from many of the well-known weaknesses that 
Helson's possesses (see, for example, Stevens, 1958; 
Parducci, 1965). 
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The most attractive feature, however, of the 
present similarity-related approachc category 
scaling is that it explains the difference between 
the form of the category-scale function for 
prothetic and metatbetic continua. ~he curvilinear 
functions derived as equation (5.21) and (5.23) are 
true only for prothetic continua, since the similarity 
models used in their derivations are assumed to 
apply only there. The corresponding similarity model 
for (unidimensional) equal-measure metathetic continua 
is a function of the absolute difference between 
stimulus values (see equations 5.3 and 5.8): 
(5.24) 
1 -
= 1 + (5.25) 
If model (5.24) is the more correct, as evidence 
from the prothetic case suggests, the form of the 
category-scale function will be linear, whichever of 
the two scale constructions is used. This is in 
line with the suggestion by Stevens and Galanter who 
state (p_ 377, op.cit.) that category scales on 
metathetic continua "may be linear" when plotted 
against the ratio scale of subjective magnitude. In 
terms of the present models, non-linearity could be 
due to the continuum not being purely metathetic -
that is, not an exactly 'Iequal-measurell continuum -
but beinq somewhere along the continuum to protheticness. 
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~hus, if the line of reasoning presented in this 
and previous chapters is correct, an explanation for 
this particular aspect of the difference between 
metathetic and prothetic continua will have been 
given. We are not aware of any other explanation. 
5.2 OTHER PROBLEMS 
5.2.1 He1m's result 
Helm and his co-workers (see, for example, 
Coombs, 1964, p. 488ff., and Helm, Messick and 
Tucker, 1961) have noted that both Stevens' and 
Galanter's relation between category and ratio scales, 
and apparent high dimensionality in metric multi-
dimensional scaling solutions, can be "explained G 
by transforming data with an exponential transforma-
tion. A similarity approach to the former result was 
the subject of the previous section; we shall briefly 
give a partial explanation of the latter result in 
this section. 
The usual interpretation of the apparent need for 
the exponential transformation is that subjects 
"underestimate large distances fl (see Coombs, Ope cit.); 
it occurs primarily with prothetic continua. But this is 
the Procrustean syndrome at it s worst: what is 
really meant is that Euclidean distance (as the 
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distance function usually is in this context) 
overestimates subjective dissimilarities on "large 
distances" - that is, it is a bad model, We shall 
therefore compare our dissimilarity models on 
prothetic continua with the Euclidean distance, for 
"big distances". 
This comparison is not a well-defined one 
because of the fact that (as was proved in Chapter 1) 
the two models do not give the same dissimilarity 
ordering: what is "big" for Euclidean distance is 
not necessarily "big~ for the preseht models. The 
most usual case of "big" distances for the 
Euclidean model is, however, when at least one of 
the two points is well away from the origin. Thus 
if we take the cases that x,y,u,v,£lR n are such that 
or 
h+h >h +h x y U --y 
h > h 
x+y u+v 
(5.26) 
(5.27) 
(which are not equivalent) we shall not be too far 
wrong. They will include a proportion of "small" 
distances~ and conversely, some "large" distances 
will not be included. But in this case, to compare 
the performance of the two model S l' we look at 
D 12 (x,y) :M 2 (u,v) 
RI == D 12 (u,v) • :M 2 (x,yf ; and 
D 22 (X'Y)/:M 2 (u,v) 
R2 == D 22 (u,v) :M 2 (x,y) 
We use D 12 and D 22 merely for simplicity; 
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D la and D 2e would give less straightforward but not 
radically different, resultse 
Now 
:M 2 (x,y) 
RI == ~ + hI :M 2 (u,v) h + h • = u v 
:M 2 (u,v) JM 2 (x,y) h+ h-x y 
(5.28) 
h + h 
and u, v 
:M 2(x,y) 
R2 hx + I J« 2 (u,v) h = == .U + V 
:M 2 (u,v) :M 2 (x,y) hx + y 
(5.29) 
~ +v 
so by assumptions (5,,26) and (5.27) respectively, 
or 
D 12 (x,y) 
D 12 (u,v) 
and 
:M 2 (x,y) and D 22 (x,y) X 2 (x,y) 
< < 
:M 2 (u,vl D 22 (u,v)" :M 2 (u,v) 
(5.30) 
In other words, the present models, in these 
particular cases, predict the tlunderestimation" of 
"large U distances. This suggests they are better 
models for prothetic spaces, and that if used in 
multidimensional scaling, will give more valid, 
perhaps IOl-ler dimensioned, results,. 
Note again that this "underestimation" is not 
predicted for the equal-measure me~tathetic case. 
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5.2.2 Ekman's Law for metathetic continua 
Ekman (l96l) has suggested a subjective analogue 
of Weber's law, for prothetic continua: 
Ax = ox + B (5.31) 
where Ax is the j.n.d. on the continuum at the value 
X, and a and e are constants with e very near to 
zero. Stevens (1966) has called it "Ekman's Law" 
and suggested that decreasing sensitivity (increase 
in size of j.n.d.'s) up a scale was a characteristic 
of prothetic scales. 
A similarity derivation of Ekman's Law was 
reproduced in section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2; it 
assumed that P a j.n.d. is constant on the similarity 
continuumr.. Once again, this can be applied to the 
metathetic case of the present models, giving 
at = $(x,x+Ax) = F{Ax) (5.32) 
where a' is a constant and F is Fl or F2 of 
equations (5.4) and (5.5). In either ,case, since 
both are one-to-one, we have 
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or 
6x = (J. (5~33) 
-1 
where a = F (a'), a constant. 
In other words, the "equal similarity of 
j.n.d.'s" assumption also predicts constant 
sensitivity (constant discrimination, constant size 
of j.n.d.'s) on equal-measure metathetic continua, 
which is the usual approximate empirical result. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
APPLICATION TO SOME DATA AND TO HULTIDIMENSIONAL 
SCALING 
Up until this point, the development of the 
6is)similarity models has been largely abstract 
and theoretical. In this chapter we shall look 
at a limited number of experiments which seem to be 
illustrative of the distinctions drawn within the 
models, and their practical implications. This 
will lead into a discussion of multidimensional 
scaling ( .. mS) with regard to the ne,'? models. 
Finally we shall briefly examine some empirical 
ordinal results, found by various workers in the 
field of similarity, as to whether they are consistent 
with the models of this thesis. 
It will be noted.that, except for the last 
section (ordinal results), all sllnilarity data used 
in this chapter will be pool.ed data. Pooling over 
subjects is, quite rightly, a highly contentious 
procedure - see, for example, Carroll (1972), 
Shepard (1964), or the references of section 6.3 of 
this chapter. Individuals will have different 
sets of dimensions that they use, different weights 
on those dimensions, and possibly different judgment 
strategies and/or models. The hope in averaging 
data is that the pooled data will represent an 
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"average subject". The risk is that pooling will 
in fact create data that appears to fit a model that 
in fact fits none of the individual subjects. 
Shepard (op.cit) gave an exa~ple where pooled, bu~ 
not individual, data indicated non-convex isosimilarity 
contours. Micko and Fischer (1970) and Fischer and 
Micko (1972) have shown that averaging Minkowski 
distances is invalid. We use pooled data here 
mainly because virtually all data published by Content 
model workers is pooled data; however we do 
think the "average subject" view does have some 
validity, especially at the "gross features" level we 
are largely aiming at, at present. We shall have 
something more specific to say on this in section 6.4. 
6.1 SOME SIMILARITY DATA 
6.1.1 In one dimension 
The metathetic continua we are dealing wjb are 
our socalled "equal measure" continua (see Chapter 3). 
It was noted in section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3 that a very 
similar "equal measure ll concept was used by many Content 
model workers to simplify their models, and that there-
fore a large body of similarity data for this latter 
type of space existed. It seems reasonable to look at 
some of this data to see whether it coincides with our 
metathetic continua. 
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We have therefore chosen same fairly typical 
examples of this type of experiment: from Ekm.an 
(1965) (which itself uses data reported in other 
papers). The data is presented in Table 6.1. 
In each case, subjects were instructed to ignore 
any quantitative differences or"differences in 
intensity;' Similarity estimates were given on a scale 
ranging from 0 ("no similarityU) to 100 
("identity") • 
Ekman analysed. th.e similarities by using the 
model 
cos$ = $(x,y) ($(x,y) + /S+$2(x,y» 
xy 4 
which is the solution for cos+ of the model of 
xy 
Ekman, et. al. (1964). Ekman factor analysed the 
cosines so obtained, by the method of principal 
factors, and rotated to simple structure. 
In experiment 1, the stimuli were the nine 
Swedish words meaning in English: happy, pleased, 
content, sad, gloomy, depress~, agitated, impatient, 
restless. Ekman found three factors, which he 
interpreted as "sadness", Rhappiness", and "agitation". 
In fact, Ekman's scaling produced three clusters of 
three virtually indistinguishable points. There 
therefore seems no reason why more than two dimensions 
should be necessary, and this is confirmed in a similar 
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experiment by Lund (1975). 
'the stimuli of experiment 2 consisted of six 
mixtures of amyl acetate and n-heptanal, which were 
sniffed by the observers. 'they were in concentrations 
of 100, 87.5, 75.0, 50.0, 25.0 and 0.0 percent of 
amyl acetate. Sl~ective intensity was approximately 
constant for all stimuli. Two factors - one 
representing each chemical - were found. 
Seven colour st±muli of constant brightness -
nearly monochromatic light with transmission maxima 
at 522, 546, 560, 566, 570, 575 and 580mp - were 
used in the third experiment. Again, two factors 
were found: "green" and "yellow". 
'the final experiment used ten words representing 
personality traits; in English translation: shy, 
ifthibited, reserved, uncommunicative, timid, self-
centred, independent, self-sufficing, unsociable, 
taciturn. The two factors found were interpreted as 
"Shyness n and "Self-centration". 
If the present models are correct we would 
expect the similarity data to be well described by 
one of two transformations Fl or F2 
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Fl(X) = 1 - x, 0 < x < 1 (6.1) 
F2 (x) 1 - x = 1 + x' o < x < 1 (6.2) 
of either a Minkowski distance (if the continuum is 
equal-measure metathetic) or one of the distance 
functions D 16 or D 26 (if the continuWR is prothetic). 
Of course if the continuum is somewhere midway 
between prothetic and equal-measure metathetic, none 
of these distance functions will be exactly right. 
A curve fitting (equally, a scaling) exercise 
was therefore carried out to see which, if any, of the 
six possible models fitted each set of data best in 
one dimension. This was done by minimising, over the 
n scale values {xi}n , the loss function 
i=l 
n n 
L= 1: 1: (F($(a. ,a.» - » (x
1
. ,x).»2 
i=l j=l 1 J 
where _. there are n stimuli {ai}n ; 
. i=l 
3L 
3xi = 
the $(ai,aj ) are the similarity data; 
F is either Fl or F21 
D is D l' D 2 or 14. 
Since :14 (Xi ,xj ) = IXi -xj I, if D = :M then 
+ 2 1: (xi-x.) j~i ) 
n 
so that for a minimum, if we take ~ x. = 0 
j=l J 
(as we may), we have 
X. = 
/ ~ 
n 
~ 
j=l 
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\x.-x., 
Since the ~ J are determined simply by the order 
xi-x j 
of the x., which can be found either by nonmetric 
~ 
unidimensional scaling or by unfolding methods, an 
analytic best-fit solution is easily found. 
For ID 1 or D 2 an analytic solution is not 
so easily found; here a steepest-descent iterative 
minimisa tion technique was used. In this case, 
+ best minima were found for xi £lR ,. i = 1, ••• .;. ,n, 
so it is immaterial whether D 1 or D 2 is the 
distance function used (we are therefore really 
testing four, not six models). We can, and shall, 
therefore use the notation D = D 1 = D 2 in this 
section. However, there were noticeable problems 
with local minima; it is hoped these were largely 
over come by use of several initial configurations. 
Even then, somewhat different configurations with 
nearly equal L-values were found, but these 
configurations did not differ enough to be of 
real practical significance. 
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The minimum L-values occurred as follows. 
For experiments 1, 2 and 4, the best model was P 2 (D ) 
- the ratio model of unidimensional similarity. 
For experiment 3 it was PI (:H). However the fit for 
F 2 (:M) in experiment 2 (L = 0.0438) was not much 
worse than that for F2 {D) (0.0362). A linear 
regression of the theoretical similarity values 
versus the empirical values gave F-ratios that were 
highly significant (beyond the .005 level in all 
four cases). Experiment 2 has a poorer fit than the 
other three, though it is still highly significant. 
The results are tabulated in Table 6.2. 
TABLE 6.2 
Fit of best-fittins models for data in 
Ekman (1965). 
Expt. ··I·-~~e~----!-~~:-~-~::~T-·---·~··---·TF_RatiO I d.f. I 
I-----l------l-- ___1 . .. J --~-+--- -
1 I D jF2 I 0. 0399 1 3623.8 I 25 
2 ! D F2 O.036~! I 68.2 I 7 
! I 3 ~ Fl 0.0503[ 443.4 12 
4 D F2 . 0.320 I 300.3 ! 33 
-'--____ . ___ .. J ___ .... __ ... _._ ... _l.._ .... _ ...... ___ .. _l .. __ ......... ___ .. _ 
d.f. = (n(n-l)/2)-n-2 for n stimuli 
The linear fit is plotted in Figures 6.1 - 6.4 
respectively, along with the four scalings of the 
stimuli. 
data 
1·0 
0·8 
0·6 
0-4 
0-2 
o 
o 0-.2 0-4 
Best fit of model 
Data=Hodel 
0-6 o-s 
(a) Fit of model F 2 (D) to data. 
I "' 
Content 
Pleased 
r----- Impatient 
~-- Restless 
.219_ 
1·0· model 
Sad 
o 2·5 5-0 7·5 10 1'2-5 15 
(b) Scaling of data. 
FIGURE 6.1 Fit and scaling of data from Ekman (1965), 
Expt. 1. 
, I 
17·5 
data 
1-0 
0·8 
0·6 
0·4 
0·2 
• 
• 
Best fit of model 
Data=model 
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o 
o 0.2 0.4 0·6 0·8 1·0 model 
(a) Fit of model F2 (ID) to data. 
500/0 
I 
1·0 
I 
4·0 5·0 
(b) Scaling of data: stimuli are marked in percentage 
amyl aceta·te. 
FIGURE 6.2 Fit and scaling of data from Ekrnan (1965) 
Experiment 2. 
6·0 
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1·0 
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0·8 
0·6 
0·4 
0·2 
Best fit of model - ----
• • Data:model 
0 
0 0·2 0·4 0·6 0·8 1·0 model 
(a) Fit of model Fl (]M) to data. 
580 575 570 566 560 546 522 mj.J 
. ! 
.I 
-0·5 
I 
-0·3 
i 
-0·1 
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(b) Scaling of data: stimuli identified by their 
wavelengths in m~. 
FIGURE 6.3 Fit and scaling of data from Ekman (1965) 
Experiment 3. 
data 
1·0 
0·8 
0·6 
0-4 
0·2 
0 
o 
• 
• 
• 
0 0·2 0·4 
(a) Fit of model F2 (ID) 
inhibited 
taciturn 
5 10 
(b) Scaling of data. 
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Best fit of 
Data = 
0·6 
to data. 
uncommunicative 
reserved 
unsociable 
15 20 
0·8 
model .... _---
model 
1.0 model 
self-centred 
self-sufficing 
indeRendent 
25 30 
FIGURE 6.4 Fit and scaling of data from Ekrnan (1965) 
Experiment 4.' 
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We can interpret the results as follows. 
Experiment 1 is on the prothetic continuum of sadness. 
It should be noted that since D (;, ~) = D (x,y) 
for one dimension, an equivalent (in the sense 
of equally well-fitting) solution exists on a 
"happiness" continuum which would simply be a 
multiple of the reciprocal of that for sadness 
{this is consistent wi~~ an observation of Torgerson, 
1960). A stmi1ar comment applies to both experiments 
2 and 4. Recall that Ekman found three dimensions 
in this experiment and Lund, two. Thus the present 
model reduces the dimensiona1ity while preserving 
an excellent fit. The subjects would appear to be 
using only one of the several latent dimensions of 
the stimulus set. 
Experiment 2 can be described most simply as 
on the prothetic continuum of n-heptanal concentration 
or intensity (or, alternatively, amyl acetate 
concentration). The scaling in fact almost equally 
spaces the multiples of 25.0% concentration although the 
stimulus with 97.5% amyl acetate seems slightly 
displaced. But in view of the near equal fit of the 
FI (D) and F2 CM) models, it would seem likely that 
this continuum is one which is midway between prothetic 
and equal-measure metathetic. This suggestion is in 
agreement with a very similar finding by Eisler (1963), 
and would to some extent explain results like those 
of Mitchell (1971), who found that odour intensity could 
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not be accurately described by a simple power law, 
giving reason to doubt the purely prothetic nature 
of this continuum. Mitchell Cop.cit., p.3-25) 
also questions the use of grouped data from odour 
similarity experiments, providing data on the 
reliability of individual subjects. 
Experiment 3 implies a metathetic continuum 
of hue in the green-yellow zone of the spectrum 
going from green to yellow (or vice versa). 
Superficiily this might seem at variance with the 
more complex scale one 'tvould expect from one of 
the usual three-colour theories of colour vision 
(see for example, Judd, 1960, p.832ff., Graham, 
1965, Chapters 13 and 15; Gregory, 1966, p.l2l). 
However, the stXmulus set is largely situated between 
the usual values given for the primaries green and 
red: around 550m~ and 600mp respectively; and in 
this part of the spectrum, the primary of blue or 
violet has negligible effect and is nearly constant. 
Thus the main effect could be interpreted 
physiologically as a simple substitutive process 
between red and green sensitive cones (see also 
Indow, 1974b). The uneven spacing of the stimuli 
on the subjective scale (see Figure 6.3(b» also 
strongly suggests that the scale is, at least 
approximately, a constant discrimination one. In 
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particular, it predicts a maximum in discriminability 
(a minimum j.n.d.) for wavelengths between 570 and 
575ml1. This is in accord with dat,a found by direct 
methods (see Graham, 1965, Chapters 12 and 15; and 
Gregory,op.cit., p.124). This is also in accord with 
the suggestion under "Ekman's Lawn (section 5.2.2) 
in Chapter 5 that equal-measure metathetic scales 
could be constant discrimination ones. 
Finally, experiment 4 produces a prothetic 
scale which seems best interpreted as a "se1f-
confidence" scale. 
These four analyses show that the conventional 
content model interpretation of "equal measure" 
(i.e. equal vector lengths of the stimulus points) does 
not coincide with that of the present models. 
However the present models appear to fit well, 
and their approach to the protheti.c versus metathetic 
distinction has some independent validation. 
Two points should be noted. Firstly, the 
present models seem to quite effectively reduce the 
dimensiona1ity required to explain the data. This 
implies that subjects do not use all of the, sometimes 
quite distinctive and therefore perceived, d~ensions 
latent in the inter stimulus variations exemplified 
in the stimulus set, when judging similarities. 
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Fenker and Brown (1969) and Green and Carmone (1971) 
are among the many who previously have recognised 
this type of behaviour. 
Secondly, the simple ratio model of unidimensiona1 
similari ty seems to have been re,ri ved by these 
analyses; this may be because we are now definitely 
working in subjective space. 
6.1.2 In two dimensions 
From both a similarity modelling and a MDS point 
of view, one of the most interesting experiments 
carried out using similarity judgments is that in 
Eis1er (1967). This appears to be a critical one in 
determining the meaningfulness of ~rarious methods of 
analysing such experiments. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.2) I Ei.sler' s €!xperiment, along 
with his o~m analysis and that done by Roskam (1972), 
provides an example of how two different analyses 
(i.e. two different models) can give two equally 
interpretable but different solutions. One of these 
solutions must of course be wrong, so interpretability 
is no gua.rantee of validity. 
Eis1er's experiment is detailed in Eisler (1967): 
each stimulus consisted of two points (produced by 
light shining through holes in a metal sreet), the 
bottom left hand one of which was always fixed, and the 
other taking a position in a4x4 grid (see Figure 6.S). 
CO GO KO 00· 
BO FO JO 1\10 
AO EO 10 MO 
o DO HO lO 
(a) The original design 
of light holes: the 
unlabelled hole was 
lit for qll stimuli. 
The labelled holes form 
the Eisler configuration 
y 
in terms of the (b) A typical 
horizontal and labelling and 
vertical axes. not present). 
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stimulus pair (the 
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(c) The Eisler configuration 
in terms of angles and 
lengths. 
sine 
(d) The sler configura-
tion in terms of sines of 
angles and lengths. 
FIGURE 6.5 Eisler's Experiment. 
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Subjects made similarity judgments between all pairs of 
such stimuli, on a ten-point scale. The arithmetic 
mean was taken of these ratings, and they were 
divided by 10 to give similarity values between 0 
and 1 (see Table 6.3). 
The reason why this experiment is an interesting 
one is that there are at least two obvious possible 
descriptions of each stimulus. It can be described in 
terms of the projections the variable point of the 
stimulus makes on the horizontal and vertical axes; or 
it can be described in terms of the length of the line 
joining its two points, and the angle (or same function 
of the angle) that line makes with the horizontal 
axis. Other such descriptions naturally exist, as will 
be seen. The descriptions are themselves completely 
equivalent mathematically in that anyone can be 
calcula ted from any other 1 but the interesting point in 
the experiment is which (if either) of the two above 
descriptions is used by the observer to make judgments, 
since each description will give rise to a different 
set of similarities. 
A good MOS solution should provide up to two 
dimensions that are interpretable in terms of one of 
the possible descriptions. It would then be assumed 
that this pair of· dimensions is the one used by the 
subject. It was pointed out in section 2.3 of 
A 
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1. 506 
1.443 
i 
1.633 
.479 
1,,315 
!.328 
.394 
.308 
.252 
.258 
.252 
.246 
.181 
B 
.773 
.255 
.474 
.803 
.646 
.407 
.509 
.590 
.519 
.330 
.387 
.436 
.411 
c D 
.171 
.304 .455 
.662 .232 
.86.3 .136 
.297 .708 
.368 .333 
.583 .209 
.723 .136 
.410 .564 
.394 .270 
.544 .179 
.590 .117 
TABLE 6.3 
SIMILARITY DATA FROM EISLER (1967) 
E F G H I J 
.666 
.402 .748 
.454 .418 .304 
.791 .670 .397 .602 
.638 .861 .731 .387 .687 
.458 .750 .902 .253 .483 .745 
.280 .379 .409 .811 .501 .480 
.535 .576 .477 .493 .830 .703 
.. 542 .681 .659 .345 .682 .875 
.474 .634 .792 .240 .483 .775 
It L 
.381 
.510 .627 
.785 .438 
.916 .342 
M N 
.760 
.490 .789 
o 
N 
N 
Y) 
• 
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Chapter 2 that interpretability of dimensions in 
this sense is often taken as an indication of the 
suitability to the data of the model used in the 
HOS algorithm. 
In the present case however, two different 
models used for MDS gave the two different sets of 
dimensions. In his original report, Eis1er used a 
vector-type Content model to scale his data: he 
found that the two dimensions of his scaling quite 
clearly corresponded to the vertical and horizontal 
, 
axes of the stimulus space (he also found two other 
dimensions which were rather difficult m interpret). 
Roskam (1972) and Eis1er both analysed the data using 
r 
several Minkowski-based non-metric MDS algorithms. 
The result inwery case was highly interpretable: 
the axes corresponded to stimulus dimensions of line 
length and some function of angle (Roskam suggested 
the function was the sine function; Eis1er, less 
convincingly, suggested it was the identity function). 
~he result therefore casts doubt on the validity 
of using the results of any type of MDS to deduce the 
dimensions used by observers in making similarity 
judqments. Two approaches suggest themselves to check 
the nature of this particular result. Firstly, this 
experiment was designed to give a grid pattern when 
the physical dimensions are the horizontal and 
vertical axes - we shall henceforth call this design 
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"Eisler's configurationR : this type of design allows 
very easy checking of the interpretation of the axes. 
A second experiment using the same type of stimuli 
but with a design that gives a grid pattern in the 
physical 1engths-versus-sines space would check whether 
the result is merely an artifact of the particular 
experimental design. 
Secondly, one could use the method of Monte 
Carlo studies by taking the type of configuration 
used in the experiment, calculating the interpoint 
distances under a variety of models, and scaling these 
distances with the different models used for scaling 
the empirical data. It would then be seen whether 
artifactual dimensions can result from using the 
wrong models for scaling. We shall discuss the use 
of our models in non-metric MDS and present the results 
of same Monte Carlo studies in section 6.2. In this 
section we present the results of an auxi1liary experi-
ment as suggested above. 
6.1.2.1 Stimuli 
Instead of using the light-holes arrangement 
devised by Eisler, we simply used black dots on white 
paper, the bottom lefthand one being fixed with 
respect to the similarity scale used by subjects to 
. mark judged similarities (see Figure 6.6(a». 
• 
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The stimuli (16 in all) were chosen to give a 4x4 
grid in the physical space of lengths versus sines 
(see Figure 6.6{b), (c». All pairs of such stimuli, 
including all sixteen pairs of identical stimuli, 
(136 pairs in all) were made up into a booklet in a 
random order, three pairs to a page. Each pair of 
stimuli was therefore presented only once to each 
subject, and the pairs were presented in the same 
order to all subjects. 
6.1.2.2 Subjects 
Subjects were 53 second year psychology students, 
naive to both practice and theory of psychometric 
experiments of this type. They took part in the 
experiment as part of their classwork for the year, 
although participation was not compulsory. 
6.1.2.3 Instructions 
Instructions to subjects were printed on the 
first page of the booklet of stimulus pairs; they 
read as follows: 
This is an experiment about similarity. 
In this booklet there are figures made~ of a 
pair of point patterns, one to the left and 
one to the right. Each pattern consists of two 
dots. Your task is to estimate the similarity 
between the two patterns on a scale, which you 
will find beneath each figure, between zero and 
ten. Zero stands for no similarity at all, and 
ten stands for identity. Make your estimates 
as precise as you can by marking the scale at 
the corresponding value. 
Here are a few examples for practice. 
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6.1.2.4 Procedure 
Subjects were asked to read the instructions and 
do three practice trials. They were then asked if 
they had any questions, and proceeded with the 
experiment. ~ experiments were carried out 
simultaneously: the present one, and another similarity 
experiment, of identical form but with different 
stimuli, which is not presented here. (The stimuli 
in that experiment were pairs of brick walls, like 
those used by Gregson, 1974, whose two heights were 
proportional to the sine and length values respectively, 
of the dot stimulus experiment: for details, see the 
unpublished paper by D. Cargo, 1973.) Half the 
subjects did one experiment first, half the other. 
6.1.2.5 Results 
To be consistent with Eisler's treatment of his 
data, similarity values were averaged over subjects. 
Of the 53 subjects, four were not included in the 
average because it was obvious from inspection of their 
judgments that they were not adhering to the 
instructions in a consistent way. One used dissimilarities, 
two showed little recognition of the meaning of the 
identity judgment, and the remaining one used only 
the integers of the lowest part of the scale, making 
frequent use of zero. The lower triangle of this matrix 
of average sLmilarities, including the main diagonal 
of n identity" jud9Jl1ents, and the lower triangle of the 
TABLE 6.4 
DATA FROM DOT STrMULUS EXPERIMENT 
(a) Matrix of average similarities. 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P 
.. ~. ". __ ~"~,,," •• __ .. _~.~,,_,~.~~_ •• "' ._.",.~~ __ .~ ... ·~~~' __ ~".~~~'_~M' .... _~_~ •• _.~_._.~_~.~_ "'~,_"~ .... , ,~._, __ ~_"~. __ •••. , __ • 
Ai.977 
B I .749 .975 
C .629 .780 .978 
D .578 .740 .914 .991 
E .723 .539 .485 .368 .980 
F I .571 .702 .614 .474 .725 .975 
G I .414 .537 .622 .656 .671 .757 .959 
H .373 .448 .516 .668 .578 .711 .823 .948 
I .630 .470 .381 .363 .784 .625 .537 .440 .906 
J .340 .583 .477 .444 .611 .790 .735 .624 .672 .981 
K .327 .475 .592 .570 .427 .503 .683 .655 .570 .770 .963 
L .272 .411 .426 .573 .385 .491 .551 .618 .481 .627 .796 .963 
M .525 .465 .321 .239 .560 .497 .510 .326 .667 .463 .314 .264 .986 
p . .454 .454 .304 .356 .477 .461 .361 .376 .599 .525 .378 .707 .984 
0 .215 .346 .491 .449 .244 .346 .463 .488 .267 .503 .513 .516 .580 .733 .971 N 
w 
p 
.189 .244 .293 .468 .. 231 .290 .359 .408 .245 .366 .391 .583 .467 .. 615 .776 .984 U'I 
• 
TABLE 6.4, continued 
(b) Matrix of corresponding varlances. 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P 
r' , 
, 
A I .003 
B I .021 .005 
CI·041 .035 .004 
D I .052 .025 .009 .001 
E .045 .044 .048 .045 .003 
F .047 .052 .042 .057 .021 .005 
G .048 .055 .061 .047 .034 .026 .008 
H .053 .043 .047 .049 .046 .025 .038 .008 
I .047" .054 .039 .042 .039 .036 .045 .045 .001 
J .037 .057 .036 .045 .040 .031 .036 .031 .042 .004 
K I .034 .050 .052 .042 .043 .044 .042 .035 .037 .024 .006 
L .036 .048 .052 .049 .044 .040 .038 .054 .058 .044 .024 .010 
M .07~ .062 .056 .048 .065 .056 .044 .039 .048 .054 .038 .035 .001 
N .084 .076 .048 .044 .060 .050 .038 .037 .050 .046 .044 .038 .001 
0 .044 .051 .077 .091 .036 .046 .059 .064 .032 .040 .066 .055 .038 .025 .004 !'..l 
P .042 .040 .051 .079 .037 .033 .046 .073 .042 .040 .062 .051 .045 .031 .001 
w 
.028 0\ 
• 
237. 
corresponding variances are given in Tables 6.4(a) 
and (b) respectively. 
An error in the experimental design should be 
noted, The pair of stimuli which should have been N 
and A were in fact B and A, so data for the pair 
(N,A) is missing. However, this provides a smail 
consistency check on the experiment. The two mean 
judgments which should be the same were 0.772 (standard 
error 0.018) and 0.726 (s.e. 0.023). In the analysis 
following, $(A,B) was taken to be the mean of these 
two values, 0.749, and $(N,A) to be missing data. 
An indication of the reliability of the results 
can be found from a comparison of the first half of the 
49 subjects (who did the reported experiment first) 
and the second half (who did D.Cargo's experiment first). 
A linear regression was therefore performed between 
the two halvesi this gave an F-ratio of 453 with an 
intercept on the second-half (y) axis of -0.065 and a 
slope of 0.962. The difference between the two appears 
to be insignificant. 
6.1.2.6 Analysis 
The similarity data was scaled using Young's 
(1973) POLYCON non-metric HDS algorithm using Euclidean 
and Cityblock models, in from one to three dimensions. 
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The most interesting solutions, on both a priori and 
goodness of fit grounds, are those in two dimensions. 
The best fit for these solutions was for the Cityblock 
scaling with a stress (Kruskal's formula) of ll'~ this 
compares well with the comparable result of Roskam's, 
scaling Eisler's data. It gave a solution. that was a 
quite recognisable grid, though somewhat distorted 
in (what were physically) its outermost points. The 
Euclidean two dimensional configuration (stress 16%) 
was more distorted but still recognisably a grid. The 
two two-dimensional solutions are presented in 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
A scaling like that used by Eisler in his analysis 
was not performed because it requires estimations of 
Uvector lengths" (viz., hx for a stimulus x): this 
seems to involve a very strong prior assumption of 
the dimensions to be used, since the "vector length" 
would vary with the specification of a stimulus used. 
It is also very difficult to conceive of a suitable 
way to instruct subjects to find the "vector length" 
when the "vector" has components of lengths and sines 
- it is obvious if the dimensions are the horizontal 
and vertical axes. 
Considering only the Minkowski-based scaling, 
therefore, the result Roskam and Eisler found does 
not appear to be merely an artifact of the stimulus set 
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used (though this possibility still cannot be completely 
ignored). A consistent interpretation of this type 
of stimulus, in terms of sines aDd lengths, seems 
possible. We must therefore look at the models inherent 
in the MOS techniques used to find an explanation of 
the apparent ambiguity in the stimuli. 
6.2 MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 
We wish to find out whether scaling of data from 
one model, by a MDS algorithm based on a different 
model, can give artifactual but interpretable dtmeDions. 
The two classes of model we are concerned with here 
are the Minkowski distances and the normalised distances 
D 1 a and D 2 B discussed in previous chapters. Thus 
the first step would eeem to be to construct a 
(preferably non-m.etric) MOS algorithm based on models 
D la and D 26· 
6.2.1 Scaling with D la or D 2a 
The simplest way to construct a mon-metric MOS 
algorithm with D la and D 26 would be merely to adapt 
an existing algorithm by changing the dissimilarity 
model on which it is based. Young's POLYCON (see 
Young, 1973~ for a technical description of its 
operation) seemed a very suitable choice since it already 
has a wide range of options and is designed to make 
the introduction of new models a relatively easy task. 
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The two main requirements for modifying POLYCON 
are the derivatives, with respect to each of the 
point coordinates, of the distance functions, and a 
method for finding an initial configuration for the 
non-metric part of the program. The first requirement 
is easily met: for x,y£lR n ,13&lR,13#O,S'=(l-S)/13, 
a 3x D 113 (x,y) = 
i 
D 113 (x,y) 
and 
a 
3x D 213 (x,y) = 
i 
l 
D 213 (x,y) J I!Xk-YkIB(x.-y.) k· 1 1 
The second requirement - a procedure for finding an 
initial eonfiquration - is far more difficult. In fact 
we could find no satisfactory answer. The main reason 
for this is that the stress function surface, under 
these distance functions, is pitted with local minima 
- far more even than is the case with Minkowski distances 
(see Arabie, 1973, for example). This was further 
confirmed, as reported above, even in the simpler version 
of the one-dimensional case. Thus the initial confiquration 
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must be very good indeed (i.e. very close to the 
true minimum) for a satisfactory non-metric solution. 
To find out just how close the initial configuration 
had to be to the best one, a simulation was run on 
POLYCON with the modification to allow D U~ dissimilarities. 
This simulation consisted of scaling DIe dissimilarities 
from a given configuration, using as initial 
configuration the given configura"!:.ion itself, but with 
random noise 'A1Z'itten onto it. Only at. a very minor 
level of noise did the algorithID find the correct 
minimum stress solution. It therefore seems that if 
a solution is to be found, it will probably have to be a 
wholly analytic one (comparable to a Pactor Analysis, 
for example), since any iterative procedure will make 
very little difference. Admittedly, only one type of 
iterative algorithm was tried, but since the problem 
apparently is the roughness of the stress surface, it 
seems unlikely that other types of algorithm would give 
much improvement. 
No analytic scaling method for D la and D 26 is at 
all obvious, if only (dis)similarity data is allowed 
as input (if estimates of "vector 
n 
( t Ix ,a)1/6 , or "vedor sums", 
. 1 i ~= 
lengths" , 
n ( t Ix.+y. ,B)1/6 , 
. I ~ l. ~= 
were allowed, then an algorithm like that used by 
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Eisler, 1967, would be quite straightforward to 
construct). We therefore investigated Eisler's algorithm 
instead. This seems justified for two reasons. Firstly, 
his similarity model 
2min (hx ' hy) $(x,y) = h + h cos+xy' 
x y 
x,ye-m. n+ (6.3) 
is not unlike our models (see discussion in previous 
chapters). This was borne out in our Monte Carlb study. 
And secondly it was used by Eisler to analyse his 
data so artifactual results will be of substantial 
interest. 
Eis1er's alqor1t~ is, briefly, as follows. His 
model (equation 6.3) implies that 
= 
_(x,y) (hx+hy) 
2max (bx'yx) (6.4) 
so that from similarity judgments $(x,y) and estimates 
of vector lengths h ,h , the lefthand side of (6.4), x y 
a scalar product, can be estimated. These scalar products 
are factor analysed using principal components, with 
the squared vector lengths. as communalities. 
6.2.2 Monte Carlo studies 
Monte Carlo studies were carried out on both 
Eisler's algorithm and on POLYCON using Minkowski 
distances. In the former case both Euclidean and D12 
245. 
dissimilarities were ai.culated from the points of the 
Eisler configuration expressed either in terms of 
horizontal and vertical components, or in terms of 
sines and vector lengths. Since Eisler's algorithm 
requires similarities, the dissimilarities were 
transformed by each of the two similarity gradients 
proposed. The best factors from the varimax-rotated 
principal components analysis were rotated to either 
the vertical-horizontal or sine-length.configuration 
(which of course is in two dimensions). It made little 
difference, to which of these configurations the 
factors were rotated. Only the J.! 2 and D 12 models 
were used because :M l' D 11' D 21 and D 22' from 
experience in the POLYCON study, make only minor diff-
erences in this type of context. 
With POLYCON, D 11' D 12' D 21' and D 22 
dissimilarities were calculated from both forms of the 
Eisler configuration, and were scaled directly. There 
was obviously little point, either in including 
!-Unkowski models in the study, or in transforming the 
dissimilarities to similarities, since POLYCON is a 
non-metric algorithm. 
The design for each of the two algorithms is 
summarised in Table 6.5. 
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TABLE 6.5 
Design for Monte Carlo Studies 
Note: The ftconfiquration used" is the Eisler 
configuration expressed in terms of projections on the 
horizontal and vertical axes (P) or sines and lengths 
(SL). For gradients, see equatiol1s (6.1) and (6.2). 
(a) For Eisler's (1967) algorithm 
Study Dissimilarities model] Gradient Configuration 
Used 
1 D 12 Fl SL 
2 D 12 F2 SL 
3 D 12 Fl P 
4 D 12 F2 P 
5 m 2 Fl SL 
6 :112 F2 SL 
7 :M2 FI p 
8 :M2 F2 P 
(b) For POLYCON 
All possible combinations of the following parameter 
values: 
Parameter;! Scaling I' Model 
I; !: 
t· (; 
" I 
., 
Values li J;f l' E 2 
I1 
iI 
1I 
I! 
11 
Dissimilarities Configuration, No. of 
Model used Dimensions 
of Scaling 
D 11' D 12' P, SL 3, 2 
D 21' D 22 
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Looking first at the results of the Eisler 
algorithm studies, if Eisler's similarity model, 
equation (6.3), is in fact very like our D 12 model 
with either of the two gradients, then one would expect 
his algorithm to give a scaling which is nearly 
identical to the configuration used to generate the 
dissimilarity data under D 12 (Le. for studies 1-4)_ 
As figures 6.9 and 6.10 exemplify, this is so, 
although there is distortion in some cases, 
particularly with gradient F2- The results are close 
enough however, to be able to recognise the true 
dimensions. 
The most interesting results are from studies 
5 to 8, which use Euclidean (~2) distances to generate 
dissimilarities. With dissimilarities calculated 
from the Eisler configuration expressed in sines and 
lengths, the scaling has a res semblance to this 
configuration, but is rather distorted (see, as example, 
Figure 6.11). With dissimilarities calculated from 
the Eisler configuration expressed as projections on 
the horizontal and vertical axes however, the 
scaling has very little ressemblance to the original 
configuration, but it is interpretable in a quite 
different way. If Figure 6.12 (the scaling of study 
8) is compared with Figure 6.l3(a), the ressemblance 
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Figure 6.10: Monte Carlo Stud~ 3 (see Table 6.,5). 
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Figure 6:11: Monte Carlo Study 5 (.see Table 6,5), 
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Figure 6.12: Monte Carlo Study 8 (see Table 6.5) 
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FIGURE 6.13 Eisler configuration in terms of area and 
"shape" . 
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between the two is quite apparent. Figure 6.13 (a) 
is the Eisler configuration expressed in terms of two 
parameters which are most simply described as area 
and "shapeR of the rectangle shown in Figure 6.l3(b). 
Thus if a point has horizontal and vertical 
components x and y respectively, the new parameters 
are A=xy and 5=x-y. 
The scaling of study 7 is similar to study 8, but 
more distorted. Note that in all the above studies 
we have looked at only the first two dimensions of 
the rotated scaling. 
Thus Eisler's algorithm appears to give 
valid results if the model describing the data is 
close to Eisler's model: but it can give quite 
misleading results (because they may be invalid but 
still interpretable) if the model is very different 
from Eisler's - and this includes the sometimes 
reasonable Minkowski models. 
The results of the non-metric M05 (Minkowski) 
studies on POLYCON are surnmal?1sed in Table 6.6, where 
the stress values tabulated are Kruskal' s stress: 
A 
2 1: 1: (d.. - d. j) 
52 = i j 1J 1 
2 I t dij i j 
i 
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TABLE 6.6 
Results of Monte Carlo studies of POLYCON 
i 
I 
Dissimilar itII Stress in Confi2!!rationi Scaling: 
Dims 3 Dims , model i model 2 
I I 
P Dll :RI .105 .081 
P Dll :M2 .063 * .027 § 
P D12 -1 .052 .035 
p D12 •• 2 .002 .000 
p D 21 :NI .105 .092 * 
P D2l :112 .063 * .027 § 
P D 22 :HI .051 .041 + 
P D 22 -2 .005 .001 
SL· Dll :1(1 .044 .033<+ 
SL D 11 142 .057 * .036 
SL D 12 -I .034 .017 
SL D12 :M2 .002 .000 
SL D 21 :NI .043 * .027 
SL D 21 112 .057 * .036 § 
SL D 22 :RI .049 .019 
SL D 22 :M2 .015 .004 
For explanation of the P-SL notation, see Table 6.5. 
Footnotes: * A minimum was found at this stress value: 
otherwise stress was very close to a 
minimum unless marked "+". 
§ The third dimension has a significant 
weighting. 
1 
I 
i 
I 
, 
1 
I 
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where the d .. are the Minkowski distances of the 
~J 
'" derived configuration, and the d ij are the corresponding 
"disparities", monotone with the original data. 
It will be seen from the table that the difference 
in stress from the addition of a third dimension is 
generally not enough to warrant consideration of a 
three-dimensional solution (and this is confirmed by 
Young's, 1968, index of metric determinacy, if in fact 
it is valid); in any case, as can be seen from the 
table, the derived configuration rarely had much weight 
on the third dimension. We therefore need consider 
only the two-dimensional solutions. It will also be 
noted that there is very little difference in stress 
between the corresponding DIe and D 213 dissimilarity 
models; we thus consider only the Dle models in two 
dimensions. 
When the configuration used to generate the 
dissimilarities is that expressed in terms of sines of 
elevations and vector lengths, the derived configuration 
generally is roughly faithful to the original, although 
there is definite distortion. A typical example 
(the lowest stress of such solutions) is given in 
Figure 6.14. This should be compared with Figure 6.5(d). 
Although the reproduction of the original configuration 
is by no means perfect, it is close enough so that it 
would be recognised in an empirical case. Note that, 
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Figure 6.15: POLYCON Monte Carlo Study: Euc1l.dean analysis of Dll dissimilarities, Stress 5.7% 
1.35 
1130 
1.25 
1.20 
1,15 
1,10 
1.05 
1.00 
0.\15 
0.90 
0.S5 
0.80 
0.75 
0.70 
0.65 
0.60 
0.55 
0,50 
0.45 
0.40 
0035 
0030 
0.25 
0.20 
0015 0,10 
0.05 
0.1.10 
-0.05 
-DolO 
-0.1':1 
-0.20 
-0.25 
-O.lO 
-0.)5 
-0.110 
-0.45 
-0.50 
-0.55 
-0.60 
"0.65 
-0.70 
-0.75 
·0.80 
-0.85 
-0.90 
-0.95 
*1.00 
-1.05 
-1.10 
*1 tl5 
-1.20 
-1.25 
-1.30 
-1.35 
l\.) 
tn 
-.J 
(ISLER CONFIGU"ATIONI NORHAlI~EU EUCLIO~AN. 015TANCES fRUM PROJ.£'.TIONS ON AXES. EUCLIOEAN ANALYSI5. DERIVED CaNrlGURATla~. ulMENSION 1 (X-Axl~) V£R~US DIMENSION 2 (Y-AXIS) 
• ·1.3~OO. -1.0500. ·u.75i)u. ·0.4500. -0.150U. 0.1500. 0.45vO. 0.7500. 1.uSOO. 1.3500. 
-1.5000 -1.2000 ·U.9000 ·0.6000 -0.3000 -0.0000 . 0.3000 Oi~OOO 0.9000 1'2000 1.5000 
.'.*** .• ***.** ••. *** ••• ***.****.****.****-****.****.** ••• ****.*.**.**** •••••• ****.**** •••• *.* •••••• **.* 1.35 • 1 .,
1.30 it . 1 * 
t .25 * I * 1.20 It I 
1.15 it 1 
1010 it 1 · , * 
* 1.0') • 1 1.1l0 it I • 
* 0.95 * I 
0.90 .. I * 
· , 
* 
0.65 it 0 1 
O.liO * I A 
o.rs • 1 
0.10 it I * • 
* 0.65 .. 1 0.60 •• 1 * 
0.55 * I 
0.50 * E 
, . 
* 0.45 • 1 
0,41) * f * • 
* 
* 
· ,
* 
0.35 .. 
0.30 .. I 
0.25 it I 
0.20 .. I 
0.15 • H 1 * ,0.10 .. I 
0.05 * I 
B 
* 0.00 
-0.05 
-0010 
·0.1') 
-0.20 
"0.25 
"0030 
"0.35 
"'0 ... 0 
-0.'!5 
·O.:iO 
-0.55 
·0.60 
·0.65 
-0.70 
-0.75 
·O.ISO 
-O.ISS 
-0.']0 
-0.'15 
-1.00 
-1.05 
-1.10 
"1.15 
-li20 
-1.25 
-1.30 
-1,35 
F' 
* ·:·--·--··-----·-·-·-------.-------.·-----~---·-----i-... --.-.-.. -..... ~--.---... ---.--.--.--.--....... :. 
* I * 
• J • 
• I * 
• L e * 
•• M I G ., 
W I * 
• N I K * 
• 1 • 
• j * 
'" 0 * 
• • I • , 
.. I * 
• I * 
• I • 
* I * 
.. I * 
• • I , • 
.. I * 
* 1 * 
• 1 • 
* f * 
.. * 
• • I •• 
* f * 
'" * 
• r,.
*'****'****.**.*.****.****.****.****.****.-***.****.** **.**** ••• * •• **~*.****.*** •• -*** •• ***.****.**** •• 
• -1.3500. -1.0500. ·0.7500. ·0.450u. -0.1500. 0.1500. 0.4~OO. 0.r500. 1,U500. 1.3500. 
-1.5000 -1.2000 -0.9000 -O.bOOO ~O.JOOO -0.0000 0.3000 0.6000 0.9000 1'2000 1,5000 
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although the dimensions of the solution are roughly 
correct, the model is not - even though it can give 
a very low stress (here, 0.2%; and in the other 
cases, not more than 5.1%: see Figure 6.15). Thus 
low stress and interpretable dimensions are not 
necessarily evidence for the Minkowski model. 
When the original configuration is that 
expressed in terms of horizontal and vertical 
components, the stress is again low - not more than 
10.5% (see Figure 6.11), but as ~lall as 0.2% 
(compare the solutions found by Roskam, using Eisler's 
data: the minimum stress found there was 9%). But 
most significantly, the derived configuration is 
1Uite unlike the original configuration (a grid) but 
nonetheless highly interpretable as being in the space 
of angle of elevation versus vector length. The 
lowest stress (0.2%) solution is given in Figure 6.16 
(to be compared with Figure 6.5(c». The other such 
solutions are more distorted versions of this, but 
are still quite recognisable: again recognisable 
enough to lead to this incorrect i.nterpretation in an 
empirical situation. 
Thus Minkowski scaling, like Eisler's algorithm, 
leads to the generation of low stress, highly 
interpretable - but quite misleading - solutions if the 
model describing the data is similar to the D la or 
D 2a models. It appears to preserve dimensionality. 
6.2.3 Review of Eisler's experiment 
With these Monte Carlo results in mind, we can 
now review the analyses of Eisler's results carried 
out by Eisler and Roskam, "1'here are two basic 
questions about this experiment that need answers. 
Wha t type of model is being used _. a normalised model 
< 
(like Eisler's, or lJike D la or D 2a)' or a distance 
model (a Minkowski model)? And what dimensions are being 
used: projections on the two natural axes, or some 
function of the angle of elevation, and vector lengths? 
The Monte Carlo results show clearly that, if a 
MDS approach is used to answer these two questions, 
they are not independent of one another. If the "real" 
configuration is in the space of sines and lengths, 
then, at least in terms of recovered dimensions, it 
makes little difference what the "true" (dis)similarity 
model is, or which model is used in the i~S algorithm. 
Blut if the Hreal n configuration is in the space of 
horizontal versus vertical, then these dimensions will 
be recovered only if the correct models are used. If 
the correct similarity model is a distance one and 
scaling is with a noraalised model, fue space will appear 
to be the area-shape one. If the correct similarity 
model is a normalised one and a distance model scaling 
is used then the apparent apace will be an angle 
versus length one. 
Since this last space is quite similar to the 
sine versus length space (especially considering that 
other distortions due to incorrect modelling can take 
place), the most plausible explanation of the discrepancy 
between the results of the two types of scalings carried 
out by Eisler and Roskam is that ·the subjective space 
is in fact the horizontal-vertical one, and the 
similarities conform best to a normalised type of 
model. 
Thus Eisler's experiment may be taken as 
evidence for similarity models of the normalised type. 
Just which normalised model is the correct one will 
be decided only after a good deal more investigation; 
it may need the development of more flexible ~IDS 
algorithms, allowing a greater variety of (normalised) 
models, and requiring only (dis)similarity data input. 
It should also be remembered that not all so-called 
Content models will necessarily fall into the sa~me 
category as the present "normalised" models: 
likely candidates for exclusion are Waern's 
mUltiplicative model (e.g. Waern, 1968a) and Boijer's 
additive model (e.g. Hoijer, 1969a). 
6.3 SOME ORDINAL DATA 
In this section we shall very briefly consider -
in terms of the present models - the few results from 
the ordinal approach to investigating similarity. 
263. 
Tversky and Krantz (Tversky and Krantz, 1969, 
and Krantz and Tversky, 1975) and Wender (1971) have 
carried out similarity experiments in which the 
ordinal properties of various similarity models were 
tested (ref. Chapter 1). None of these studies 
use pooled data. 
TVersky and Krantz (1969) used schematic faces 
in which the shape of the head, the eyes, and the 
shape of the mouth all could take two possible forms. 
They found that the results largely supported the 
ordinal properties of interdimensionally additive 
(and therefore decomposable) models - and so, in 
particular, Minkowski distances. Beeause of the 
simplicity (two-valued) and the nature of the dimensions 
in the experiment, it would seem plausible that they 
could be regarded as metathetic or qualitative by 
subjects. Thus we would indeed expect the Distance 
model to hold. Beeker and Pipahl (1974) made a related 
observation, stating that the stimuli could be 
regarded as "nested" (which does not seem very credible). 
" 
They suggested that the nested property was necessary 
for decomposabili ty. This i.$ exactly the opposite to 
the present theory: but it recognises that different 
types of continua may lead to different similarity 
results. Their result is due to the use of Restle's 
(dis) similarity models (see section 2.1.3.1) instead 
of the normalised ones we use (see equations 3.1 and 3.2). 
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Wender (1971) carried out a very similar 
experiment a.n rectanqles~ he found that the 
dimensions (which he assumed to be area and shape) 
interacted, so the similarities could not be Minkowskian. 
If the dimensions are in fact area and shape (defined 
as the ratio of heiqht to width) then one (area) .is 
clearly prothetic (see Stevens and Galanter, 1957) 
while the other would seem to be more metathetic 
(perhaps by analoqy with the continuum of proportion: 
ref.op.cit.). Since metathetic continua are reversible 
(it makes equal sense here to take the ratio of width 
to height as that of height to width) Wender's results 
are in line with the present model for a mixture of 
prothetic and metathetic dimensions, which predicts 
an apparent interaction between dimensions (see the last 
equation in Chapter 3). The direction of the interaction 
varies over subjects in Wender's experiment (see 
especially his Table 2); this may correspond to the 
direction of the shape scale used by each subject. 
However some subjects show no interaction at all (see 
especially his Table 1); this could be partially 
ascribed to individual dtmensional weiqhtinq, but Wender's 
results can only be described as equivocal: they 
reject the Distance model, but do not entirely support 
the present models. Becker and Pipahl explain Wender's 
results by erroneously claiming the dimensions of the 
space are not nested ones. 
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Most recently, Krantz and Tversky (1975) again 
investigated similarity between rectangles by ordinal 
methods. They found that neither the area-shape nor 
the width-height dimensional structures allowed 
dissimilarity to satisfy interdimensiona1 additivity 
or intradimensiona1 subtractivity. They rejected 
decomposabi1ity. They therefore had to reject the 
Minkowski distance models. Their more detailed finding 
was however that "an interval along one dimension 
appears longer the higher or more extreme the level of 
the orthoqona1 dimension" (op.cit., p.31). This is 
in accord with an observation by Fenker (1972), but is 
exactly the opposite tendency to that predicted by 
our mixed model when lithe orthogona1 dimension" is the 
prothetic one. Krantz and Tversky do remark that both 
tendencies can occur: which one occurs depends on the 
stimulus set. This experiment therefore apparently 
provides a counter example to any of the models of this 
thesis. 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The data surveyed in this chapter is of course 
only a very small sample of the huge body of 
similarity data available. It does however give quite 
strong, though qualified, support to the models of 
this thesis. In section 6.1.1 we showed that the 
present models gave very good account of data on four 
quite different stimulus sets, reducing the dimensiona1ity 
and contributing to the understanding of the revealed 
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dimensions. 
In the last section, the models were able to 
explain at least some of the results from ordinal 
investigations of similarity. This area is an important 
one in that it is one of the few in which the 
mathematics of the modelling involved has been 
rigorously investigated (by Beals, Krantz and TVersky). 
Thus the models are seen to be reasonable ones, 
worthy of deeper investigation. An important warning is 
sounded by the experiments in the last section, 
however, on pooling data. As Wend er r s experiment shows 
in particular, although interactions between dimensions 
definitely occur, those interactions can vary in 
direction between subjects. Pooling of such subjects 
would "cancel out" such interactions, perhaps leaving 
no apparent interaction, but at least rendering any 
that is then present quite unrepresentative of the true 
state of affairs. Therefore great care should be taken 
when pooling data from multidimensional spaces where 
the direction of a dimension is ambiguous and the 
dimensions are either all prothetic, or mixed metathetic 
and prothetic. 
The investigation of MDS algorithms by Monte 
Carlo methods shows quite dramatically that, even when 
problems of local minima have been overcome, the model 
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used in the scaling can significantly affect the 
validity of the MOS solution. An incorrect scaling 
model can lead to a low stress, interpretable 
solution which is nonetheless quite invalid. 
~ms algori~~s also do not appear to be very 
sensitive to different models within a certain category. 
For example, all Minkowski models tend to give very 
similar solutions, as do all models of a normalised 
type (including most of the usual Content models: 
see Table 2.1). Between types of model there may be 
quite radical differences in number and interpretation 
of the dimensions of the solution; within types, the 
main difference is in solution goodness of fit (stress), 
though dimensionality may also be affected. 
From our investigations it appears that both these 
model types may be valid, but in differing contexts: the 
Minko~lski models generally in nmetathetic" situations, 
the normalised models generally in ~rothetic" situations. 
Further - more detailed - research is needed to 
identify precisely which model or models are correct 
within each model type. 
CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLOSIONS 
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In Chapter 1, the main aim of this dissertation 
was stated as being to investigate 
a) the adequacy of present distance functions 
for modelling psychological similarity, either 
in the form of direct judgments, or as implicit 
in other behaviour~ and 
b) the adequacy of present distance functions 
for use in psychophysical scaling. 
-Present distance functions" were shown to be 
distinguished by three tlgross" properties: 
D (x,y) ~ D (x,z) + D (z,y) \j x,y, ZE'1R n 
D (ax,ay) = I a I D (x,y) , 'v'aE:R ,X,YElR n 
and D (x+a,y+a) = D (x,y) Va,x,YElR n 
(7.1) 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
It was suggested that the place to look for a more 
reasonable distance function, at least on prothetic 
continua, was among the Content models of similarity; 
these have the contrasting gross features 
D (ax,ay) = D (x,y) 
D (x+a,y+a) < D (x,y) 
VaEJR ,X,YElR n 
n+ 
x,y,aElR 
(7.4) 
(7.5) 
which are mathematically incompatible with (7.2) and 
(7.3). Working from a set-theoretic approach to the 
Content models, two extreme cases of distance functions 
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were discovered. For the prothetic (quantitative) 
case, the normalised types of model, D 18 and D 28 
seem plausible; for the metathetic (qualitative) 
case, the Minkowski distances, :M 8' seem. plausible. 
We thus have a quite new type of distance function 
for quantitative dimensions. It gives to the space 
an immoveable origin and, except for a specific case, 
fixed axes. Its effect on the space is reminiscent 
of a perspective transfo~ation: pairs of stimuli 
having the same difference on a dimension will get closer 
together as they get further from the origin (like 
railway tracks in the distance). But equal 
proportionality between stimuli maintains their distances: 
two stimuli are the same distance apart at any 
distance from the origin as long as each respective 
pair of components is always in the same ratio. 
Perhaps the greatest practical importance of these 
properties is that as a result, the D 18 and D 28 
functions cannot be monotone vi th the ~ 8 functions. 
Thus even non-metric :M a-based MOS of prothetic spaces 
would be invalid. 
If it can be shown that the normalised models 
are good ones, then much similarity modelling will 
have to be rethought. We shall In this chapter briefly 
review some of the strengths and weaknesses of our 
approach to similarity modelling to give a clearer 
picture of the point to which this thesis has brought 
the psychology of similarity. 
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7.1 THE MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS 
The theoretical development of our models is 
almost entirely based on the set theoretic view of 
psychology. Rest1e gave this viewpoint respectability 
with his persuasive analysis of aspects of judgment 
and choice; but doubt ~11 quite rightly remains as 
to its validity. Luce and Ga1anter's comments on 
this matter have already been quoted in Chapter 2 
(section 2.1.3); the main ground for doubt is the 
question of whether explaining psychological phenomena 
in terms of sets really lIexpl a ins" anything. At 
the present there is no real answer to this - no basis 
(the most likely seems to be a physiological one) for 
the sets and their elements has even been formally 
proposed. So the only defence is that the approach 
seems to work. It can only be hoped that a deeper 
justification may flow from increased interest and data 
generated by success. One might point out though, 
that the set theoretic approach certainly has far more 
intuitive attraction than the IIvector" approach 
widely used by Content model workers. 
Once a set theoretic approach is accepted 
however, there are two assumptions of Rest1e's which 
the development of Chapter 3 brought into question. 
First was the definition of measure, rn, which usually 
assumes simply that the measures of disjoint sets add 
to give the measure of the union. It may be useful to 
make additional or different assumptions as to particular 
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cases of the union of non-disjoint sets, and as to the 
union of disjoint sets. One suggestion already made 
was 
Measures taking negative values may also be worth deve-
loping. 
The second assumption of Restle's was that the 
only arrays worth considering were the metathetic 
arrays (0£ which prothetic arrays are a special case) 
because they preserved betweenness, and additivity of 
the distance function Restle defined: 
d(X,Y) = ~(XAY). 
Since we are now using a quite different distance 
function (see Chapter 3), it seems likely that other 
types of array may be worth consideration. It is 
possible that a study of other such arrays, and also 
of particular cases of arrays midway between prothetic 
and equal-measure metathetic, would be fruitful in 
drawing further distinctions between subjective continua. 
It may also be worthwhile reconsidering our assumption 
that different dimensions are disjoint (see assumptions 
P.(c) and M.(e) of Chapter 3): a certain degree of 
communality or interaction between dimensions may be 
realistic in some situations. 
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While on the subject of types of continua, it 
should be noted that the suggestions made in early chapters, 
that the "equal-intensity" concept of the Content 
theorists might correspond to our equal-measure 
continua, have been shown to be largely groundless. 
This does not however close the door entirely on the 
idea that some of the "equal-intensity" continua 
(which are usually mapped into at least two dimensions) 
may reduce to unidimensional continua of a special type 
which may be worth further investigation in their own 
right. What may be happening is that the present models 
tap a metathetic quality which is due primarily to 
physiological factors, but which does not necessarily 
coincide with the intuitive notion of "qualitative" 
(metathetic) tapped by "equal-intensity" continua. 
Perhaps the most outrageous step we made was 
that of generalising the set-theory derived D 11 and 
D 21 to the functions D la and D 2a for a wide range 
of S. It is no more outrageous, though, than the 
similar generalisation made from Euclidean (M 2 ) and 
City-Block (~l) distances to any Minkowski distance 
(:M S). Again, it will stand or fall on its empirical 
support. 
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7.2 THE MODELS 
Some of the more obvious and interesting properties 
of the D l~ and lD 28 models were spelt out in Chapter 
4. They have most of the properties thought desirable 
for the prothetic case in Chapter 1. They have other 
interesting properties such as non-convex isosimilarity 
contours, and many breaches of the triangle inequality. 
The one dimensional case (either embedded in a multi-
dimensional space, or alone) is particularly interesting 
with the triangle inequality holding strictly so that 
the commonly assumed property of additivity on straight 
lines never holds, at least on lines through the 
origin. 
Of D 18 and D 28' D la seems the better behaved 
mathematically. D2B violates the triangle inequality 
more significantly than Dl8 and additionally, if 
negative components are permitted (a debatable point), 
is not bounded by unity, and is undefined for points 
exactly on opposite sides of the origin. On the 
other hand, D22 is very interesting because its iso-
similarity contours are off-centre circles, and so it 
may be indistinguishable from Euclidean distances under 
certain tests. On the whole though, these two 
normalised models are not radically different. 
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Of almost equal interest to the dissimilarity 
models themselves are the two suggested similarity 
gradients 
= 1 - a 
= I - a 
I + a 
o < a < I (7.6) 
o < a < I (7.7) 
FI has been widely suggested previously, but few 
cogent reasons have been given for adopting it7 F2 
seems worth greater consideration, especially considering 
the empirical findings of Chapter 6. It is interesting 
(though it probably has no significance) that both 
FI and F2 are idempotent: 
Both gradients apply for both prothetic and metathetic 
situations according to the theory (although Chapter 6 
suggests otherwise); this implies restrictions on the 
scale used in the metathetic (Minkowski) case, since 
otherwise similarities will become negative. 
One problem that the set theoretic approach is 
not helpful on is that of the status of the scales used 
in the models: are they subjective (psychological) or 
objective (physical)? It would seem more reasonable 
that the models are in subjective space; this is supported 
by the data in Chapter 6. But at least one of the 
models (Gregson's) that are special cases of the 
present functions, was developed largely for objective 
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values (though see Gregson, 1975, p. 235-238), 
solving only for dimensional weights or other similar 
parameters. And some of the implications of the 
models in other areas of psychology (see next section) 
would not be true if the model is in subjective space. 
However, if subjective scales have any real validity, 
in terms of truely reflecting the perceptions of an 
individual, then it would be amazing if they are not 
used in similarity judgments. Of course it could be 
the case that both the unidimensional magniDde 
estimations and the similarity judgments are summarised 
in the one model. The problem of on what basis 
unidimensional judgments are made (if at all) within 
the similarity judgment, compared to the corresponding 
judgment in isolation, is theoretically an important, 
interesting and perhaps unsolvable one. In practice 
there may be not enough difference to worry about. But 
it seems safest to assume, particularly with regard to 
empirical evidence presented here, that the models are 
in the psychological space defined by direct magnitude 
estimations. 
A related question is the scale type: are the 
unidimensional scales ordinal, interval or ratio scales? 
Or something else? The form of the D 18 and D 26 
models dictates that the prothetic scales must be at 
least ratio scales (the models themselves are on 
absolute scales). The form of the Minkowski models 
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dictates at least an interval scale for the metathetic 
continua, with the models themselves (as is often for-
gotten in MDS applications) on ratio scales. 
Many of the proofs of the properties of the 
D la and D 28 models presented here are weak, and 
occasionally even nonexistent. The investigation here 
is no more than an attempt to get an initial "feeling 
for" these models; if they prove useful, then more rig-
orous investigation should be carried out. A different 
approach to the proofs may be by using directly the set 
theoretic foundation to prove many of the properties 
in a more general context. Tversky (1972) has 
given examples of such proofs in a different context. 
7.3 APPLICATIONS TO OTHER AREAS 
An attempt vlas made to apply the similarity models 
to other areas of psychology, particularly category 
scaling. On the whole it 1; .. as remarkably successful: 
successful enough to make a similarity interpretation 
worth more detailed study. Its main failing is that 
it does not supply a rational means for taking into 
account the variety of context effects (experimental 
conditions) which are known to effect category judgments. 
Two parameters seemed sufficientb take many of these 
effects into account however. Of particular interest 
was the non-logarithmic model. 
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The most notable achievement of the present 
models was however to "explain" why the relation between 
magnitude estimation and category scales is different 
for meta thetic and prothetic continua. Thus the 
Stevens and Galanter and the Restle concepts of 
metatbeticness and protlleticness are neatly tied 
together. This result adds considerable weight to the 
set theoretic and similarity views of scaling. 
The short foray into discrimination (Ekman's 
Law) seemed quite successful in view of the result on 
colour vision in Chapter 6. One might suggest from 
this that our "similarityfl models are in fact ones of 
discrimination (they are certainly closely allied to 
several suggested for discrimination). At the least, 
there is a close relationship between the two behaviour 
patterns. 
These applications should not be taken too 
seriously at this point: the sL~ilarity models will 
not fall if they do not succeed. But they certainly 
will be strengthened if the apparent connections we 
have indicated can be shown to be more than merely 
fortuitous. Similarity was first. studied because it 
seemed basic to many types of behaviour. There seems 
little reason for continuing to study it (no matter how 
well similarity judgments per se can be predicted) if 
it cannot be fed back to make predictions in the areas 
from \'ihich it first arose. 
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7.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Very little direct evidence is presented here 
in support of the multidimensional models. This is 
mainly due to the lack of suitable MOS algorithms, which 
seem the simplest way of testing them directly. What 
evidence is presented, though, gives firm support to 
the unidimensional models and their interpretation of 
metathetic and prothetic continua. The multidimensional 
example shows that a normalised type of model is the 
most reasonable one, but to decide just which model 
it is requires further work. The ordinal results gave 
only qualified support to the models. They do show that 
the models have a definite part to play that cannot 
be played simply by the usual distance models. 
On the whole we can conclude the following. Evidence 
presented here suggests there is enough support for the 
models to warrant their further investigation. But 
there are contexts in which they do not apply (one 
example of these is in the experiment of Krantz and 
Tversky, 1975; others would include the type of 
similarity effect - Rholes in the space" - found by 
Goldmeier, 1972). The models apparently take insufficient 
account of non-uniformities in the space. They are 
plausible, but not entirely accurate models, at least 
as so far developed. 
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7 .5 MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 
The model on prothetic continua has been shown 
to be at the least a plausible one: many of its most 
important features will be present in any other such 
similarity model. Therefore the findings in MOS, in 
Chapter 6, have implications that are not tied merely 
to the present models. It was shown that by using the 
wrong model in the MOS algorithm one could get highly 
interpretable low stress solutions which were quite 
invalid descriptions of the process generating the data. 
This implies that many of the scalings done in the past 
may be quite incorrect and misleading. 
The following seems to be the position as it now 
stands. There are two general types of model: 
nor.malised types (including the present prothetic models 
and most Content models) and distance types. The two 
are quite incompatible as far as, firstly, MOS is 
concerned, and, secondly, the type of stimulus judged is 
concerned. Each type of model applies to one type of 
stimulus (prothetic or equal-measure metathetic) and 
scaling of one type of model by the other type leads 
to quite in~id and highly misleading results. (The 
position is of course further complicated by the 
existence of models midway between "distance" and 
"normalised"). 
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Therefore, before any MDS is carried out, it 
should be determined, from the type of stimuli I which 
type of model is the more likely to hold. Only when 
this is decided should a suitable scaling be performed. 
Stress (goodness of fit) values have a valid meaning 
only within types of model - not between. 
7.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
What this thesis has done is to delineate, 
using the familiar prothetic-metathetic distinction 
between types of continua, just where the various 
models of similarity should hold true. This delineation 
has been given a prima facie validation in unidimensional 
psychophysics and the psychophysics of similarity. 
Normalised types of distance functions, which 
are not necessarily metrics, probably of the form of 
our D 18 or D 28 functions, hold in the purely prothetic 
cases. Thus the "Content" type of model, the main 
examples of which are given in Table 2.1, and which are 
of the normalised type, should be applied only to the 
prothetic case. 
Distance models hold in the purely metathetic 
"equal-measure" cases. This means that the Minkowski 
models should be used for modelling similarities between 
only purely qualitative (equal-measure metathetic) 
stimuli. 
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In addition to this delineation, we have shown 
that great care must be taken in applying the various 
models in ~ms algorithms. That is, not only are the 
two types of model quite separate psychologically, but 
they are also quite different mathematically. So 
mixing models will give quite invalid results both 
psychologically and mathematically. 
The mathematical difference between the two types 
of model is perhaps stmmted up in the fact that they are 
not monotonically related to each other. At its 
simplest, we have shown that there are psychologically 
very reasonable distance functions for which scaling 
with even non-metric MOS using Minkowski distances gives 
quite in~id results. ~hat is, the flexibility given 
to MOS by allowing any monotonic transformation of 
similarity data (i.e., non-metric MOS) does not allow 
one to ignore the dissimilarity model which is the basis 
of the algorithm. 
The main aims of this thesis, as set out in Chapter 
1 and at the beginning of this chapter have therefore 
been achieved. A possible rational basis has been laid 
for the further development of similarity modelling and 
MOS. 
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7.7 SUGGES~IONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The framework erected in this thesis is no more 
than that: it needs testing to see if it will bear the 
weight of empirical evidence. And if it is found to 
be strong enough, it needs to be filled in and its 
weak points strengthened. It then has to be used in 
new applications. 
The testing of the model will initially have to 
be mainly on a basis of comparing the normalised 
versus the distance model types, to see which (if 
either) fits better in a given context. This can be 
done either directly through similarity estimates and 
model fitting, or indirectly, by testing for some of 
the distinctive "gross features" of the types of models. 
The "gross features" given in Chapter 1 would be obvious 
ones to test for initiallY1 topological tests like 
that of Zagorski (1974) would also be worth developing. 
A most important point here will be to find exactly 
what "prothetic" and "equal-measure metathetic" mean 
in reality. To do this it will be necessary to 
(a) find some way of measuring "protheticness" (for example, 
in terms of discrimination variability - see Eisler, 
1963) and 'Cb) to specify some of the dissimilarity models 
that correspond to cases of continua of varying 
protheticness. It will also be necessary to develop 
the multidimensional models on dimensions of mixed 
types. 
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The more detailed testing of the models would 
include determining which (if either) of the two 
similarity gradients Fl and F2 are correct: again, 
they may be valid in different contexts, as evidence 
in Chapter 6 suggests. The development of a (perhaps 
non-metric) MOS algorithm for the normalised models 
may be useful both for applications of the models and 
for detailed testing of the D le and D 213 distance 
functions. 
If this testing shows that the models are useful 
then the process of filling in holes and overcoming 
weaknesses would be worthwhile. The models could be 
investiqated in non-dimensional (see Cunningham and 
Shepard, 1973; Boorman and Arabie, 1972; or Johnson, 
1967) and discrete spaces: new (non-metathetic) 
set-theoretic arrays could be investigated. It may 
also be useful to attempt an axiomatisation of the 
normalised distance functions parallel to that of 
Beals, Krantz and Tversky. The significance of the 
a parameter could be investigated as has been done for 
the Minkowski case (e.g. Hyman and Well, 1967, 1968). 
The models have many weaknesses. Goldmeier (1972, 
pp. 125-126) raises the problem of discontinuities 
in the similarity space~ many context effects (see, 
for example, Goldmeier, op.cit., Fenker, 1972,and 
Torgerson, 1965) have not been accounted for. 
Consideration of the choice of "relevant dimensions" 
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and effect of "core", which we have ignored, may 
throw light on this. Individual differences between 
subjects need closer study in terms of these models -
although the implicit or explicit (equation 3.29) dimen-
sional weighting of our models may at least partially 
account for these. Closely related to this is the 
problem, brought up in Chapter 6, of choice by subjects 
of which dimensions to use. 
Finally, it is worth investigating the similarity 
view of category scaling to see \vhether a more precise 
model (taking known context effects into account) is 
possible. The relationship between discrimination and 
similarity, as suggested in the similarity investigation 
of Eknlan's Law, and supported in our analysis of the 
third experiment from Ekman (l965) also needs further 
study. 
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REFERENCES 
ADAMS, E. W., AND F~.GOT, R. F. On the theory of biased 
bisection operations and their inverses. 
J. Math. Psychol., 1975, 12, 35-52. 
ARABlE, P. Concerning Monte Car1o~a1uations of 
nonmetric multidimensional scaling algorithms. 
psychometrika, 1973, 38, 607-608. 
ARABlE, P., AND BOORMAN, S. A. l'.rul tidimens iona1 scaling 
of measures of distances between partitions. 
J. Math. Psychol., 1973, 10, 148-203. 
ARABlE, P., AND SHEPARD, R. N. Representation of 
similarities as additive combinations of discrete 
overlapping properties. Presented to the sixth 
Annual Math. Psycho1. Meeting, Montreal, 1973. 
A~1STRONG, J.S. Derivation of a theory by means of a 
factor analysis, or Tom Swift and his Electric 
Factor Analysis Machine. Amer. Statistician, 
1967, December, 17-21. 
A~KlNSON, R.C., BOWERS, G.B., AND CROTBERS, E.J. 
An introduction to mathematical learning theory. 
New York: Wi1ey, 1965. 
ATTNEAVE, F. Dimensions of similarity. Amer. J. Psycho1., 
1950, 63, 516-556. 
286. 
BKCKSTR5'1 1 L., AND GOODE, G. An empirical examination 
of a quantitative model for similarity experience. 
~ep. Dept. Psvchol., Univ. Uppsa1~, 1966, No. 40. 
BEALS, R., AND KRANTZ, D.8. Metrics and geodesics 
induced by order relations. Mathematische Zeitschrift, 
1967, 101, 285-298. 
BEALS, R., KRANTZ, D.H., AND TVERSKY, A. Foundations of 
multidimensional scaling. Psychol. Rev., 
1968, l~, 127-142. 
BECHTEL, G.G. Comparative scaling of unidtmensiona1 
discrimination and similarity data. Psychometrika, 
1966, 31, 75-84. 
BECKENBACH, E., AND BELLMAN, R. An introduction to 
inequalities. New York: Random House, 1961. 
BECKENBACH, E., AND BELLMAN, R. Inequalities. Berlin, 
Heide1berg: Springer-Verlag, 1971. 
BECKER, J., MiD PIPAHL, l'T. The additive difference model 
and a metric and an ordering on sets. Psychometrika, 
1974, 39, 361-362. 
BINDRA, D., DONDERI, D.C., AND NISHISATO, S. Decision 
1atencies of 'same' and 'different' judgments. 
Perception and Psychophysic~, 1968, !, 121-130. 
BLANK, A.A. The Luneburg theory of binocular visual 
space. J. Opt. Soc. Amer., 1953, 43, 717-727. 
287. 
BLANK, A.A. Axiomatics of binocular vision. The 
foundations of metric geometry in relation to space 
perception. J. Opt. Soc. Ame~., 1958, 48, 328-334. 
BLOCK, J. Amendation to Cohen's cautions regarding the 
measurement of profile similarity. Psychol. Bull., 
1970, 73, 307-308. 
BOORMAN, S.A., AND ARABIE, P. Structural measures and 
the method of sorting. In Shepard, R.N., Romney, 
A.K., and Nerlove, S.B. (Eds.) MUltidimensional 
scaling: Theory and applications in the behavioural 
sciences. New York: Seminar Press, 1972, Vol. I. 
BORING, E.G. Gustav Theodor Fechner. In Newman, J.R. 
(Ed.) The world of mathematics. London: AlIen and 
Unwin, 1960, Vol. II. 
BRAY, J.R., AND CURTIS, J.T. An ordination of the upland 
forest communities of Southern Wisconsin. 
~col. Monogz:., 1957, ~2, 325-349. 
BUSEMANN, H. The Geometry of Geodesics. New York: 
Academic Press, 1955. 
BUSH, R.R., AND HOSTELLER, F. A model for stimulus 
generalisation and discrimination. Psychol. Rev., 
1951, 5~r 413-423. 
CANTER, R.R., AND HIRSCS, J. An experimental comparison 
of several psychological scales of weight. 
ABler. J. Psychol., 1955, 68, 645--649. 
288. 
CARGO, D. A multidimensional scaling of similarity 
estimations. Unpublished project report, Psychology 
Department, University of Canterbury, 1973. 
CARROLL, J.D. Individual differences and multidimensional 
scaling. In Shepard, R.N., Romney, A.K., and 
Nerlove, S.B. (Eds.) Multidimensional scaling: 
Theory and applications in the behavioural sciences. 
New York: Seminar Press, 1972, Vol. 1. 
COHEN, J. re: a profile similarity coefficient invariant 
over variable reflection. Psycho1. Bull., 1969, 71, 
281-284. 
COOMBS, C.R. A theory of data. Ne~' York: Wiley, 1964. 
COOPER, L.G. A multivariate investigation of preferences. 
Multivariate Behav. Res., 1973, !, 253-272. 
CUNNINGHAM, J .P., AND SHEPARD, R.N. Monotone mapping of 
similarities into a general metric space. Presented 
to the sixth Annual Math. Psychol. Meeting, Montreal, 
1973. 
DERKS, P.L. Visual recognition of similarity and identity. 
J. Exp. Psycho1., 1972, 9~, 237-239. 
EGGLESTON, H.G. Convexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1958. (Cambridge Tract in Mathematics and 
Mathemaica1 Physics, No. 47). 
289. 
EISLER, H. Similarity in the continuum of heaviness with 
some methodological and theoretical considerations. 
Scand. J. Psychol., 1960, !" 69-81. 
EISLER, H. On the problem of category scales in 
psychophysics. Scand. J. Psychol., 1962, 3, 81-87. 
EISLER, H. How prothetic is the continuum of smell? 
Scand J. Psycho1., 1963' ..... !L 29-32. 
EISLER, H. A choice model for paired comparison data 
based on imperfectly nested sets. Psychometrika, 
1964, 29, 363-370. 
EISLER, H. Multidimensional similarity: An experimental 
comparison between vector, distance, and set 
theoretic models. Unpubl. ms., 1967. 
EISLER, H., AND EKMAN, G. A mechanism of subjective 
similarity. Acta Psychol99ica, 1959, 16, 1-10. 
EKEHAMMAR, B. A comparative study of some multidimensional 
vector models for subjective similarity. Scand. J. 
Psychol., 1972, ~~, 190-197 (a). 
EKEHAMMAR, B. Multidimensional scaling according to diff-
erent vector models for subjective similarity. 
Acta Psychologica, 1972, 36, 79-84 (b). 
EKMAN, G. Some aspects of psychophysical research. In 
Rosenblith, W.A. (Ed.) ~ensory communication. 
New York: Wi1ey, 1961. 
290. 
EKMAN, G. A direct method for multidimensional ratio 
scaling. Ps;ychometrika, 1963, 28, 33-41. 
EKMAN, G. Two methods for the analysis of perceptual 
dimensiona1ity. percept. Mot. Skills, 1965, 20, 
557-572. 
" EKMAN, G., ENGEN, T., KUNNAPAS, T., AND LINDl'AAN, R. 
A quantitative principle of qualitative similarity. 
Rep. Ps;ychol. Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 1963, No. 152, 
" EKMAN, G., ENGEN, T., KUNNAPAS, T., AND LINDMAN, R. 
A quantitative principle of qualitative similarity. 
J. Exp. Psychol., 1964, fi8, 530-536. 
EI<MAN, G., GOUDE, G., AND WAERN, Y. Subjective similarity 
in t\'iO perceptual continua. J. Exp. Psycho1., 1961, 
61, 222-227. 
EKMAN, G., AND LINDMAN, R. Multidimensional ratio 
scaling and multidimensional similarity. Rep. Psychol • 
.Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 1961, No. 103. 
It 
EDIAN, G., .A..~D SJOBERG, L. Scaling. }1..nnu. Rev. Psycho1., 
1965, !~, 451-474. 
FENKER, R.M. Tensor analysis and multidimensional 
scaling: The influence of class structure on 
similarity judgments. u.s. Army Technical Memorandum, 
Human Engineering Lab., Aberdeen Res. and Development 
Centre, Maryland, 1972, No. 13-72. 
291. 
FENKER, R.r",-., AND BRo\\TN, D.R. Pattern perception, 
conceptual spaces, and dimensional limitations on 
information processing. Mu1tivariate Behav. Res., 
1969, 1, 257-271. 
FIELD, J. Feedback modification of human similarity 
judgments. Pr~ct Report, M.A., Dept. Psychol., 
Univ. Canterbury, 1974. 
FILLENBAUM, S. Problems in the use of similarity data 
for the study of semantic structures. Rep. L.L. 
Thurstone Psychometric Lab., Univ. N. Carolina, 
1973, No. 114. 
FISCHER, W., AND MICKO, H.C. More about metrics of subject-
ive spaces and attention distributions. J. Math. 
Psychol., 1972, !, 36-54. 
, " FRANZEN, 0., NORDMARK, J., AND SJOBERG, L. A study of 
" pitch. Goteburg Psycho1. ReE., 1972, ~, No. 12. 
FREEDLE, R. A stimUlUS similarity scale for temporal 
measures of attention in infants and children. 
Developmental Psycho1., 1971, !, 240-247. 
GALANTER, E.B. An axiomatic and experimental study of 
sensory order and measure. PsychdL Rev., 1956, 63, 
16-28. 
GIBSON, E.J. Learning to read. Science, 1965, 148., 
1066-1072. 
292. 
GLESER, G.e. Quantifying similarity between people. 
In !~atzr M.H., Co1e, J.O., and Barton, W.E. (Eds.) 
Role and I!\ethodo1ogy of classification in psychiatry 
and psychopathology. U.8. National Institute of 
Henta1 Health, 1968. 
GOLDMEIER, E. Similarity in visually perceived forms. 
Psychological Issues, 1972, !, No. 1, monograph 29. 
(The fist six chapters of this originally appeared 
" If 
as: Goldmeier, E. Uber Ahn1ichkeit bei gesehenen 
Figuren. Psycho1. Forsch., 1936, 21, l46-208). 
GOODALL, D.r,,!. A new similarity index based on probability. 
Biometrics, 1966, 22, 882-907. 
GOUDE, G. A quantitative model for similarity experience. 
Rep. Psycho1. Lab., Univ. Uppsala, 1966, No. 39. 
GOliER, J.C. Some distance properties of latent root and 
vector methods used in multi~Tariate analysis. 
Diometrika, 1966, 53, 325 0 -338. 
GOWER, J.C. A general coefficient of similarity and some 
of its properties. Unpub1. ms., Rothamsted Exp. 
Station, England, 1967. 
GRAHAM, C.H. (Ed.) Vision and visual perception. New York: 
\,Jiley, 1965. 
GREEN, F.E., AND CARMONE, F.J. The effect of task on 
intra-individual differences in similarities 
judgments. Multivariate Behav. Res., 1971, ~, 433-450. 
GREGORY, R.L. Eye and brain - the psychology of seeing. 
London: World University Library, 1966. 
293. 
GREGSON, R.A.M. Theoretical and empirical multidimensional 
scalings of taste mixturematchings. Brit. J. Math. 
Statist. Psychol., 1966, 19, 59-75. 
GREGSON, R.A.M. Simulating perceived similarities between 
taste mixtures having mutually interacting components. 
Brit. J. Math. Statist. Psychol., 1968, 21, 117-130. 
GREGSON, R.A.M. Quadratic similarities. Brit. J. Math. 
Statist. Psychol., 1970, 23, 53-68. 
GREGSON, R.A.M. Quadratic similarities and a collapse-
points condition. J. Math. Psychol., 1972, 9, 368-388. 
GREGSON, R.A.M. Similarity judgments modified by feedback. 
Acta Psychologica, 1974, 38, l17~9. 
GREGSON, R.A.M. Psychometrics of similarity. New York: 
Academic Press, 1975. 
GUILFORD, J.P. Psychometric methods. 2nd. ed. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1954. 
GUILFORD, J.P. AND DINGMAN, H.F. A modification of the 
method of equal-appearing intervals. ber. J. Psychol., 
1955, 68, 450-454. 
GUTTMAN, L. A general nonmetric technique for finding the 
smallest coordinate space for a configuration of 
points. Psychometrika, 1968, 33, 469-506. 
HALMOS, P.R. Measure theory. New York: D. Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1950. 
294. 
HELM, C.B., MESSICK, S., AND TUCKER, L.R. Psychological 
models for relating discrimination and magnitude 
estimation scales. Psychol. Rev., 1961,~ 167-177. 
HELSON, H. Adaptation-level as a basis for a quantitative 
theory of frames of reference. Psychol. Rev., 1948, 
.?5, 297-313. 
Q • HOIJER, B. Mechan1sms of cognitive judgments. 
Rep. Dept. Psychol., Univ. uEPsa1a, 1969, No. 67 (a). 
n 
HOIJER, B. On testing metric and nonmetric models of 
n 
multidimensional similarity. R~p. Dept. Psycho1., 
Univ. Uppsala, 1969, No. 68 (b). 
HOIJER, B. On the consistency of similarity judgments. 
~~. Dept. Psychol~_ Univ. Uppsala, 1970, No. 77 (a). 
HOIJER, B. Isosimilarity contours of twodimensional 
cognitive judgments. Rep. Dept. Psychol., Univ. 
Uppsala, 1970, No. 79 (b). 
HYMAN, R., AND WELL, A. Judgments of similarity and 
spatial models. Perception and Psychophysic!, 1967, 
2, 233-248. 
HYl~~, R., ~TI WELL, A. Perceptual separability and 
spatial models. perception and Psychophysics, 1968, 
3, 161-165. 
INDOW, T. Colour atlases and colour ~caling. In 
Association Internationale de la Couleur, Color 
~}_: __ ~~oceedings .9£ __ the 2nd Congress. London: 
Adam Hilger, 1974, p. 137-152 (a). 
295. 
INDOW, T. Scaling of saturation and hue shift: Summary 
of results and implications. In Moskowitz, B.R., 
et.al (Ed.) Sensation and Measurement. Dordrecht: 
Reidel, 1974 (b). 
JACCARD, P. The distribution of the flora in the 
Alpine zone. New Phytologist, 1912, 11, 37-50. 
JOHNSON, S.C. Hierarchical clustering schemes. 
Psychometrika, 1967, 32, 241-254. 
JUDO, D.B. Basic correlates of the visual system. In 
Stevens, S.S. (Ed.) Bandbook of Experimental 
PsychologY. New York: Wiley,1960. 
JUNGE, K. The category scale equation. Scand. J. Psychol., 
1960, 1, 112-114. 
KELLEY, J .L. General topology. New York: Van Nostrand, 
1969. 
KooPMAN I R. F., AND COOPER, M. Some problems with 
Minkowski distance models in multidimensional scaling. 
Presented to the Amer. Psychometric Soc., Stanford, 
March, 1974. 
KRANTZ, D.B. Rational distance functions for multidimen-
sional scaling. J. Math. Psychol., 1967, 4, 226-245. 
KRANTZ, D.B., AND TVERSKY, A. Similarity of rectangles: 
An analysis of subjective dimensions. J. Math. 
Psycho1., 1975, 12, 4-34. 
296. 
KRUSKAL, J.B. Multidimensional scaling by opttmizing 
goodness of fit to a nonmetric hypothesis. 
Psychometrika, 1964, 29, 1-28 (a). 
KRUSKAL, J.B. Nonmetric multidimensional scaling: a 
numerical method. Psychometrika, 1964, 29, 115-130 (b). 
n q 
KUNNAPAS, T., AND KUNNAPAS, U. On the mechanism of 
subjective Similarity for unidimensional continua. 
Rep. Psychol. Lab., Univ. Stockho1m, 1971, No. 342. 
KfiNNAPAS, T., AND ~AS, U. On the ~elation between 
similarity and ratio estimates. Rep. Psychol.,Lab., 
Univ. Stockholm, 1973, No. 382. 
n n 
KUNNAPAS, T., AND KUNNAPAS, U. On the mechanism of 
subjective similarity for unidimensional continua. 
Amer. J. Psychol., 1974, 87, 215-222. 
LANCE, G.N., AND WILLIAMS, W.T. Computer programs for 
hierarchical polythetic classification ("similarity 
analyses"). Computer J., 1966, ~, 60-64. 
LANCE, G.N., AND WILLIAMS, W.T. Mixed-data classificatory 
programs. I. Agglomerative systems. Austral. 
Computer J., 1967, !, 15-20. 
LANDAHL, H.D. Neural mechanisms for the concepts of 
difference and similarity. Bull. Math. Biophysics, 
1945, 7, 83-88. 
LEVY, R.M., AND KAUFMAN, H.M. Sets and subsets in the 
identification of multidimensional stimuli. 
Psychol. Rev., 1973, 80, 139-148. 
297. 
LOCKHEAD, G.R. Identification and the form of 
multidimensional discrimination space. J. Exp. 
Psychol., 1970, ~, 1-10. 
LOCE, R.D. On the possible psychophysical laws. 
Psychol. Rev., 1959, 66, 81-95 (a). 
LOCE, R.D. Individual choice behaviour. New York: Wiley, 
1959 (b). 
LUCE, R.D. A choice theory analysis of similarity 
judgments. Psychametrika, 1961, 26, 151-163. 
LUCE, R.D. Detection and recognition. In Luce, R.D., 
Bush, R.R., and Qianter, E.H. (Eds.) Handbook of 
Mathematical Psychology. New York: Wiley, 1963, Vol. I. 
LOCE, R.D., BUSH, R.R., AND GALANTER, E.B. (Eds.) 
Handbook of Mathematical PsychologY. New York: 
Wiley, 1963, Vol. I. 
LOCE, R.D., AND GALANTER, E.B. Discrimination. In 
Luee, R.D. et.al. (Eds.) Handbook of Mathematical 
Psychology. New York: Wiley, 1963, Vol. I (a). 
LOCE, R.D., AND GALANTER, E.H. Psychophysical scaling. 
In Luce, R.D. et. al. CEds.) Handbook of Mathematical 
Psychology. New York: Wiley, 1963, Vol. I (b). 
LUCE, R.O., AND GREEN, D.M. A neural timing theory for 
response times and the psychophysics of intensity. 
Psychol. Rev., 1972, 79, 14-57. 
298. 
LUND, T. Multidimensional scaling of political parties -
a methodological study. Scand. J. Psychol., 1974, 
15, 108-118. 
LUND, T. An alternative content method for multidimensional 
scaling. Multivariate Behav. Res., 1975, 10, 181-191. 
LONEBERG, R.K. The metric of binocular visual space. 
J. Opt. Soc. Amer., 1950, 40, 627-642. 
MACH, E. The analysis of sensations. London: Open Court, 
1914. 
MARKS, L.E. Sensory processes - the new psychophysics. 
New York: Academic Press, 1974. 
MICHELS, W.C., AND HELSON, H. A reformulation of the 
Fechner Law in terms of Adaptation-Level applied to 
rating-scale data. Amer. J. Psychol., 1949, 62, 
355-368. 
MICKO, H.C. A "halon-model for multidimensional ratio 
scaling. Psychometrika, 1970, 35, 199-227. 
MICKO, H.C., AND FISCHER, W. The metric of multidimensional 
psychological spaces as a function of the differ-
ential attention to subjective attributes. 
J. Math. Psychol., 1970, 7, 118-143. 
MITCHELL, M.J. Investigations of olfactory s1milarity 
scaling. Thesis, Ph.D., Univ. Of Canterbury, 1971. 
299. 
NASH, M.C. An experimental test of the Miche1s-He1son 
theory of judgment. Amer. J. Psycho1., 1950, 63, 
214-220. 
PARDUCCI, A. Category judgment: A range-frequency model. 
Psycho1. Rev., 1965, 72, 407-418. 
n 
PFANZAGL, J. Theory of measurement. Wnrzburg/Vienna: 
Physica-Ver1ag, 1968. 
POSTMAN, L., AND MILLER, G.A. Anchoring of temporal 
judgments. Amer. J. Psycho1., 1945, 58, 43-53. 
REED, S.R. Pattern recognition and categorization. 
Cognitive Psycho1., 1972, 3, 382-407. 
RESTLE, P. A metric and an ordering on sets. Psychometrika, 
, 1959, 24, 207-219. 
- , 
RESTLE, F. Psychology of judgment and choice: A theoretical 
essay. New York: Wi1ey, 1961. 
RICHARDSON, M.W. Multidimensional psychophysics. Psycho1. 
Bull., 1938, 35, 659-660. 
ROSENBERG, W.J. On the validity of Minkowski metrics: A 
critical note on Roskam's scaling of Eis1er's 
similarities data. Ned. T. Psycho1., 1974, 29, 229-233. 
ROSKAM, E.E. Metric analysis of ordinal data in psychology. 
Voorschoten, the Netherlands, 1968. 
300. 
ROSKAM, E.E. Data Theory and metrical analysis, Part I. 
Ned. T. Psychol., 1970, 25, 15-54 (a). 
ROSKAM, E.E. Data Theory and algorithms for nonmetric 
scaling, Part II. Ned. T. Psychol., 1970, 25, 
66-82 (b). 
ROSKAM, E.E. Multid~ensiona1 scaling by metric 
transformation of data. Ned. T. Psychol., 1972, 27, 
486-508. 
RUMELHART, D.L., AND GREENO, J .G. Similarity between 
stimuli: An experimental test of the Luce and 
Restle choice models. J. Math. Psychol., 1971, 8, 
370-381. 
SBEPARD, R.N. Stimulus and response generalisation: A 
stochastic model relating generalisation to distance 
in psychological space. Psychometrika, 1957, 22, 
325-345. 
SHEPARD, R.N. Stimulus and response generalisation: Tests 
of a model relating generalisation to distance in 
psychological space. J. Exp. Psychol., 1958, 55, 
509-523 (a). 
SHEPARD, R.N. Stimulus and response generalisation: 
Deduction of the generalisation gradient from a 
trace model. Psychol. Rev., 1958, 65, 242-256 (b). 
301. 
SHEPARD, R.N. Similarity of stimuli and metric properties 
of behavioural data. In Gulliksen, H., and 
Messick, S. (Eds.) ?sychologicalscaling: Theory 
and applications. New York: Wiley, 1960. 
SHEPARD, R.N. The analysis of proximi ties: multidimensional 
scaling with an unknown distance function, Part I. 
Psychometrika, 1962, 27,125-140 (a). 
SHEPARD, R.N. The analysis of proximities. Multidimensional 
scaling with an unknown distance function, Part 11. 
Psychometrika, 1962, 27, 219--246. (b) 
SHEPARD, R. N. Attention and the metric struct.ure of the 
stimulus space. ~. Math. Psychol., 1964, 1, 54-87. 
SHEPARD, R.N., ROMNEY, A.K., AND NERLOVE, S.B. 
Multidimensi:nal scaling: Theory and applications 
in the behavioural sciences. Vol I - Theory. 
Vol. I1 - Applications. New York: Seminar Press, 1972. 
SJ~BERG, L. Models of similarity and intensity. 
G8teburg Psychol. Rep., 1973, 3, No. 10. 
SPENCE, I., AND GRAEF, J. The determination of the under-
lying dimensionalit.y of an empirically obtained 
matrix of proximities. Multivariate Behav. Res., 
1974, 9, 331-341. 
STEINHEISER, F.B. Individual preference scales within a 
multidimensional Asimilarit.ies" space. J. Exp. 
Psycho1., 1970, 86, 325-327. 
302. 
STEVENS, S.S. On the psychophysical law. Psychol. Rev., 
1957, 64, 153-181. 
STEVENS, S.S. Adaptation-level vs the relativity of 
judgment. ~r. J. Psychol., 1958, 71, 633-647. 
STEVENS, S.S. Mathematics, measurement and psychophysics. 
In Stevens, S.S. (Ed.) Handbook of Experimental 
Psychology, New York: Wiley, 1960 (a). 
STEVENS, 5.5. Ratio scales, partition scales and confusion 
scales. In Gulliksen, H., and Messick, S. CEds.) 
Psychological scaling: TheofY and applications. 
New York: Wiley, 1960 (b). 
STEVENS, 5.5. A metric for the social consensus. 
Science, 1966, 151, 530-541. 
STEVENS, S.S., AND GALANTER, E.H. Ratio scales and 
category scales for a dozen perceptual continua. 
J. Exp. Psychol., 1957, 54, 377-411. 
TERNUS, J. The problem of phenomenal identity. In Ellis, 
W.D. (Ed.) A sourcebook of Gestalt psycholoqy. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938. 
THURSTONE, L.L. Multiple-factor analysis: A development 
and expansion of "The Vectors of the Mind". Chicago: 
Univ. Chicago, 1947. 
TORGERSON, W.S. Theory and methods of scaling. New York: 
Wiley, 1958. 
303. 
TORGERSON, W.S. Quantitative judgment scales. In 
Gulliksen, H., and Messick, S. (Eds.) Psychological 
scaling: Theory and applications. New York: Wiley, 1960. 
TORGERSON, W.S. Multidimensional scaling of similarity. 
Psychometrika, 1965, 30, 379-393. 
TVERSKY, A. Elimination by aspects: A theory of choice. 
Psychol. Rev., 1972, 79, 281-299. 
TVERSKY, A., Al\1J) KRANTZ, D.H. Similarity of schematic 
faces: A test of interd±mensiona1 additivity. 
Perception and Psxchophysic~, 1969, 5, 124-128. 
TVERSKY, A., AND KRANTZ, D.H. The dimensional representation 
and the metric structure of similarity data. J. 
Math. Psychol., 1970, 7, 572-596. 
VEGELIUS, J. Correlation coefficients as scalar products 
in Euc1idean spaces. Rep. Dept. Psychol., Univ. 
Uppsala, 1973, No. 145. 
WAERN, Y. A model i>r multidimensional similarity. 
Rep. Psychol. Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 1968, No.256 (a). 
WAERN, Y. Multidimensional scaling with a priori 
dimensions. Rep. Psycbol. Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 1968, 
No. 270 (b). 
WAERN, Y. Multidimensional similarity: an analysis of 
'analyzability'. Rep. Psychol. Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 
1969, No. 280. 
304. 
WAERN, Y. Preference and perception: A study on 
individual subjects of the unfolding model. Rep-. 
Psycho1. Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 1970, No. 309 (a). 
WAERN, Y. A comparison of some models for multidimensional 
similarity. Rep. Psychol. Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 1970, 
No. 312 (b). 
WAERN, Y. A model for multidimensional similarity. 
Percept. Mot. Skills, 1971,~3, 15-25. (a). 
WAERN, Y. Structure in similarity matrices - a 
graphic approach. Scand. J._ Psychol., 1971, 12, 5-l6(b}. 
WAERN, Y. Similarity estimates and cognitive strudnre. 
Studies in some models and methods. Rep. Psycho1. 
Lab., Univ. Stockholm, 1971, supplement 9. (c) 
WAGENAAR, W.A. Stevens vs Fechner: A plea for dismissal 
of the case. Acta Psychol09ica, 1975, 39, 225-235. 
WALLACH, M.A. On psychological similarity. Psychol. Rev., 
1958, 65, 103-116. 
WENDER, K. Interpretation of Minkowski metrics in ordinal 
multidimensional scaling. Presented to the 2nd 
Annual Meeting of the Gruppe Math. Psychol., 
Marburg/Lahn, 1968. 
lmNDER, K. A test of independence of dimensions in 
multidimensional scaling. Perception' and Psychophysics, 
1971, 10, 30-32. 
305. 
WERTHEIMER, M. Laws of organisation in perceptual forms. 
In E1lis, W. D. (Ed..) A sourcebook of Gesta.l t 
Psychology. New York~ Ba~court Brace, 1938. 
YOUNG, F.W. Nonmetric mu1tid.imensional scaling: 
Development of an index of metric determinacy. 
Rep. L.L. Thurstone Psychometric Lab., Univ. N. 
Carolina, 1968, No. 68. 
YOUNG, F.W. A model for polynomial conjoint analysis 
algorithms. In Shepard, R.N., Romney, A.K., and 
Nerlove, S.B. (Eds.) Multidimensional scaling: Theory 
and applications in the behavioural sciences. 
New York: Seminar Press, 1972 1 Vol. I. 
YOUNG, F.W. Conjoint Scaling. Rep. L.L. Thurstone Psycho-
metric Lab., Univ. N. Carolina, 1973, No. 118. 
YOUNG, G., AND HOUSEHOLDER, A.S. Discussion of a set of 
points in terms of their mutual distances. 
Psychometrika, 1938, ~, 19-22. 
ZAGORSKI, M.A. A topological test of metric models of 
stimulus similarity. Presented to seventh Annual 
Math. Psycho1. Meeting, Ann Arbor, 1974. 
306. 
APPENDIX A 
PROOFS USED IN CHAP'l'ER 4. 
1. D la obeys the trianq1e inequality strictly on 
straiqht lines, for a > 1 (see section 4.1.1.1): 
We shall use the notation 
IIxll = 
so that D 1S (x,y) - H x-yJl 
f1. x ll +11 yll 
t1x ,yelR n. 
Let y be between x and z on a straiqht 1ine7 
+ then there exists an aelR , 0 < Cl ~ 1, such that 
\f ie{1,2, •••. ,n} 
(i.e. y = ox + (l-a)z). 
Thus we have that 
D 1a(x,y) + D 1a(y,z) 
(l-a) fI x-z 11 + 
Ifax+ (l-a) Z 11 + ff z 11 
a IIx-z 11 
= 11 ox+ (l-a) z 11 + (I x 11 
= 11 x-z 11 11 ax+(l-o)zll +011 xII +(1-0) If zll • 
'(fJ ax+(l-a)zJl +11 zlD (11 ax+(l-a),zU +U zl& 
Now, by the Minkowski Inequality (since we have assumed 
that a~ 1), 
11 ax+ (l-a) z 11 ~ all xII + (I-a) n z" 
so 11 ax+ (l-a) z 11 ~ max{ 11 x If , H z 11 }. 
(a) Suppose that 
IJ ax+ ( 1-0) z If .::. min { 11 x rr , 11 z" } 
From (A.1) we have 
D 18 (x,y) + ]) 18 (l', z) ~ 
211!-z It fI ax+ (I-G) z 11 
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(A.1) 
(A.2) 
(A. 3) • 
z 
11 ax+(l-G)zll (11 xII +Jf zln+fI ax+(l-G)zrl +11 xII 11 zlr 
But 
2 11 ax+ (I-a) z 11 + 11 xliII z 11 
= (11 ax+ (I-a) z 11 - [J xII) (t1 ax+ (l-G) z 11 -11 z 11> 
+ 11 ax+ (I-a) z 11 (f1 x II + fl z 11 ) 
< "ax+(l-a)zll (/I xJl +11 zll ) 
since, by (A.3) and (A.2) 
(11 ax+ (l-a) z 11 -11 xii ) (11 ax+ (l-a) z 11 -11 z In < o. 
Therefore 
11 11 2 ~ ax+ (l-ft) z If - I, x - z 11 x-z 211 ax+( -a}zll (If x +11 zn) - 11 xii +11 zll 
:::: D1S(x,z) 
(b) Suppose that 
" ax+ (I-a) z JI ~ min{ 11 xII, 11 z 11 } (A.") • 
But we have, in either case, that 
allxll+(l-a)llzll.:. min{1I xII ,11 zll} 
which implies that 
> 
= 
DlB(x,y)+DlB(y,z} > 
11 (lX+ (I-a) z +max{ " x 11 ,11 z 11 } 
!Ix - z 11 
mIn (11 x 11 , 11 z ID +max{ 11 x " , 11 z fI } 
by (A.4) 
" x-z 11 = D la (x, z) • 
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But (A.3) and (A.4) are exhaustive of all the relevant 
possible cases, so the proof of the triangle inequality 
is complete. 
To have equality in case (a), we must have 
equality both in (A.l) and in either (A.2) or (A.3). 
Equality in (A.l) occurs only if 
i = 1,2, ••• ,n. (A.5) 
which implies that 11 xII = ~II zlt. But equality will 
then occur in (A.2) or (A.3) only if 
IIxff = I1zll (A. 6) : 
i.e., if ~ = 1 - which means that x = z, a contradiction. 
Hence there must be strict inequality in case (a). 
309. 
In case (b), equality will occur only if (A.4) 
has equality and 
Cl fI xII + (1-a) n z 11 = min (11 x If , 11 z 11 ). 
But the two equations give 
11 ax+(l-a)zll = min(ft xII ,11 zf/ ) = all xII + (1-a) 11 zll 
so again we must have (A.5) and (A.6): a contradiction. 
Thus there is strict inequality in all cases. 
2. If x,y,a(i)EE n , where iE{1,2, ••• ,n} and a(l)i = O. 
then 
Dll(xi+a(i)'Yi+a(i» < Dll(x,y) (A.5) 
if 
t I a (i). 1 > min{ t 1 x·l, t 1 Yj I } j~i J j~i J j~i (A.6) 
(see equations (4.4) and (4.7) in section 4.1.1.1): 
Let A = t ta(i) .1. Then (A.5) is equivalent to 
j,.i J 
< 
or, rearranging, 
n 
I 'x .-Y.l ~=l J J 
n n 
t Ix·l+ t IYi' j=l J j=l 
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(A.7) 
Calling the right hand side of this inequality 
R, we have 
R - ~ 
R < 
IXi-Yi! 
n 
I Ixj-Yjl j=l 
< ~ r </xjl+!y.I-lx.-Yjl) 
- j~i J J 
< ~ r ( Ix. I + I y. 1-11 XJ-lYjl I ) 
- j"i J J J 
-
< 
I min{lxjl,lyjl} j,&i 
mint I IXjl, I IYj!} j"i j"i 
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Hence, if A ~ min( ~ Ixjl, t IYjl), then 
j"i j"i 
A > R, which is (A.7) Thus, by the definitions of 
A and R, (A.6) implies (A.5), G.E.D. 
3. F 2 (D 12) is multiplicative on straight lines 
(see section 4.1.1.3): 
Recall that F2 is defined as 
1-a 
l+a o < a < 1 
Thus three numbers a,a,y are multiplicative under F2 
- say 
if and only if 
a =- S+y l+Sy 
If x,y,z lie on a straight line with y between x and 
z: i.e. 
y = ~x + (l-~)z for some ~, 0 < 6 < 1; 
we therefore need to look at 
and show 
B :01 
D 12 (x,y) + D 12 (y, z) 
1 + D 12(x,y)D 12(Y'z) 
B - D 12 (x, z) • 
But, using the notation 
11 xli = 
n 2 ~ ( ~ I Xi I ) 
i-1 
Vx£:m n, 
J12. 
we have 
11 x-ox-(l-o)zll + 
B = 11 x 11 + 11 ox+ (1-0) z 11 .,.,-J.L=-=-=-,~::"""":;~-=-++---' 
2 2 
011 xliII zll +(1-0) 11 xII 11 zll +11 ox+(l-o)zll (11 xII +11 zll )+811 xII +(1-0) 11 zll 
11 x-zll «1-0) li zll +811 xii +11 Qx+(l-o)zll) 
11 xii + zll 
D 12 (x, z) Q.E.O. 
4. With points (x,y,z) either on a straight line under 
D 12' or on a straight line through the origin under D lB' 
if Y is between x and z, then 
$(x,z) < $(x,y)$(y,z) (A.B) 
where $ = Fl (ID) (see-Table 4.1): 
Firstly, note that since $(x,z)~$(x,y),$(y,z)~l, 
trivially we have 
$(x,y) > $(x,z)$(y,z) 
and $(y,z) ~ $(x,z)$(x,y). 
Thus the inequality (A.B) is the critical one. If 
(A.B) holds then we have sho~~ that the similarity triangle 
inequality holds only trivially on straight lines under 
D12 , and on straight lines through the origin under 
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D 1 a' ""i th , = F 1 (D ) • 
To prove (A.8), we use the fact, shown in the 
previous section of this Appendix, and in section 4.2, 
that in the oases under consideration here, 
whioh is equivalent to 
D (x,y) + D (t' z) 
D (x,z) =- 1 + D (x,y)Dy,z) 
since F2 (a) = (l-a)/(l+a), 0 < a < 1. 
(A.9) 
Substituting from (A.9) we see that (A.a) is equivalent 
to 
F (D (x,y)+D (y,z) ) < F
1
(D (x,y»F
1
(D (y,z» 
1 l+D (x,y) D (y,z) 
or, putting y = D (x,y) and 0 =- D (y,z), 
But 
y+t5 
1 - l+yt5 < (l-X) (1-0) 
(l-y) (1-~) - (1_y+6 ) l+yo 
Y+O-X- cS+yc5+ycS(y6-X- cS ) 
1 + y(S 
> 0 since 0 < y,t5 < 1 
= 
y 0 (1-",() (1- 0 ) 
l+yo 
which proves (A.10) and therefore (A.8). 
Q.E.D. 
(A.I0) • 
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APPENDIX B. 
PROOF USED IN CHAPTER 5. 
If all pairs of consecutive category exemplars 
of a category scale are in equal ratio, then the 
category numbers are linear with the logarithms of 
their respective exemplars (see section 5.1.2): 
Consider a category scale of n (~2) categories, xi 
being the exemplar of the ith category, with 
(B.l), 
so a and b are the end-exemplars of the scale. We 
shall denote the category scale value corresponding 
to the stimulus with value x as R(x); thus in 
patticular 
i=l,2, ••• ,n. (B.2) 
By assumption we have 
'\f i,je{1,2, ••• ,n-I} 
We shall call any set of stimulus values {xi}n 
ial, 
(B. 3) 
with a = xl' b = xn ' an n-section of (a,b) if (B.3) 
1s true of the set. 
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We now show by induction that for any n-section 
{xi}n of any (a,b), if n > 2, then 
i-I 
X. == ~ 
i-I, ..•• ,n. (B.4) 
It is obviously true for n III 2. If n - 3 then 
by (B.3), for any (a,b), 
ID 
so it is true for n = 3. 
Suppose now that (B.4) is true for any (a,b) for 
n == k (k > 3). 
Let n == k+l. Take a (k+l)-section {x }k+l 
i i-I 
of an interval (a,b) where a-Xl' b=x
n
• Then clearly 
k {Xi} is a k-section of the interval (a,xk), 80 i-I 
by our last assumption 
i-l, ••• ,k. (B.5) 
k+l 
Similarly {Xi} is a k-section of (x2,b), i=2 
i=2, ••• ,k+l (B. 6) • 
Putting i=2 in (B.S) gives 
1 
x --
x
2 
=: a(ak)k-l 
and substituting in (B.6) with i=k,.we get 
1 1 k-2 
x -- .-- ---
x = a(~)k-l (£(~ )k-l)k-l 
k a a x k 
or, solszi..ng for x k' since k > 3, 
--
k-1 
x k = a(~)]{ a 
SUbstitutixn
g
i 
:ora;':~a~~nk~~)·5~=~ive. 
~ i=l, ••• ,k 
or 
i-I, ... , k. 
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Since xk+1 = b, this shows that (B.4) holds for 
n-k+l. 
Since (B.4) holds for n=3, it holds for all n ~ 3, 
so we have proved what we set out to with regard to (B.4). 
Now solve each equation (B.4) for i: 
log (xl/a) 
i = (n-l) log (b/a) +1 i-l, ••• ,n (B.7) 
(where the logarithm is to any base). 
But by (B.2), for each i, K(Xi ) = i, so 
log(x./a) 
K(xi)=(n-l)log(b/a) +1 i=l, ••• ,n; n > 2 
which is the required result. 
